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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
INFORMING THE DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE OF A PRO-POOR PAYMENT 
FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PROGRAM IN WESTERN PANAMA 
Human society depends on healthy ecosystems. Payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) have emerged as an incentive-based tool to protect and restore ecosystem-service 
flows, which are being degraded at regional and global scales. Through PES, users of 
ecosystem services pay landowners who supply these services through land management. 
This study focuses on PES programs as a possible means to achieve ecosystem-service 
conservation on private lands, which are playing an increasingly important role in 
conservation efforts. Specifically, his study examines the potential for PES to address 
conservation and livelihood issues in the buffer-zone of La Amistad Bi-national World 
Heritage Site in Western Panama, and provides insights for the equitable architecture of 
such a program. Although Panama does not currently have a national or regional PES 
program, there is widely recognized potential for program development. 
We conducted a survey of 344 farmers regarding their interest in a hypothetical 
PES program. While respondents reported a lack of familiarity with the PES concept, 
after being provided with an explanation, many expressed interest in participating; 
interest was greatest for the agroforestry and forest conservation scenarios. Using logistic 
regression analyses we found that farm size, participation in other conservation programs, 
the number of conservation organizations with which the farmer has worked, and total
iii 
 
income were all significant predictive factors of willingness to participate for at least one 
of three program scenarios with a positive relationship. Land tenure security and age 
were significant explanatory factors with a negative relationship for one or more 
scenario. Several of these factors are related to a household’s socioeconomic status.  
We also investigated equity and fairness concerns including how potential PES 
program design factors related to minimum enrolled area, land tenure, and land 
characteristics (e.g., slope) might affect eligibility of low-income households, an 
increasingly important target of PES programs, particularly in developing countries. 
Using eligibility requirements based off of Costa Rica’s national program, and also 
generally in-line with programs elsewhere, we found that respondents who ranked lower 
on our constructed socioeconomic scale were less likely to be eligible to enroll in a 
Panamanian PES program despite that many are willing to participate.  
PES land enrollment requirements, tenure, and land characteristics (e.g. slope) 
result in participation trade-offs. For example, higher land enrollment requirements result 
in a rapid decline in potential participants. Our research contributes to a key piece of the 
PES design puzzle by proactively exploring ways to ensure that landowners across the 
socioeconomic spectrum (particularly the poor) are able to participate. Understanding 
trade-offs is important for guiding PES program architecture to achieve rural 
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In recent years the term “ecosystem services” has proven useful in helping individuals and 
organizations to understand and value the on-going processes of the natural environment. 
Ecosystem services are “the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the 
species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life” (Daily et al., 1997, p. 3) Provisioning 
services are products obtained from ecosystems such as food, fiber, fuel, and fresh water. These 
along with cultural services or non-material benefits obtained from ecosystems, including 
recreation, scenic beauty, education, inspiration and spiritual value, are directly related to human 
well-being and are valued by human societies although they may or may not be included in 
formal markets. However, regulating services such as pollination and climate or erosion 
regulation make these more tangible goods and services possible and are also crucial for human 
well-being. The same is true of supporting services (nutrient cycling, provision of habitat, soil 
formation and retention, the production of atmospheric oxygen, etc.) (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2003, 2005; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2006). These 
regulating and supporting services are greatly undervalued by human societies and, as a result, 
they are rapidly being degraded (Kroeger & Casey, 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). 
Today society faces unprecedented challenges at the intersection of human well-being and 
natural resource management, from climate change to biodiversity loss to energy security and 
beyond. The impacts of unsustainable human use and abuse of ecosystem services are 
increasingly apparent. In total, 60 % of the world’s ecosystem services have been degraded 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). These unprecedented changes are impacting the 
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services that these ecosystems provide to human societies. Land use change is heavily impacting 
ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Loss of biodiversity is rapidly 
taking place on a global scale. These unprecedented changes are impacting ecosystems and the 
services that these ecosystems provide to human societies. In the face of such complex problems 
that cut across the socio-ecological interface, decision makers are increasingly interested in 
transforming how society values ecosystem services. 
Simultaneous to the rapid human induced degradation of the world’s ecosystems, ecosystems are 
being revealed by researchers as capital assets, with the potential to generate a stream of vital 
life-supporting services that merit careful evaluation and investment. The ecosystem services 
approach recognizes the linked components that form a broader, more holistic view of land 
management. To better understand the consequences of changes to ecosystems and to evaluate 
potential future impacts, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned, the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) to examine the relationship between ecosystem 
services and human well-being. The MA reported that intact ecosystems are essential to 
numerous aspects of human well-being and by maintaining biological diversity and ecological 
resilience we are investing in the future of our own species. The MA also concluded that 
ecosystem services are limited and diminishing, and, as a result, society is forced to evaluate 
trade-offs between immediate and long-term human needs (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005).  
In order to realize a more sustainable future, we must take a critical look at patterns of change in 
land use, possible incentives to put new land use practices in place, and how and where we can 
alter the current trajectory. Transforming these ideas into action is not an easy next step. 
Unfortunately, “the dominant national and global institutions—for policy, business, 
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conservation, agriculture, and research—have been shaped largely by mental models that assume 
and require segregated approaches” (Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008, p. 64) and change is often slow. 
Institutions and individual actors must gain the courage to move beyond historical distrust and 
compartmentalization to recognize that their goals are often ultimately the same. As emphasized 
in Daily et al. (2009), the time has come for us to “integrate ecosystem services into everyday 
decision making around the world. This requires turning the valuation of ecosystem services into 
effective policy and finance mechanisms” (p.21). One increasingly popular approach to 
integrating ecosystem services into the market is payment for ecosystem services or PES. The 
adoption of PES approaches to conservation is rapidly increasing globally. A 2002 global 
assessment found 287 PES and PES-like initiatives that were either in operation or currently 
being developed (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). A few notable examples include a national-
scale PES program in Costa Rica that has been operating for over a decade (Pagiola, 2008; 
Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005; Pfaff, Robalino, Boomhower, & Sanchez-Azofeifa, 2007; 
Sierra & Russman, 2006; Zbinden & Lee, 2005) and a more recently developed national program 
in Mexico (Alix-Garcia, De Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2004; Corbera, Soberanis, & Brown, 2009; 
Pagiola et al., 2005), and the municipal drinking water purification services that residents of New 
York City, USA and Quito, Ecuador pay upland farmers for (Daily & Ellison, 2003; Foley et al., 
2005; Grieg-Gran, Porras, & Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005).  
 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine the potential of payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
to address conservation and sustainable development goals in the buffer zone area surrounding 
the La Amistad World Heritage Site – a biodiversity rich agricultural region on the Costa Rica–
Panama border. PES are often championed as a tool for supporting conservation and community 
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livelihoods, yet experience to-date demonstrates that impacts on livelihoods depend directly 
upon site-specific characteristics and payment design (Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008; Hope, 
Porras, & Miranda, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Zilberman, Lipper, & McCarthy, 2008). While 
neighboring Costa Rica has a well-established national PES program, Panama has not yet 
implemented a program, though there is recognized potential to do so (Harvey et al., 2008). Both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations are actively discussing the development of a 
national and/or local PES programs. This feasibility study is designed to help to define specific 
goals and metrics of success and then determine the likelihood for program success under 
alternative PES scenarios.  The information gathered through this study could help to inform 
policy discussions currently underway to propose a law in Panama with the intent of developing 
PES capacity at the national level. This study builds on the existing literature and attempts to fill 
gaps in the current knowledge base by uncovering factors that have an important influence on 
potential participant interest in ecosystem service markets. It looks at characteristics of both 
likely participants and desirable PES program features. It also assesses farmer and rancher past 
experience with conservation programs and knowledge of ecosystem services and markets. Our 
project goals are (1) to assess the potential for a PES approach to achieve conservation and 
livelihood benefits in the study area, (2) identify community demographics which are likely to 
correspond with program success, and (3) provide recommendations regarding program design 
options. We aim both to provide a contribution to the growing discussion of PES as a tool to 
address conservation and livelihood issues and recommendations for the development of an 




When analyzing PES feasibility one must consider the social, ecologic, and economic landscape 
and how it will interface with the 3-level provider - intermediary - buyer relationship at the 
aggregate scale. However, it is also important to understand the options, opportunities, and 
internal dynamics at each level. This research is focused on the ecosystem service provider level. 
At the provider or seller level, PES program design, administration, and eligibility requirements 
determine who can participate, how they participate and the magnitude and quality of social, 
ecological, and economic outcomes.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Drivers of Change in Ecosystem Services: Why focus on Land-use change and agriculture? 
Questions of when, where and how to implement and evaluate new policies and programs such 
as PES that are informed by understanding the value of ecosystem services  are pertinent social 
science questions. Indentifying key ecological, social, and political landscapes to focus efforts 
requires a solid understanding of the relationship between land-use change and ecological 
change.  
 
Capacity and changes in ecosystems services are determined by many direct and indirect drivers 
operating at multiple scales. The drivers of ecosystem services are defined in the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) as human-induced factors that directly or indirectly cause a change 
in an ecosystem. Direct drivers identified in the MA include land-use change, climate change, 
and the introduction of invasive species. These direct driving forces are controlled by indirect 
drivers such as population change, economic development (income), or cultural changes / 
changes in human behaviors (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). Changes in these 
drivers catalyze changes in the provision of ecosystem goods and services. Direct drivers are 
7 
 
mainly physical, biological, or chemical processes that explicitly influence ecosystem processes, 
services, and goods. Indirect drivers function more diffusely, often by influencing one or more of 
the direct drivers. 
 
Land-use change is one of the most important direct drivers of terrestrial ecosystem change and 
involves changes in the human management of ecosystems (e.g., settlement and cultivation) that 
alter the cycles, climate, and hydrology of an ecosystem. Land-use change includes land 
transformation and land degradation, both of which have a negative impact on the ecological 
complexity of the landscapes and therefore the ecosystem services provided by the land 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, 2005; Vitousek, Mooney, Lubchenco, & Melillo, 
1997). For example, a full 20 % of irrigated land suffers from secondary salinization and water 
logging, induced by the buildup of salts in irrigation water. Substantial increases in human 
exposure to natural disasters is credited by many scientists to climate change which is 
exacerbated by the intensification of agriculture and other land-use changes (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Sathirathai & Barbier, 2001; UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2009; Wood, 
Sebastian, & S. Scherr, 2000). Land-use change also drives biodiversity loss through habitat 
fragmentation and destruction. Biodiversity and ecosystem services are closely linked. Diversity 
of flora and fauna is crucial for healthy ecosystems and for healthy human livelihoods. 
Biodiversity is important for disease resistant crops, resilient animal populations and for creating 
the unique environments that human populations value for scenic beauty, cultural traditions, and 
recreation. Biodiversity is also crucial for the many ecosystem processes that are essential to the 






Ecosystem Services and Agriculture 
Establishing formal protected areas is one means of conserving ecosystem services, “but socio-
economic and political constraints limit the amount of land in such status. Addressing 
conservation issues on lands outside of formal protected areas is also necessary” (Polasky, 
Nelson, Lonsdorf, Fackler, & Starfield, 2005, p. 1387). Almost 90% of the world’s  total 
terrestrial land mass lies outside of formal protected areas (WRI, 2003),  and agricultural lands 
now occupy 40% of the total terrestrial land mass and constitute one of the most extensive 
biomes on earth (Ramankutty & Foley, 1999). This extensive land-use change, from natural 
ecosystems to landscapes managed for increasingly intensified agricultural production has 
contributed significantly to fragmentation, habitat and biodiversity loss, unsustainable water use, 
and to global climate change (Foley et al., 2005). Facilitating the transformation of agricultural 
production from being one of the greatest threats to global biodiversity and ecosystem services 
into playing a major role in strengthening ecosystem integrity is a major global challenge 
(Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008). Around the globe communities, organizations, and governments 
grapple with this transition. For example, Harvey et al. (2008) argued for “a new approach to 
biodiversity conservation within human-dominated Mesoamerican landscapes— one that unites a 
focus on ecologically sustainable agriculture with existing efforts in protected areas to achieve 
lasting conservation outcomes at local and regional levels… to secure a future for both 
biodiversity and rural livelihoods in Mesoamerica”(p.13). Some approaches that allow 
sustainable agriculture and ecosystem conservation to complement and support each other will 




The trade-offs between intensive agricultural production and natural landscapes are significant.  
Land-use change, especially the increasing intensification of agriculture is one of the strongest 
and most cited contributors to worldwide biodiversity loss (Sala et al., 2000). The Stern Report 
indicated that agricultural production is directly responsible for 14 % of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG), while indirectly responsible for perhaps another 18 % of GHG emissions 
through deforestation and the burning of biomass, in 2005(HM Treasury, 2006). Overall, land-
use changes are expected to result in average global temperature increases of 1.5º C to 5.5º C 
over the next 100 years (IPCC, 2001). Forests worldwide contain more than half of all terrestrial; 
carbon and provide approximately 80% of the carbon exchange (Montagnini & Nair, 2004). As 
these forests are continually converted for agricultural production, we must consider the 
implications of these land-use changes for biodiversity, climate regulation and other important 
ecosystem services.   
 
However, there is a middle ground. Although conserved natural ecosystems and ecosystem 
services are not synonymous, they are closely linked. Biodiversity often differs less between 
natural habitat and low intensity farming systems than it does between low and high intensity 
farming (Daily, Ceballos, Pacheco, Suzán, & Sánchez-Azofeifa, 2003; Donald, 2004). Carbon 
sequestration also differs considerably depending on the type of agricultural system. 
Agroforestry also has the potential to yield 50 t C ha−1 in the humid tropics and thus is an 
increasingly recommended carbon sequestration strategy (Montagnini & Nair, 2004). 
 
Farms that use low intensity methods in areas bordering on forest ecosystems can increase 
diversity in these buffer zones and decrease the severe transition from forest to farm (Belsky & 
Siebert, 2003). Agricultural biodiversity provides ecosystem services important to rural 
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livelihoods. ‘Agricultural Biodiversity’ is defined by the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity  by the United Nations (1992) to include genetic diversity in crops, animals, fish, and 
trees; diversity of wild species on which agricultural production depends, such as wild 
pollinators, soil microorganisms, and predators of agricultural pests; and diversity of wild species 
that use agricultural landscapes as their habitat. Regrettably, agricultural biodiversity, like the 
other ecosystem services throughout the world critical to poor farmers, is deteriorating (Galizzi 
& Herklotz, 2008).  
 
Farmers constitute the largest group of ecosystem service providers and natural resource 
managers on Earth (Wossink & Swinton, 2007). They both depend on and generate a wide array 
of ecosystem services. Agriculture’s contribution to the provision of ecosystem services depends 
on the incentives available to farmers. Such incentives currently tend to favor the provision of 
conventional outputs such as food and fiber over that of other services. In response to massive 
land use change impacts on biodiversity and other ecosystem services, researchers in 
conservation biology endorse less intensive agricultural practices like multistrata agroforestry 
systems that provide income for farmers while protecting biodiversity (Harvest, McNeely, & 
Scherr, 2002; Finegan & Nasi, 2004). However, global demand for associated agricultural 
products is projected to rise at least 50% over the next two decades (Sánchez, Hunger, Yuksel, 
Dobie, & Swaminathan, 2005) and, without a significant change in the system, agricultural 
production is likely to intensify and agricultural biodiversity, climate stabilization, and water 
purification/regulation are likely to suffer as a result. What we need to sustain human well-being 
in the future is “integrated conservation-agriculture landscapes, in which biodiversity 
conservation is an explicit objective of agriculture, food security, and rural development, and the 
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latter three are explicitly considered in shaping conservation strategies” (Galizzi & Herklotz, 
2008). However, this type of win-win is difficult to achieve without massive changes in our 
incentive system.  
Agroforestry systems provide one tool for realizing a shift especially in areas with sufficient 
rainfall. These systems can include timber, fruit, and native forest species and contribute to 
biodiversity conservation by mimicking natural habitats for species and providing landscape 
connectivity. (Harvey, González, & Sánchez, 2006; Méndez, 2008; Finegan & Nasi, 2004).The 
fruit,  timber and other byproducts of agroforestry systems can provide alternative and 
supplemental sources of income to households and buffer them from fluctuating prices paid for 
their crops (Rice & Greenberg, 2009). The shade provided in agroforestry systems conserves soil 
temperature and “moisture regimes” that improve nutrient cycling and can increase the efficiency 
of nutrient use of the system (Young, 1997). Heterogeneous agricultural landscapes maintain 
plentiful tree cover provide landscape connectivity resulting in increased habitat and resources 
(Harvey et al., 2006; Sekercioglu, Loarie, Brenes, Ehrlich, & Daily, 2007) and they contribute 
across the larger landscape to the maintenance of important ecosystem services (Daily et al., 
1997; Soto-Pinto, Perfecto, & Caballero-Nieto, 2002). Sustainable agriculture practices, 
including diverse coffee agroforestry (Komar, 2006; Moguel & Toledo, 1999), cacao 
agroforestry (Connelly & Shapiro, 2006; Harvey et al., 2006), silvopastoral systems (Harvey et 
al., 2006), and traditional land uses such as organic farming (Finegan & Nasi, 2004) “harbor high 
levels of both wild and agricultural biodiversity and offer much greater conservation value than 
the agroindustrial systems that typically replace them” (Harvey et al., 2008, p.9). In 
Mesoamerica and other key regions of the world a growing number of studies demonstrate that 
some agricultural landscapes and traditional smallholder practices contribute to biodiversity 
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conservation (Daily et al., 2003; Estrada & Coates-Estrada, 2002; Mayfield & Daily, 2005) and 
at the same time can result in long-term sustainability of food production and rural income 
(Pretty, Morison, & Hine, 2003). However, overcoming short term conversion costs remains a 
barrier to overcome in many areas and these changes may be impossible in some places, 
especially those with high potential to produce a lot of food.  It is hard to get past the fact that 
payment for ecosystem services often relies on agriculture that is less intensive and thus 
produces less food, thus success relies on truly valuing other important services and fining places 
where the trade-offs are worthwhile. 
Reshaping our economic system to value ecosystem services will constitute a fundamental part 
of catalyzing change. It is important to focus initial efforts on critical landscapes at the socio-
ecological interface. This is where our investments will provide the greatest returns in terms of 
both conservation and human-well being (Harvey et al., 2008).  
 
Key Landscapes: Why is successful protected area and buffer zone management so important to 
successful conservation and sustainable development? 
 
Ecosystem Services and Protected Areas: Although conservation on private lands is an important 
new frontier, protected areas remain the primary building blocks of practically all national and 
international conservation strategies. Protected areas have a high value in terms of the 
provisioning of ecosystem services including biodiversity, clean water, forest products, etc. They 
provide habitat to protect the world’s threatened species and are increasingly recognized as 
essential providers of ecosystem services and biological resources. Protected areas are vitally 
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important to climate change mitigation strategies; and in some cases, they are also vehicles for 
protecting threatened human communities or sites of cultural and spiritual value. 
 
IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, recognizes the increasing importance 
of making the link between protected areas and ecosystem services more explicit.  The new 
IUCN definition of a protected area is: “A clearly defined geographical space, recognized, 
dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term 
conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (Dudley, 2008). 
 
 Establishing formal protected areas is one of the key means of conserving ecosystem services, 
but socio-economic and political constraints limit the amount of land in such status. With 
increasing population growth and development pressure, proponents of conservation are now 
often expected to justify protection of natural areas by quantifying the direct and indirect benefits 
realized by local communities and, in many cases, national economies. While difficult and not 
without critics, this shift does have some positive implications. The ecosystem services 
framework approach to conservation allows for a more holistic approach to protected area 
management in which human needs and aspirations are considered as part of an interconnected 
web with natural systems. By using an ecosystem services approach to land management, the 
value of conservation to humanity can be made more explicit.  
 
Uninhabited protected area systems are likely near reaching the limit of their ability to expand 
and improve conservation. If the establishment and management of parks and protected areas 
constitute the historical foundation of applied conservation, then what future actions will best 
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build off of this remarkable investment? Among others Wade & Theobald (2010) suggest that 
the “[c]onservation of ecological processes and biodiversity may require development of a 
conservation system consisting of protected “cores” surrounded by “buffer zones” that 
effectively expand and connect the cores”(p151). These buffers zones could consist of 
conservation agriculture maintained by PES. 
 
Ecosystem Services and Buffer Zones: Buffer zones at the interface between natural and human 
systems provide an ideal environment for investigation of the impacts of land-use distribution 
and decisions on biodiversity. (Duffy, Corson, & Grant, 2001). A buffer zone is defined as “Any 
area, often peripheral to a protected area, inside or outside, in which activities are implemented 
or the area managed with the aim of enhancing the positive and reducing the negative impacts of 
conservation on neighbouring communities and neighbouring communities on 
conservation”(Ebregt & DeGreve, 2000, p.7).  Buffer zones are often multiple use areas and they 
constitute a significant portion of conservation areas in some countries. Effective management of 
buffer zones can have both significant direct and indirect effects on the ecological integrity of the 
protected area. With increasing population pressure and food security issues, more communities 
in the buffer zones of protected areas are encroaching on the parks. The Millennium Assessment 
reported that more than 45% of 100,000 protected areas analyzed had over 30% of their land area 
in crop production (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). The challenges of reconciling 
development and conservation goals may be greatest in the buffer zones surrounding biosphere 
reserves in developing countries (Crihfield, 1994; Oldfield, 1988). Here, both philosophically 
and physically, the economic and social problems of rural poverty confront the environmental 
and ecological problem of habitat destruction (Reardon & Vosti, 1995; Stonich, 1989). As the 
actual spatial location where conservation (in the form of preserved natural areas) and human 
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development (the communities around the protected are) meet, buffer zones provide critical 
space for the exploration of sustainable development issues. As crucial areas for both people and 
nature buffer zone management are best approached using a participatory process (Ebregt & 
DeGreve, 2000). 
 
Sustainable land-use in the buffer zones around protected areas is a vital contributor to 
ecosystems services (Daily et al., 1997; Soto-Pinto et al., 2002; Wallace, Barborak, & 
MacFarland, 2005). Unlike some other kinds of land use, agroforestry systems within the larger 
agricultural matrix surrounding protected areas contribute to biodiversity conservation (Harvey 
et al., 2006). Agroforestry systems can serve as a buffer zone and biological corridor between 
monoculture agriculture and protected areas (Gamez & Ugalde, 1988).  
  
How to Move Forward: What role could Payments for Ecosystem Services play?  
The challenge of recognizing the true value of nature has contributed to more systems level 
thinking about complex environmental problems and transdisciplinary approaches to 
understanding the natural environment and human development. In order to realize a more 
sustainable future, decision makers are often drawn to approaches that quantify the value of 
ecosystem services. As a result, economic value is increasingly associated with many ecosystem 
services. Economic value, however, is just one representation of the value of ecosystem services 
to human society. Assigning a price does not magically encapsulate the value of a commodity in 
a single number and many question how one can put a price on clean water and air for future 
generations? Often trade-offs are valued differently by different people. It is the role that 
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valuation plays within the broader framework that helps us to begin to see the big picture of how 
our decisions, and their resulting actions, affect the planet and human well-being.  
The need to balance human development and ecosystem service production activities in 
protected area buffer zones requires management approaches that are sensitive to the complex 
ecological, economic, and social conditions at play. The root of the problem with our current 
system of valuation in regards to ecosystem services is that many of the benefits that we derive 
from ecosystems are external to the system (externalities) or public goods for which no one pays. 
In other words “the existence of many forms of market failure means that natural capital 
depletion is often much greater than would be socially optimal” (Engel et al., 2008). Since a 
substantial portion of ecosystem benefits are externalities, voluntary approaches are likely to 
change people’s behaviors or practices if they are rewarded for the provision of the ecosystem 
services or for land-use practices that are directly related to the improvement of ecosystem 
services. These approaches are known as payments for ecosystem services or PES.  
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are an incentive-based mechanism that resulted from the 
translation of ecosystems science to economics and ultimately to practical application. In this 
system the trade-off costs and benefits, and thus the economic value of ecosystem services 
produced on the land is directly recognized. Areas that provide the highest value of service for 
the lowest cost are ideally targeted through this system (Engel et al., 2008).  The basic concept of 
PES is for users (beneficiaries) of ecosystem services to pay landowners for the ecosystem 
services supplied by their land (Pagiola et al., 2005). However, in reality intermediaries make 
these transactions possible through government programs, non-profit organizations, private 
brokers or other institutions that link buyers and sellers, help to set prices, and provide 
information and security to the individuals involved in the transaction.  
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Often, the term PES is used loosely to describe any kind of market-based mechanism for 
conservation including eco-certification and other approaches that may not adhere to the strict 
definition of PES. According to Sven Wunder (2005), a formal definition for PES is as follows: 
a. a voluntary transaction where 
b. a well-defined environmental service (ES) (or a land-use likely to secure that service) 
c. is being ‘bought’ by an (minimum one) ES buyer 
d. from an (minimum one) ES provider 
e. if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision conditionally. 
Conditionality means that the buyers only pay if actual additional services are provided. This 
requires oversight and regulation. Trough this structured approach PES seeks to internalize what 
would otherwise be an externality. PES approaches, like environmental taxes, subsidies, and 
certification, rely heavily on economic incentives. PES programs can also be thought of as an 
environmental subsidy for the ES providers combined with a user fee charged to the ES users 
(Engel et al., 2008).  
 
However, even proponents of PES recognize the many challenges to implementation (Engel et 
al., 2008; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 
2006). As a subsidy approach, PES is particularly vulnerable to several potential pitfalls: 1) Lack 
of Additionality - making payments for land-uses that would have been adopted anyway and thus 
reducing funds available to induce more sustainable land-use change elsewhere (Pagiola, 2008); 
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2) Leakage – shifting environmental damage to a different location, but not actually reducing 
overall impacts (Engel et al., 2008); and 3) Perverse Incentives – increasing environmentally 
damaging activities in order to be eligible for subsidies at a later date (Engel et al., 2008). In 
order to avoid these pitfalls, PES should only be used in appropriate situations and with adequate 
planning and when supported with strong institutional capacity. Although PES could, in 
principle, merely provide rewards that do not function as incentives for real change, most service 
buyers are only willing to make additional payments for actual additional services. This 
“conditionality” is a key redeeming factor of PES, and it requires transaction monitoring and 
oversight to be credible (Engel et al., 2008). This oversight, once again requires institutional 
capacity.  
 
PES approaches were originally created as a conservation tool in response to the disparity 
between actual and recognized values of ecosystem services and mounting concerns about how 
this discrepancy is contributing to massive and unsustainable global environmental change. PES 
programs have potential as a conservation tool and many argue that they can also be used as a 
sustainable development tool that can contribute to poverty reduction (Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008; 
Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Hope et al., 2005; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Miranda, Porras, & 
Moreno, 2003; Pagiola, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola, Rios, & Arcenas, 2007; Pfaff et al., 
2007; Zilberman et al., 2008). PES approaches, however, are not without their critics. Critics fear 
that the human-centric focus of PES will only favor certain flora, fauna, and ecological processes 
and that intact natural ecosystems may not be the outcome (Adams et al., 2004; Redford & 
Adams, 2009). They also point out that the concept may be taking off too quickly and without 
adequately addressing potential pitfalls such as those mentioned previously (Redford & Adams, 
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2009). Others have argued that by increasing land value, PES could result in wealthy individuals 
or politically powerful groups forcing out poorer land users especially when they do not have 
secure land tenure (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). However, Costa Rica's PSA program has 
been shown to improve tenure security by legitimizing forest management and protecting against 
squatters rights on “idle” land (Miranda et al., 2003). In many countries, including Costa Rica, 
tenure has been traditionally secured through making “improvements” to the land and these are 
generally developments which are not good for conservation such as clearing forest. PES 
programs can legitimize alternative land management strategies. McCauley argued in “Selling 
out on Nature”, a commentary in Nature magazine, that a PES approach fails to recognize 
intrinsic value of nature and the moral obligation that we have to protect it (McCauley, 2006). 
This is yet another frequent concern about PES. 
 
Proponents of PES claim that, when designed and implemented correctly, these programs have 
the potential to address both conservation and human development goals and could contribute 
significantly to more sustainable approaches to agriculture. Given that we need to better integrate 
ecological conservation into working landscapes in order to sustain human well-being in the 
future, payment for ecosystem services is a promising tool.  The question then becomes, how 
does one design and implement a PES program correctly? This research focuses specifically on 
the potential for PES to advance conservation and sustainable development goals on agricultural 






Potential for PES in Panama 
Panama has not yet implemented a PES program, yet multiple avenues for program development 
seem possible and are being discussed. The carbon market provides one potential avenue for 
Panama to enter the global PES market. The potential is great for Panama to become a leading 
supplier of carbon sequestration services at the global market level (Lichtenfeld, 2007). Panama 
is home to the largest rainforest outside the Amazon Basin in the Western Hemisphere (BBC, 
2009). The country contains these extensive areas of primary forest along with increasing areas 
of deforested and degraded land. Factors contributing to Panama’s potential for providing carbon 
services include substantial humid regions with high tree growth rates, a recent successful 
program to address land-tenure (rights to land) issues in the country, strong NGO institutional 
networks, stable government, a growing economy, and a business friendly legal environment 
(Lichtenfeld, 2007). 
 
Overall, Panama is doing well as far as deforestation rates are concerned. Between 2000 and 
2005, Panama lost only 0.1 percent of their forest cover per year compared to the 1.2 percent 
average yearly deforestation rate across Central America. In total, between 1990 and 2005, 
Panama lost 1.9% of its forest cover or approximately 82,000 hectares (FRA, 2006). Protected 
areas in Panama vary substantially in their ability to successfully control deforestation and 
according to a recent study by Oestreicher et. al. (2009) Parks within the La Amistad Biosphere 
Reserve have some of the worst records. Estimates of land cover change from 1992 – 2000 
derived by ANAM staff from satellite images (ground resolution 30 m) showed that La Amistad 
suffered the second highest level of loss in mature forest cover out of the ten protected areas 




Several industrialized nations, including Canada, Spain, Italy, and Holland, have already signed 
Memoranda of Understanding with Panama in anticipation of purchasing carbon credits. These 
MOUs facilitated by Panama’s National Environmental Authority (ANAM) provide some 
guarantee of demand for carbon sequestration services to potential suppliers (Lichtenfeld, 2007).  
Biodiversity is another potential avenue for attracting PES investments. In the La Amistad region 
alone over 300 endemic species of flora and fauna are threatened, including at least 107 that are 
critically endangered (The Nature Conservancy, 2007). Differences in species composition of 
tropical forests are greater over distance (beta-diversity) in Panama than even in Amazonia- the 
epitome of biodiversity (Condit et al., 2002). 
In addition to habitat destruction and fragmentation, other land use changes such as globalization 
of market forces, agricultural industrialization, migration, public policy, and cultural changes are 
driving the transformation of diverse, traditional, smallholder agroecosystems into agroindustrial 
systems dependent on chemical inputs and mechanization (Angelsen, Kaimowitz, & Research, 
2001; Conroy, Murray, & Rosset, 1996; Perfecto, Armbrecht, Philpott, Soto-Pinto, & Dietsch, 
2007; Perfecto, Rice, Greenberg, & Voort, 1996). These changes are also substantial drivers of 
biodiversity loss in the region. Industrial agriculture leads to intensification and is often 
accompanied by significant reductions in land cover, habitat diversity, and forest connectivity. 
These transformations directly threaten species dependent on natural habitat and undermine 
traditional and more sustainable management practices (Harvey et al., 2008). Most of the 
agricultural land on earth is grazing land where agroforestry is not possible because of low and 
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varying rainfall.  This is not the case in Panama where precipitation levels are high and many 
innovative options are viable.  
 
Watershed services offer a third promising opportunity in Panama (Gentry, Newcomer, Anisfeld, 
& Fotos, 2007). The Panama canal zone has been recognized as a key potential area for project 
development and “[m]any experts believe that the protection of water and power sources–
including water protection payments–may be a practical way to promote forest conservation in 
the highlands and middle elevations, in indigenous reserves, and buffer-zone lands of the 
Amistad Park” (Clark, Ashton, & Dixon, 2006, p. 6). 
 
Ultimately, Panama may be well positioned to pursue a bundled service payment program 
similar to the Costa Rican program. Ecosystems provide several kinds of environmental services 
at the same time and bundling these services and selling them as a single product can reduce 
transaction costs while helping to conserve the entire landscape. In Costa Rica’s PSA Program, 
the National Forestry Fund (FONAFIFO) buys various environmental services as a bundle from 
local farmers and landowners. 
 
APPROACH 
Defining Clear Conservation and Development Objectives 
The concepts of human well-being and sustainable rural livelihoods are central to the ongoing 
debate about environmental management, rural development, and poverty reduction (Scoones, 
1998).  Researchers working with subsistence and low-income farmers must be aware of the 
livelihoods issues in their study region. Successfully understanding and incorporating the 
socioeconomic and cultural landscapes into conservation planning and decision making can be 
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crucial to the success of many projects. This compromise between conservation and development 
goals often comprises the main debate around program objectives. Survey information about 
landowner characteristics aids in targeting efforts (Lynch & Lovell, 2003). This research project 
examines the potential for farmer participation in PES with insights on how to design such 
initiatives so that support long term social development and conservation. The collaborative 
research approach described below was integral to realizing the goals of this project. 
 
A Community–Based Participatory Research Approach 
Community-based participatory research (CBPR) is an approach through which research is 
conducted by both traditionally trained "experts" and community members working in 
partnership. CBPR is similar in some ways to Participatory Action Research. The development 
of CBPR grew out of three fields, popular education as advanced by Paulo Freire, international 
development and the work of Orlando Fals Borda, and the action research of Kurt Lewin (Fals-
Borda, 1987; Freire, 2005, 1998, 1995, 1970; Lewin, 1946). CBPR projects start with the 
community and the community participates fully in all aspects of the research process. 
Community can mean many things; various common definitions of community include 
geographic community, a community of individuals with a common problem, or a community of 
individuals with a common interest or goal (Schulz et al., 1998). In this project, the community 
participating in the research includes people already working on sustainable development issues 
in and around La Amistad. The initial request for this project came from these community 
partners who approached a contact that they had at Colorado State University (CSU) in order to 
request assistance with a local ecosystem services research project and were subsequently put in 
touch with this research team. These partners were involved in the workshop in Cerro Punta, 
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Panama where researchers from CSU and local practitioners worked together to clearly identify 
and further define the research problem, need and purpose. CBPR encourages the research 
“experts” to provide expertise that is seen as useful to the investigation by the community, and 
be committed to an equitable partnership and producing outcomes that are directly useful to the 
community. Equitable partnerships require the sharing of power, resources, recognition, results, 
and knowledge. The success of CBPR projects is dependent upon participants’ capacity to 
appreciate each other’s knowledge and skills at each stage of the project, including problem 
definition/issue selection, research design, conducting research, interpreting the results, and 
determining how the results should be used for action. This collaboration throughout the project 
often encourages the development of culturally appropriate measurement instruments, thus 
making projects more effective and efficient (Altman, 1995; Stull & Schensul, 1987). CBPR also 
establishes a mutual trust that enhances both the quantity and the quality of data collected 
(Brown, 1995; Cousins & Earl, 1995; Schulz et al., 1998). The insights and perspectives of 
community participants enhance the knowledge and understanding of researchers about 
community dynamics and conditions. This research seeks to strengthen the skills of community 
members in gathering and using data to facilitate change within their own community. 
 
By employing a community–based participatory research process to engage stakeholders from 
both Costa Rica and Panama, this research team worked together with the community to define 
the scope of the research, to foster information exchange between stakeholders, and to provide 
policy-relevant information for PES design. The project launched in May, 2009 when Dr. Josh 
Goldstein (CSU), Ryan Finchum (CSU), Jorge Pitty (FUNDICCEP), and this writer (Esther 
Duke, CSU) facilitated a collaborative workshop on ecosystem services in Cerro Punta, Panama. 
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The workshop involved participation from protected area managers, conservation practitioners, 
local farmers, and other stakeholders from across the transboundary region. Workshop outcomes 
included: 
 A map developed through a participatory process showing the supply and demand of 
ecosystem services for communities in the study region (figure 1.1) 
 A prioritized list of the most important ecosystem services produced in the region (table 
1.1) 
 A list of opportunities and challenges for using PES to support farmers and conservation 
efforts in this region 
 Commitments from participants to continue this transboundary partnership.  
 
The information gathered through this workshop was used to develop realistic PES scenarios that 
might be implemented on agricultural lands in the study region. These scenarios were then 
presented during interview surveys with local agriculturalists in order to determine the likelihood 
of success of a PES program given different program design scenarios. The anticipated effect of 
each program scenario on conservation and local livelihoods was also explored through the 
survey instrument.   
 
This research team has been particularly interested in involving local stakeholders in the initial 
planning stages of the research as well as throughout the rest of the process. This collaborative 
approach is designed to overcome a recognized barrier to using research to support on-the-
ground conservation – namely, that input from local stakeholders is too often not obtained at the 
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beginning of a research project, when this information can be most effective in helping to design 
research that will inform local management decisions. 
CBPR is unique in the way it associates research and practice, so research informs practice and 
practice informs research synergistically. One of the principal ways in which it is different is that 
instead of creating knowledge for the advancement of a field or for knowledge's sake, CBPR is 
an iterative process, incorporating usable research, reflection, and local empowerment (Padgett, 
2008). In this study CBPR is used as a framework or approach for conducting research.  This 
study incorporates both qualitative and quantitative methods. What characterizes CBPR is not 
the methods used, but the principles that guide the research and the relationships between 
researchers and the community. In this study, the CBPR approach is used in order to develop and 
implement a mixed-methods study of PES capacity in the buffer zone of La Amistad. 
STUDY LOCATION 
La Amistad Buffer Zone 
This study took place in several communities in the Panama Pacific buffer zone area of La 
Amistad World Heritage Site and Biosphere Reserve. La Amistad is officially recognized by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a bi-national 
Reserve split between Panama and Costa Rica. The area encompasses a conglomerate of 
different types of protected lands and a buffer zone comprised of several indigenous territories 
(Cabecar, BriBri, Naso Teribe, and Ngöbe Bugle) Some of the indigenous populations in the area 
are expanding fairly rapidly, especially the Ngöbe . The mid to high elevation areas in this region 
are highly regarded for their unique levels of biodiversity (primarily within the Talamanca 
Montane ecoregion). The Amistad mountain chain includes the highest peaks in both countries: 
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the Cerro Chirripo in Costa Rica at 3,819 meters, and Volcan Baru in Panama at 3,475 meters 
(Clark et al., 2006).  
 
Due to its historic isolation and inaccessibility, the area contains large tracts of virgin rainforest, 
and the watersheds in the highlands provide important freshwater sources for many large 
communities in the lowland areas of both countries (Clark et al., 2006). The main rivers are the 
Changuinola, Teribe and Sixaola. The Watershed provides half of Costa Rica’s fresh water and 
the Sixaloa Basin is shared by the province of Bocas del Toro in Panama.  
 
La Amistad is located within the Meso-American Biological Corridor and is recognized 
worldwide as a biodiversity hotspot. Ten of Panama’s 13 life zones, and nine of Costa Rica’s 
twelve life zones are found in the reserve. The highland region of Talamanca also provides a 
range of habitats and protection for more than 400 species of birds (resplendent quetzal, umbrella 
bird, harpy eagle and great green macaw), and supports 215 species of mammals including the 
puma, jaguar, white-lipped peccary, and the countries’ largest population of tapir. In fact, the 
region harbors 70% of the wild animals and an estimated 90% of known flora found in Costa 
Rica and it is estimated to harbor almost 4% of the varieties of all the Earth’s species (Clark et 
al., 2006; “Parks in Peril,” 2009).  
 
Indigenous territories in the highlands along with small locally-owned farms and an increasing 
number of larger farms make up most of the buffer zone of La Amistad. Isolated rural 
communities depend on the watershed services, pollination services from wild pollinators in 
forested areas and many other ecosystem services provided by the protected areas for coffee 
production and a variety of rural livelihood activities. Intact natural ecosystems provide the 
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resources needed for rural agricultural communities to maintain material welfare, health and 
livelihoods (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003; Clark et al., 2006; Dettman, 2006; Landell-Mills & 
Porras, 2002). In a Park in Peril (PiP) /Nature Conservancy Conservation Area Planning process 
for La Amistad buffer zone area one of the four key threats identified was “incompatible 
agricultural activities” (The Nature Conservancy, 2007)and three of the six strategies identified 
to address the four key threats were: “alternative income generating activities”; “Strengthening 
of community-based conservation capacity”; and “payment of environmental services initiatives” 
(p.5). This project is designed to help identify the best next steps to address “incompatible 
agricultural activities” by implementing these strategies through a PES program. Details about 
the study site communities are provided in methods sections of Chapter I.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions developed in order to accomplish the study objectives are detailed below. 
For each research question both general results for the region and differences between two 
communities in the study region were examined. 
 R1: Which potential PES program modalities are most acceptable to producers? 
 R2: What factors influence a landowners’ willingness to participate in these hypothetical PES 
programs? 
R3: What is the relationship between household socioeconomic status and likelihood to 
participate in a PES program? 
R4: What is the relationship between household socioeconomic status and eligibility to 





This introductory chapter provided an overview of the pertinent literature and the current state of 
the debate about PES as a tool used to address conservation and livelihood issues on the working 
landscapes surrounding protected areas. This first chapter also provided a broad overview of the 
purpose, approach, location, and research questions addressed through this research project in the 
La Amistad buffer zone of western Panama.  
 
Chapter II focuses on factors which influence participation in PES programs and includes a 
systematic review of research to date on actual PES program participation and willingness to 
participate in hypothetical PES programs in Latin America and internationally. This review is 
followed by results reported from survey research on farmers’ willingness to participate in 
several potential PES programs in western Panama. An overview of the study population and 
their preferences is presented along with an in-depth analysis of factors influencing willingness 
to participate in each of the program modalities.  
 
Chapter III provides an overview of pro-poor PES program design considerations based on 
lessons learned from existing programs along with a socio-economic profile of the study 
communities in western Panama coupled with analysis and discussion of various PES program 
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As human activities increasingly alter ecosystems, there has been an emerging recognition that 
intact, healthy ecosystems provide many benefits upon which humans depend (Heal, 2000). 
Agricultural lands cover approximately 40 percent of the Earth’s land surface, representing 
humanity’s most extensive type of managed ecosystem (Foley et al., 2005). While these lands 
are critical to producing food for people, there is broad concern about the detrimental impacts of 
agricultural production on non-food ecosystem services (e.g., climate regulation, water 
purification) and biodiversity (Foley et al., 2005). Indeed, facilitating the transformation of 
agricultural production from being one of the greatest threats to biodiversity and ecosystem 
services into playing a major role in strengthening ecosystem integrity is a major global 
challenge (Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008). Protection and restoration of ecosystem services will 
require a better understanding of how humans benefit from ecosystems and how to modify 
human behaviors to more sustainably manage ecosystems. Many ecosystem services (e.g., 
carbon sequestration, water purification) and biodiversity are considered externalities from 
landowners’ perspectives, which has led to their systematic under-provision relative to society’s 
needs (Pagiola, et al., 2007). Given growing pressures on ecosystems, and in an attempt to fix 
this market failure, payments for ecosystem services (PES) – in which beneficiaries of ecosystem 
services pay landowners (as sellers) to supply services from their land – have emerged as a major 





Payment for ecosystem services programs are increasingly used to create incentives for 
agricultural producers to manage their land for biodiversity and ecosystem services outcomes, 
alongside continued food production (Harvey et al., 2008; Pagiola, Rios, & Arcenas, 2008). 
Given that agricultural lands are often found in the buffer zone and lands adjacent to protected 
areas, PES targeting agricultural landowners could be key to improving environmental 
management of not only the targeted agricultural lands, but also protected areas (Harvey et al., 
2006). Accordingly, for a PES program to be successful in achieving its environmental 
objectives, it must be designed to enable participation by landowners managing ecologically 
important parcels of land (Kosoy, Corbera, & Brown, 2008). Furthermore, with attention 
increasingly focused on the potential for PES to support landowners’ livelihoods, including 
contributing to poverty alleviation, it is also necessary to understand how to best design a PES 
program to allow participation by a broad spectrum of landowners, rather than (even if 
unintentionally) create a program structure that excludes households with a lower socio-
economic status (Pagiola et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). With investment in PES projected to grow 
substantially in the coming years, these issues related to effective program design to achieve 
environmental and social objectives are only growing in importance (Engel et al., 2008; Jack, 
Kousky, & Sims, 2008).  
PURPOSE 
When considering the feasibility of a new PES program in a target region, three broad questions 
should be addressed to inform program design with regards to factors affecting landowner 
participation and the subsequent potential livelihood impacts of the program. First, do 
landowners express interest in the PES concept and support the development a new program? 
Second, assuming a positive response to the first question, what type of program focus (e.g., 
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forest conservation, reforestation) would be most attractive to landowners? Finally, how might 
decisions about specific program design elements (e.g., minimum eligible area, program 
oversight) affect the ability to participate of individual landowners within the target region? 
Obtaining responses to these questions from landowners and communities that would be affected 
by a new program can help to proactively consider ways to expand landowner eligibility and 
participation, including considering factors that may unintentionally rule out certain groups of 
landowners. We note at the outset that there is also a set of key questions related to achieving a 
PES program’s environmental objectives, though these are outside this project’s focus on 
potential landowner eligibility and participation. The full economic analysis needed to determine 
payment amounts is also outside the scope of this project but could build upon insights from this 
research.  
 
Few studies exist that examine the interactions between ecological, economic, and social factors 
to make recommendations about appropriate PES program development for a specific region. 
However, several countries in Mesoamerica have emerged at the forefront of innovative 
approaches to addressing these issues and research on who is participating in these programs and 
why can inform program design. Drawing upon what literature does exist and focusing on site 
specific concerns, this study explores the potential opportunities and obstacles to developing a 
PES program in the La Amistad buffer zone in western Panama with a particular focus on 
program accessibility. We provide information that can be used to improve sustainable 
development opportunities in the buffer zone of La Amistad World Heritage Site (a globally 
important ecosystem on the Panama – Costa Rica border) by exploring options and opportunities 
for assessing real world PES feasibility and preferred development strategies. As a result of this 
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study, local non-profit organizations will have key data about the communities that they work in, 
and their preferences and thresholds for PES program participation. At the regional and national 
level, this study will helps to identify the types of PES programs that are most likely to be 
effective in one of Panama’s most important rural production and biologically rich areas and 
provide recommendations for effective implementation.  
 
In this chapter we provide contextual information demonstrating why PES may be the 
appropriate tool to address conservation and livelihood issues in this region including lessons 
learned about PES on private lands and individual household factors which influence 
participation. A systematic literature review of 56 publications contributing to our knowledge of 
key factors influencing likelihood of landowner participation in PES is presented with a brief 
overview of each of the key factors. This is followed by an overview of the methods of this 
empirical study, and results including general characteristics of the study sample for the districts 
of Renacimiento and Boquete, a discussion of responses to the payment for ecosystem services 
scenarios, scenario preferences, and a logistic regression analysis to determine factors 
contributing to stated willingness to participate in the PES scenarios presented in the study. 
These factors are then discussed within the broader context of the systematic literature review. 
Overall the findings from this study are supported by the literature but also offer site specific 








PES? Why and How? 
PES when used in tandem with other sustainable development incentives has the potential to 
catalyze a healthy change in ecosystem service production on private land (Goldstein, et. al. 
2006). A PES program could help to incentivize large scale adoption of agroforestry, forest 
conservation, reforestation, and other land management practices to protect and enhance 
biodiversity and ecosystem services on private lands.  
 
Policy makers, conservation organizations, and human welfare agencies need specific 
information in order to determine whether, first, a PES approach is appropriate for the region, 
and second, how a PES program could be designed to best achieve policy targets. Identifying the 
best PES architecture for a given landscape is a complicated and difficult task. The lessons 
learned from functioning and failed programs can help guide how to proceed and what 
information and indicators are relevant, especially if these programs were implemented in similar 
socio-economic and/or ecological landscapes. There exists a need to understand the conditions, 
eligibility requirements, incentives, processes, and players that will make a PES program 
successful in achieving its environmental and, where defined, social objectives. Related to social 
objectives, there is a growing focus on understanding which landowners are participating in PES 
programs and how program structure affects participation (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005; 
Wunder, 2005; Zbinden & Lee, 2005). By understanding the factors that will affect an 
individual’s likelihood of participating in a PES program, one can then determine how a PES 
program could be most effectively designed to deliver livelihood benefits to participating 




Lessons Learned About PES on Private Lands 
A handful of national, regional and local level PES programs have been operating long enough 
that researchers have evaluated the outcomes of different legal frameworks and implementation 
structures when applied in communities across the socio-economic spectrum. In a review of 
global market-based programs for forest conservation and development, Pagiola & Platais (2002) 
identify a number of key factors that are critical to the success of incentive-based programs, 
including: ensuring effective demand, flexibility in program design, ensuring that the poor can 
participate, and covering transactions costs (p. 286). When analyzing PES feasibility, one must 
determine how to effectively bring together buyers, sellers, and intermediaries to enable program 
operation. Equally important, however, is understanding the internal dynamics of each group. 
For landowners who act as sellers of ecosystem services, PES program design, administration, 
and eligibility requirements determine who can participate, in what ways they can participate, 
and the social, ecological, and economic outcomes. Only through investigating these issues and 
ensuring that incompatibilities are addressed through appropriate program design will a program 
be successful. In the subsequent section we explore factors which influence participation and 
discuss the implications of these factors for program participation.  
 
Understanding the Individual Household Factors which Influence Participation: How to make a 
PES program successful 
Land-use and management decisions are normally made at the household level, meaning that 
these decisions are subject to the constraints facing these households (Chowdhury & Turner, 
2006). Economic and environmental outcomes are clearly shaped by how households manage 
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their productive assets, including different types of material, economic, and cultural capital. In 
order to promote sustainable land use approaches as a viable livelihood strategy, one must 
understand the factors that contribute to household land-use decisions and how incentives can be 
most effectively created to push adoption of more sustainable practices. 
 
With interest in PES program development growing rapidly, researchers have begun to 
investigate landowners’ interest in ecosystem service markets, their preferences, and factors 
affecting their willingness to participate (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009). This information is 
important, because these factors determine who is able to benefit from PES and how PES may 
affect social and economic development as well as environmental resource management (Kosoy, 
Corbera, & Brown, 2008; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009).  
 
Research on factors influencing participation in existing PES programs or willingness to 
participate in hypothetical programs is increasingly available as well (Jolejole, Swinton, & Lupi, 
2009; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Zbinden & Lee, 2005). The hope is that understanding these 
factors will help PES program designers to tailor programs to be more accessible to a wider 
spectrum of landowners, and also successful in achieving their environmental and social 
objectives. The following case studies provide examples of the kinds of lessons that can be 
learned from 1) existing PES programs (Costa Rica), and 2) research into potential future PES 
programs using surveys about hypothetical scenarios (North Carolina). Following these case 




Costa Rica – PSA Program 
In 1996, Costa Rica launched the first PES program in a developing country (Pagiola, 2008). The 
Costa Rican program is generally referenced as the PSA program, an acronym derived from the 
Spanish ‘Pagos por Servicios Ambientales.’ The PSA program initially recognized four services: 
(1) greenhouse gas mitigation; (2) hydrological services; (3) scenic value; and (4) biodiversity. 
Where feasible, the PSA program developed mechanisms to charge the users of ecosystem 
services for the benefits they receive, including charging water, biodiversity and carbon 
sequestration users. The program then used the money raised through these fees along with 
additional resources from international funders to compensate forest landowners for value 
created by either reforested or conserved natural forest parcels on their land. Between 1997- 
2005, Costa Rica’s PSA program had already provided payments to more than 4,400 farmers and 
forest owners for reforestation, forest conservation, and sustainable forest management activities 
(Zbinden & Lee, 2005).  
 
Over the years, the PSA program has evolved considerably. “An agroforestry contract was 
introduced in 2004, and a natural regeneration contract is being introduced…[Also] the PSA 
program is moving towards a greater degree of targeting” (Pagiola, 2008). Research revealing 
the lack of program participation by poorer households, and factors influencing overall 
participation (Miranda et al., 2003) have influenced additional restructuring of the program in 
regards to land title requirements, size constraints, and other factors (see Appendix A for detailed 
discussion).  Research on PSA program participation can also provide insights for program 
development elsewhere. For example, Zbinden and Lee (2005) report outcomes from a logistic 
regression analysis used to model actual PSA participation dependent on a set of hypothesized 
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behavioral determinants. The data used in their analysis resulted from a 2002 survey of 246 rural 
Costa Rican households. This study provides an example of the types of research which we drew 
upon to inform the focus of this project.  Selected results of Zbinden and Lee’s research in Costa 
Rica are presented below along with outcomes from other similar investigations of PES program 
participation in a Systematic Literature Review of Key Factors Influencing Likelihood of 
Landowner Participation in PES.  
 
North Carolina, USA – Red Wolf Conservation on Private Lands 
As part of a larger project to examine economic values generated by red wolf conservation in 
North Carolina, Kramer and Jenkins (2009) explored ways to use market-based incentives to 
encourage greater conservation effort by private landowners. They administered a survey to 298 
farm operators in the red wolf area about their attitudes toward current conservation programs 
and their interest in participating in future programs oriented toward the provision of ecosystem 
services. They found that while there is a lack of familiarity with ecosystem services 
terminology, many are interested in participating in future PES programs, particularly if the 
programs emphasize wildlife conservation or water quality. Payment levels are found to be an 
important factor in decisions to enroll, but so are other program attributes, particularly contract 
length and the program administration (i.e. government, NGO, private company). Details of 
these findings are also included in the literature review below.  
 
Kramer and Jenkins designed a series of choice experiments (also known as choice-based 
conjoint analysis) that would allow the estimation of tradeoffs across contract length, program 
administrator, and payment level in a PES program. They also designed a contingent valuation 
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question to estimate willingness to accept payment for providing red wolf habitat on private land. 
Variables that were shown to have a positive, statistically significant influence (at the 5% level) 
on respondent non-enrollment were age and household income. They suggested that older 
respondents may be less willing to change the way they have managed their land, and more 
affluent ones may not feel the need to consider a change. This research focusing on stated 
willingness to participate in a hypothetical program provided useful insights for my surveys with 
farmers exploring hypothetical PES programs in Panama.  
 
SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Key Factors Influencing Likelihood of Landowner Participation in PES  
A compiled review of information from research on existing and hypothetical programs resulted 
in the following lessons learned about which characteristics are most likely to predict participant 
response to program opportunities. Although the body of knowledge is gradually increasing, 
“understanding people’s willingness to participate in PES projects and programs has not been a 
key analytical concern of the scholarly literature around this new field of environmental policy 
and practice” (Kosoy et al., 2008). The following section of this chapter is dedicated to 
compiling what we do know about this important issue. Key factors related to farm/household 
characteristics, program design, and land attributes are discussed below and summarized in table 
2.1 based upon literature relating to PES participation in existing programs and willingness to 




Farm size is commonly found to be a significant, positively correlated factor influencing 
participation in PES and other agricultural conservation programs (Lynch & Lovell, 2003). In 
other words famers with larger farms are more likely to participate in agricultural land 
preservation program such as PES. In some cases, this is due to program eligibility requirements.  
Programs often favor larger farms due to the lower transaction costs per hectare and develop 
minimum size requirements for enrollment; in other instances, this relationship may be explained 
by the fact that farmers with sufficient production capacity and incomes from large landholdings 
typically have greater flexibility to engage in new activities including innovative government 
programs (Nowak, 1987). This same relationship seems to hold true for PES program 
participants. For example, in Costa Rica, Zbinden & Lee (2005) found that farm size was 
positively associated with participation. Also, Jolejole, Swinton, & Lupi (2009) report that the 
“low cost suppliers of environmental services are the largest farms. Agricultural policies based 
on payment for environmental services that aim for cost-effective environmental impact will 
likely achieve most of their impact from larger farms”. Some argue that larger plots submitted 
for participation in Costa Rica’s PSA (especially, under forest conservation) may be preferred 
from a forest ecology standpoint in addition to being more economically competitive for a PES 
contract (Zbinden & Lee, 2005). Although PES programs which target landholders with more 
land may be more efficient in terms of reducing administrative expenses, they certainly decrease 
equity in the distribution of payments. Given this, Zbinden and Lee (2005) note that “realizing 
economic goals (e.g., program efficiency) and environmental goals may conflict with achieving 
equity goals. Policymakers may ultimately have to choose the optimal balance among these 
multiple goals.” Some PES programs require a minimum land enrollment size in order to be 
eligible to enroll. Creative approaches to overcoming this constraint include the establishment of 
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land collectives in order to bring together several smaller landholders for group enrollment. This 
approach may help to keep transaction costs lower, though these costs are still problematic 
(Pagiola et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). This confirms what various authors have suggested with 
respect to potential economies of scale associated with PES participation and the need to address 
these issues early in the discussion about PES program development (Chomitz, Brenes, & 
Constantino, 1999).  
 
In addition to influencing participation, farm size might play a part in determining the type of 
PES program that a landowner prefers. Lambert, Sullivan, Claassen, & Foreman (2007) 
examined characteristics of farmers who were attracted to working lands conservation programs 
(as opposed to land retirement program) and found that farm size combined with off-farm 
income were important factor in the decision making process for farmers in the United States. 
Those with larger farms were generally more interested in working land programs and they 
suggested that this was because small scale farms in the United States were mostly hobby or 
retirement farms and not primary income producing activities for their owners. This situation is 
likely very different in other countries were local livelihoods depend on small farms.   
 
Land and tree tenure has been highlighted as an important factor affecting PES program 
participation in numerous studies, as it affects landowners’ perceptions about the value of 
undertaking long-term investments and activities (e.g., adoption of agroforestry systems) 
(Godoy, 1992; Hyman, 1983; Schuck, Nganje, & Yantio, 2002; Zbinden & Lee, 2005). Farmers 
who own their land and have an official title from the government to certify and recognize their 
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ownership are generally considered to have secure land tenure. Of course, this is dependent on 
the legitimacy and stability of the government in their country. In some places land rights are 
deeply contested and numerous people claim rights to the same land or people have no way to 
prove that the land that their family has farmed for generations actually belongs to them. Limited 
tenure rights are often a significant constraint to forest conservation activities in the developing 
world (Godoy, 1992). Legal land title is often required in order to be eligible to participate in 
PES programs. For example, all three payments types in Costa Rica’s PSA originally required 
that participants have official title to their land. Even though the PSA program has since relaxed 
land title requirements, Zbinden & Lee (2005) found that possession of legal land title 
significantly increases the probability of participation. More generally, Tejada & Peralta (2000) 
found the lack of efficient, reliable, and workable land registry systems to constitute a significant 
constraint to rural development across Latin America specifically because this leads to the 
systematic exclusion of low income rural farmers from some market-based activities. For 
example, those without secure land title often have no collateral for loans and may not be able to 
justify long-term investments in their property.  
 
A landowner’s environmental ethic and other non-financial factors can also play a key role in 
conservation decisions, because producers may gain direct personal satisfaction from the 
improved environmental quality (Chouinard, Paterson, Wandschneider, & Ohler, 2008).  Some 
studies have actually found that the environmental attitudes and affiliations, as opposed to 
economic factors, were the strongest motivation for landowners to participate in PES and other 
conservation programs on private lands (Jolejole et al., 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008; Lichtenberg & 
Zimmerman, 1999). Kosoy et al. (2008) concluded that while the PES economic incentive may 
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attract applicants, it was not the most important motivation for members of the four participating 
Mexican ejidos which he analyzed. In a broad study of the factors that motivate restoration and 
conservation behavior, Pease, Rankin, Verdon, & Reisz, (1997) also found that environmental 
values were more important than financial reasons for landowners participating in conservation 
programs. On a related note, the landowner’s perception of environmental improvements or the 
effectiveness of the conservation action prescribed through the program is another important 
factor in PES enrollment decisions (Jolejole et al., 2009). 
Education, age, and other decision-maker characteristics are another key factor identified as 
influencing participation decision (Ayuk, 1997; Chambers & Foster, 1983; Jolejole et al., 2009; 
Nagubadi, McNamara, Hoover, & Mills, 1996; Rahm & Huffman, 1984). Education and age are 
human capital variables embedded in the decision making process. Education influences one’s 
ability to obtain and process information, as well as one’s competence at implementing 
knowledge-intensive conservation strategies and technologies (De Souza Filho, Young, & 
Burton, 1999). Based upon a survey of 3,000 Michigan corn and soybean farmers about their 
willingness to adopt cropping practices that enhance provision of ecosystem services through 
hypothetical PES programs, (Jolejole et al., 2009) found that those with higher education levels 
were more likely to say they would participate in the program. In Costa Rica’s PSA, Zbinden and 
Lee (2005) found that participants receiving payments for forest conservation and sustainable 
management had over twice as many years of formal education as nonparticipants. 
The role of age is more ambiguous because age is sometimes used as a proxy for experience with 
the expectation that older farmers will be more likely to participate; with PES, however, it may 
be offset by a greater reluctance to try new things, including new technologies or government-
sponsored programs. (Zbinden & Lee, 2005). Some researchers, including Jolejole et al., (2009), 
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have found that younger farmers are more likely to adopt cropping systems that supply more 
ecosystem services. (Langpap, 2004) found the same when analyzing likelihood of participation 
in conservation incentives programs for endangered species. However, it is true that previous 
experience in similar programs tends to increase participation (Jolejole et al., 2009).  Data from 
the Kramer & Jenkins (2009) survey of North Carolina farmers showed that landowners who 
were already participating in conservation programs were predisposed to be willing to participate 
in a PES program. “This may be due to their familiarity and satisfaction with programs they are 
enrolled in. This may also reflect the influence of a stronger conservation ethic that predisposes 
some individuals to consider enrollment in such programs” (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009). Not 
surprisingly, landowners are more likely to participate in programs that require them to 
undertake practices which they already implement and/or are familiar with (Jolejole et al., 2009).  
 
These individual farm and demographic factors often affect a given household’s eligibility or 
ability to participate in PES. However, demographics (individual household socio-economic 
factors) are not generally good predictors of attitudes and behaviors and there are other practical 
household factors such dependence on farm income and available labor which can play a 
significant role in determining participation decisions for eligible households 
 
Off-farm employment is an important factor highlighted in the literature. Research indicates that 
landowners with a greater percentage of off-farm income are more likely to enroll or state that 
they would enroll in a program (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Lynch & Lovell, 2003). As Kramer 
and Jenkins (2009) point out, these landowners are less dependent on farm income, so program 
participation is less of a gamble of them.  However, Zbinden & Lee’s (2005) observations about 
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positive externalities accruing from the activities that generate off-farm income may also play an 
important role in this relationship. For example, farmers engaged in off-farm activities often 
have an increased level of information access (internet, professional networks, etc.) which is 
hypothesized to be key for participation. Establishing a PES contract can often require 
considerable knowledge and the ability to manage administrative tasks. This skill set may be 
stronger for those engaged in off-farm income generating activities. Education level, skills and 
experience gained from off-farm employment, or the management of larger farm operations all 
impact human capital and household economics and are thus shown to be significant 
determinants of program participation. In Costa Rica, less educated (often poorer) farmers are 
likely to lack the skills needed to take advantage of the government incentive programs (Zbinden 
& Lee, 2005). 
 
Farm labor availability and source (family or outside) have complex and mixed affects on PES 
program enrollment decisions. In Costa Rica, the availability of family farm labor was found to 
be negatively associated with participation perhaps since traditional farming is more labor 
intensive but can be very profitable those with available farm family members to work on the 
farm often stick with these those with fewer low cost laborers available are more attracted to the 
PES program opportunities (Zbinden & Lee, 2005).  Other studies have confirmed the significant 
influence of labor allocation in determining program participation or technology adoption (Ayuk, 
1997; Neupane, Sharma, & Thapa, 2002; Scherr, 1992). However it is important to distinguish 
between different types of PES programs when discussing the affect of labor. For example, 
reforestation may be an attractive option in the long run when family labor is scarce, because 
although it is labor-intensive in the short run (planting the trees) and during harvest years, it may 
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be perceived as a way to decrease labor demand in the long run if household members have the 
opportunity to take advantage of better off-farm income generating employment. 
 
While previous studies have attempted to identify the characteristics of individuals 
(demographics and past experiences) that influence participation in conservation programs, less 
research has been done on the importance of various program design characteristics. The 
following section begins with an overview of what we do know about program design attributes 
that make programs more attractive to participants and then delves into research concerning land 
attributes. 
 
Contract length is a factor that varies considerably in the literature as pertains to landowner 
participation. In Kramer & Jenkins (2009) study on hypothetical PES programs in North 
Carolina, landowner respondents showed a preference for shorter contract lengths; as the 
contract length of a particular program type increased, respondents were less inclined to select 
that program. This suggests that many respondents may be uncomfortable with the idea of 
entering into long-term program contracts. Using a series of focus groups, (Schnepf, 1994) found 
that landowners in his sample were concerned about permanent enrollment terms, and that long-
term or permanent enrollment terms may discourage participation.  However, Chen, Lupi, He, & 
Liu (2009) found that participants were more likely to participate in six-year instead of three -
year contracts in China’s Grain-to-Green Program; they suggest that this may be because longer-
term programs provide more stable income and larger cumulative payments, however they also 
note that longer-term programs “bring more risks and less flexibility by limiting farmers' ability 
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to adapt to changing conditions in markets of crop products” (Chen et al., 2009, p. 11814). For 
this reason participation levels remained about the same for six and ten year contracts.  
 
Program administration and oversight are other important factors affecting landowner 
participation in PES program design (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009). Studies in the United States have 
shown a preference for or acceptance for working with the government (Jolejole et al., 2009). In 
fact, (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009) found that respondents were statistically less likely to opt for 
programs administered by a private company or conservation NGO than a state agency. They 
speculated that this finding might reveal a distrust of or unfamiliarity with companies or 
conservation NGOs. This does not necessarily hold true in parts of the world were government 
corruption and other issues cause landowners to prefer programs administered by NGOs (Hope 
et al., 2005; Petheram & Campbell, 2010). In Brazil, (De Souza Filho et al., 1999) found that 
households who had a contract with an NGO were more likely to adopt conservation 
technologies.  
Institutional competence and capacity is key to program success (Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Lee 
& Mahanty, 2009). For example, transparency, simple rules, procedural flexibility, information 
outreach and technical assistance, and effective communication between resource managers, 
intermediaries and government all encourage participation (Alix-Garcia, Janvry, Sadoulet, & 
Manuel, 2009; Engel, Wünscher, & Wunder, 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008; Locatelli, Rojas, & 
Salinas, 2008). Conversely, top-down management and other inappropriate project design or 
management approaches can negatively affect participation (Fischer & Vasseur, 2002). 
Programs with lower transaction costs are more likely to be successful in attracting participants 
(Pagiola, Agostini, Gobbi, Haan, & Ibrahim, 2004; Pagiola et al., 2007; 2008; Wunder, 2008). 
49 
 
Transaction costs are generally considered to be one of the biggest barriers limiting participation 
of poorer households in PES programs (Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2008; Rios & Pagiola, 
2009). NGOs and other organizations often focus on helping to lower transaction costs, thus 
increasing poor landowner participation (Locatelli et al., 2008).  
One of the most obvious program design factors is compensation amount. Some empirical 
studies of conservation-oriented farming practices have found that the most important motives 
for conservation adoption are “selfish” and financial in nature (Chouinard, Paterson, 
Wandschneider, & Ohler, 2008). Cary & Wilkinson (1997) found that the best way to increase 
the use of conservation practices is to make them profitable. There are also a number of PES 
specific studies showing a positive relationship between the compensation amounts offered and 
program enrollment or preference (Cooper, 2003; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009). However, most of 
these studies show that compensation amount is one of multiple significant factors explaining 
landowner participation decisions in existing or hypothetical programs. For example, (Purvis, 
Hoehn, Sorenson, & Pierce, 1989) studied farmers’ willingness to participate in a filter strip 
program using a contingent valuation survey and concluded that farmers’ participation decisions 
are determined by the yearly payment offered to participants, the related opportunity costs, and 
farmers' perception of the environmental change. Although compensation amount is the most 
obvious explanatory factor it is not always the most influential.  
Targeting mechanisms such that payments go to lands with higher conservation value, all else 
equal, can result in a win-win for participants and conservation (Mäntymaa, Juutinen, 
Mönkkönen, & Svento, 2009). For example, Mexico’s carbon payment program paid more for 
cloud forest than other types of forest, which proved to be successful in enrolling more land with 
higher biodiversity value (Kosoy et al., 2008). In China’s Grain-for-Green Program, targeting 
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resulted in lands with higher environmental benefits participating in the program (Gauvin, 
Uchida, Rozelle, Xu, & Zhan, 2010). Programs that do not target for conservation value or are 
unsuccessful in targeting efforts may result in enrolling mostly degraded lands. (Zbinden & Lee, 
2005) posited that land quality and slope characteristics may influence the participation decision 
in all three PSA programs and verified this with findings that the variable measuring perceived 
degraded area within the farming system was positively related to participation (a 10% increase 
in degraded area resulted in 51% increase in the probability of participation).    
 
In fact, there are several land attributes that are influential. These include soil quality, slope, 
conservation and ecosystem service value of the land, and the agricultural production value of 
the land. Land quality and slope characteristics in particular are likely to influence participation 
decisions about PES programs.  Those with highly sloped land nare likely to be interested in 
forest protection or sustainable management because maintaining forest on these lands decreases 
the threat of landslides and helps to preserve top soil. Also the harvesting costs on sloped land 
are often high and intensive agriculture may not be financially feasible on lands above a certain 
grade.  It is reasonable to assume that a landowner would first choose to reforest marginal land 
on his or her parcel (Zbinden & Lee, 2005).   
Land opportunity costs play an integral role in PES program participation, as landowners with 
highly productive land (and therefore greater opportunity costs) are far less likely to participate 
than landowners with marginal lands (Wunder, 2005). This may not be the case, however, in 
regions where rich landowners hold secure property rights over large tracks of unproductive 
lands. For this reason, (Pagiola et al., 2005) suggest that the farming structure (mostly small or 
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mostly large farms vs. mixed landscape) greatly determines the ability of rural households to 
participate in PES, jointly with secure land tenure, investment and technical capacities. 
A greater the heterogeneity of land value results in a greater range of payment levels that are 
sufficient to encourage landowner participation and thus an increased potential for PES schemes 
to be cost-effective compared with other approaches (Jack et al., 2008). “By offering a set 
payment for service provision, individuals who can produce the ecosystem service at or below 
that price have an incentive to enroll in the program, whereas those providers who have a higher 
opportunity cost of enrolling do not…Likely sources of individual heterogeneity in the costs of 
providing ecosystem services include differences in the opportunity costs of land use stemming 
from biophysical features of the land and its location, as well as individual characteristics of the 
landholders, such as education, risk aversion, and plot size” (Jack et al., 2008, p. 9467).  
 
There are many types of PES programs and success is largely dependent upon crafting the right 
PES program for a specific location (Engel et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; 
Pagiola et al., 2008; Zilberman et al., 2008). As illustrated by the information presented above 
from the systematic literature review on factors influencing the likelihood of landowner 
participation in PES, there is substantial information (though not always with consistent 
conclusions) that can be used to guide the design of future PES programs. By building upon what 
has been learned in similar locations and using the literature and local conditions to guide 
collection of primary data from the target region, researchers and policy makers are in a position 
to predict and proactively address issues that are likely to affect landowner participation, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that a PES program will have intended environmental and social 
outcomes. Accordingly, this study was motivated by factors identified from this literature review 
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and extensive discussions with local stakeholders in the focal region in western Panama to 
explore the design of a future PES program that enables broad landowner participation.  
METHODS 
 
We used a community–based participatory research process to engage stakeholders to define the 
scope of the research, to foster information exchange between stakeholders and organizations, 
and to develop the survey instrument to provide policy-relevant information for PES design 
related to landowner participation (Wallerstein & Duran, 2003). Our study uses quantitative and 
qualitative methods combing mixed-model and mixed method approaches (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).The goal of mixing methods in this study is predominately “expansion”, or 
increasing the breadth and depth of the study (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). However, 
mixed methods also inform the “development” of the study by “using the findings from one 
method to inform the other” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In this case, the information 
collected through the workshop (see Ch. I) informed the development of the research questions 
and surveys. Corroboration of results is a secondary reason for the mixed methods approach and 
triangulation of results from different methods of studying the same phenomenon help to make 
the findings more robust and may help to identify paradoxes and contradictions thus driving 




This project focuses on the agricultural buffer zone on the Panamanian Pacific side of the La 
Amistad Biosphere Reserve and bi-national UNESCO World Heritage Site located in the 
Talamanca/Chiriquí highlands of Costa Rica and Panama. Located in the northwestern sector of 
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Panama and the south-central region of Costa Rica, the binational site of La Amistad is one of 
the region’s largest expanses of virgin forest (figure 2.1). In total, La Amistad Biosphere Reserve 
includes approximately one million hectares (Clark et al., 2006). La Amistad is estimated to 
harbor almost 4% of the varieties of all the Earth’s species (T.Clark et al., 2006). Parque La 
Amistad (part of the reserve) was designated as a peace park by former president of Costa Rica 
and Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. Oscar Arias. By presidential declaration, in both Costa Rica 
and Panama, the park is dedicated to serving as a working example of peace between 
neighboring countries and also to fostering sustainable development in buffer zones of the park.  
 
Like most protected areas in Mesoamerica, La Amistad is surrounded by a buffer zone consisting 
predominately of agricultural landscapes (DeFries, A. J. Hansen, Newton, & M. C. Hansen, 
2005; Foley et al., 2005; A. J. Hansen & DeFries, 2007; Harvey et al., 2008). While rich in 
biodiversity, the area is economically marginalized, and despite the region’s remoteness and 
relatively small human population, many of its biological riches are in jeopardy. This once 
remote area is now in danger of losing its World Heritage Site designation due to concerns over 
the degrading impacts of overfishing, unregulated and poorly planned tourism, development, 
colonization, logging and clearing of land for subsistence farms, unsustainable farming practices 
(e.g., contamination by agrochemicals), banana plantations, and cattle grazing, and expansion of 
hydroelectric dams, power plants and roads (The Nature Conservancy, 2007; UNESCO, 2008). 
In the study region, as with many others, the fate of biodiversity within protected areas is 
therefore inextricably linked to the broader landscape context, including how the surrounding 
agricultural matrix is designed and managed (Vandermeer & Perfecto, 2007; Wallace et al., 
2005). However, “[t]he region also offers significant opportunities for economic and social 
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development” (The Nature Conservancy, 2007, p. 22). No PES program are currently in 
operation in the study region, but PES program development potential has been noted by several 
researchers and is increasingly discussed by NGOs and government agencies working in the area 
(Clark et al., 2006; Gentry, Newcomer, Anisfeld, & Fotos, 2007; Oestreicher et al., 2009). 
 
For our interviews with farmers related to landowner participation (described below), we defined 
our study population as landowners living within the buffer zone of La Amistad in the 
Panamanian Pacific sector. Although there is no official spatial definition of a buffer zone in 
Panama, the general agreed upon definition is communities and properties immediately adjacent 
to the park and where human socio-economic activities are interwoven with the park 
environment (personal communication Adrian Benedetti- former director of Panamanian national 
parks, February, 2010). Individuals in the communities involved in this study are both affecting 
and affected by the protected areas. This project includes the following defined study sites within 
the general study region: 1) the district of Boquete including the town of Boquete and the 
surrounding countryside, and 2) the district of Renacimiento including the towns of Cerro Punta, 
Guadalupe and the surrounding countryside.  
 
The Boquete district, and especially the town of Alto Boquete (referred to commonly as 
Boquete), until recently was primarily an agricultural region famous for growing flowers and 
coffee. In recent years, the mild climate, relative accessibility and natural beauty have attracted a 
large influx of American and Canadian expatriates and retirees. Thus, residential development 
has increased rapidly with inadequate planning in many cases (The Nature Conservancy, 2007). 
Land prices in the area have increased with the immigration of foreigners and many 
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agriculturalists have sold their land to developers (personal communication, Jorge Pitty, Director 
of FUNDCCEP, May 2009). Farming also continues to be a major economic activity in the 
region, including an expansion of farming activities in the park due to a recent expansion of the 
park’s boundary.  
 
The Renacimiento district includes the town of Cerro Punta and the small neighboring 
community of Guadalupe, as well as communities along the road to the Costa Rican border.  
Farms in this region enjoy the rich volcanic soil under Volcan Baru and produce approximately 
80 percent of the vegetables for the entire country of Panama. Despite the regions important 
position as the breadbasket of Panama, it is economically fragile with fluctuating market prices 
putting pressure on farmers with already small profits margins (Shah, 2006). Renacimineto 
primarily relies on industrial agriculture for economic development and “agricultural production 
is commonly practiced with very intensive agrochemical use, which affects humans and wildlife, 
as well as water resources”(The Nature Conservancy, 2007, p. 43). The steep slopes in the area 
have also lead to landslides under intensive agricultural production without proper planning. 
“Analysis suggests that the current agricultural practices are unsustainable and ecologically 
destructive, due to high dependence on agrochemicals and inefficient irrigation and cultivation 
on steep slopes.” (Shah, 2006, p. 143). The farming techniques used are unsustainable, as a result 
of the intensification of farming, soils are degraded and nutrients are lost. Without substantial 
changes, river sedimentation and agrochemical pollution will become major problems (Shah, 
2006). In addition to these impacts, encroachment on the park continues as producers claim 
production land from the Amistad Park. Despite Cerro Punta’s position as the main horticultural 
production center in Panama, the Ministry of Agriculture has very little presence in the area (The 
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Nature Conservancy, 2007). This district also includes a rural area along the road to Rio Sereno 
and the Costa Rican border. Many of the farms in this area still produce coffee and are small, 
locally-owned farms (personal communication, Jorge Pitty, 2009).  
 
Poor agricultural practices throughout Chiriquí province need to be converted to more 
environmentally sustainable ones, but this transition will “require deliberate policy measures and 
actions that will make it economically appealing for farmers to adopt sustainable agriculture 
principles” (Shah, 2006). This study region is an appropriate site to start the process of using 
sustainable agriculture as a means of supporting conservation in La Amistad buffer zone. For 
example, “Cerro Punta already has environmentally sensitive civil societies that are prepared to 
support the message of sustainable agriculture and encourage people to participate and change 
their farming practices. The prospects for success in the region are high (Shah, 2006, p. 155).  
 
Landowner Surveys 
We conducted landowner surveys in the Boquete and Renacimiento districts to gather 
information about potential participation to inform the design of a PES program targeting lands 
in the buffer zone of the La Amistad park (Panama). The survey instrument was designed to 
generate a representative sample of the main farmer and rancher livelihood activities in the study 
area, which could have external validity for similar rural agricultural landscapes in protected area 
buffer zones elsewhere.  The communities in the Boquete and Renacimiento districts included in 
this study are directly adjacent to La Amistad with some households even farming within the 
park’s boundary. The land uses in these communities have important potential to impact the 
integrity of the park. There is no PES program presently available to these land owners, however 
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agricultural intensification and other land use changes are underway and are degrading 
ecosystem services. Furthermore, local leaders have expressed interest in using PES as a new 
tool to address these concerns. The transboundary dialogue initiated by both Costa Rican and 
Panamanian community and conservation leaders in the region has the potential to lead to the 
development of a pilot program in Panama and/or a cross-border regional PES program to 
operate separately or in tandem with national efforts. Public and nonprofit groups from both 
sides of the border have made a great deal of progress towards better coordinating management 
of this region and they are interested in continuing to grow this capacity.  
 
Sampling and Data Collection  
We obtained lists of farmers and ranchers in our study region from multiple agencies to obtain as 
comprehensive a list as possible of the entire population. Surveys of farmers and ranchers are 
undertaken regularly by Panama’s Ministry of Agricultural Development (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Agropecuario de Panamá; MIDA). The regional office of MIDA in the city of David 
provided lists of agriculturalists from which we pulled our most of our sample. The regional 
office of Chiriquí conducted an encuesta de café (coffee survey) in 2005-2006, which focused on 
coffee planting and harvests for the region and used a similar approach for selecting farmers to 
survey. The lists available were similar, but not identical for the two districts.  
For the Renacimiento district, we were able to access very current lists (a 2007 and 2009 survey) 
of onion and potato farmers, a list of farms tested for coffee plant disease (2008), and a list of 
participants in several MIDA farmer assistance programs (2009). Since almost all of the onion 
and potato farmers also grow coffee and other crops, these lists actually provided a reasonably 
comprehensive group of farmers. These lists resulted in a total of 910 farmers after removing 
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duplicates. The total population of Renacimiento is 18,257 (2000 census). In 2009, there were 
850 coffee producers in the town of Cerro Punta. They constituted ~12 percent of the total town 
population of 7,000 people.  When this same percentage is used to estimate the total number of 
coffee farmers for the entire district with a population of ~20,000, then we can estimate that there 
are approximately 2,400 coffee farmers in the District of Renacimiento. About 38 percent of 
these farmers were represented in our lists. 
For the District of Boquete, we were able to access equally current lists (2007 and 2009) of onion 
and potato farmers, a survey of coffee producers (2009), and a list of local coffee cooperative 
members (2009). After removing duplicates, our combined list included 747 farmers. The 
District of Boquete has a total population of approximately 20,000. Of that population, 
approximately 5% percent are employed in agriculture, livestock and fisheries. The percent has 
been on a general downward trajectory over the past decade and is down from 14.6 percent in 
1996 with the non-farmer population growing quickly. These numbers include not only farm 
owners but also day laborers, processors, etc. Our final list of farmers accounted for 
approximately 75% percent of all those employed in agriculture in the district and most of the 
farm owners (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial, 2008).  
For both study sites the sample was handled by farm instead of by individual. This means that if 
a new household had taken over the farm then they were offered the opportunity to contribute to 
the study. These interviews counted in lieu of the previous resident.  
An initial random sample of 250 landowners was selected from the combined list for 
Renacimiento; of these, 127 participated in the survey, while 29 refused to participate. Ninety-
four contacts were not locatable, so a second random sample was taken to replace these missing 
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individuals and a total of 52 contacts on the second list were not actually living or farming in the 
region at the time of the survey This resulted in a final count of 198 landowners contacted with a 
response rate of 85 percent (169 respondents). An initial sample of 250 farmers was also 
randomly selected from the combined list for Boquete and of these 74 were not locatable, dead, 
the farms had been developed, etc. and one refused the survey. Our final count was 176 
landowners contacted with a response rate of 99 percent with 175 completed surveys from 
Boquete.  
Out of list of 500 people a total of 374 were successfully located across both regions, we 
received responses from 344 farmers. Accordingly, the overall response rate for the study was 92 
percent. A sample of this size can be used to relatively accurately represent a population of as 
many as one hundred million people (well above the population of our study area) at a 95 percent 
confidence level with a +/- 10 percent margin of error or 4,000 people to a 95 percent confidence 
level with a +/- 5 percent margin of error (Salant & Dillman, 1994). This assumes a conservative 
50/50 split approach which is appropriate since little is known about the diversity of opinions 
that will be represented by this population. The 50/50 split is used to determine the appropriate 
sample size when a given population is divided half and half on an issue. This the most 
conservative approach requiring the largest sample size (Salant & Dillman, 1994).  
 
Survey Instrument and Data Collection Procedures 
The survey instrument focused primarily on gathering information for an analysis of landowner 
interest in participating in hypothetical PES scenarios that were representative of major program 
types currently in operation globally targeting similar types of landscapes (described further 
below). Supporting information related to demographics, land use, socio-economic status, PES 
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familiarity, and other pertinent factors was also collected to inform analyses of factors affecting 
landowners’ willingness to participate and potential eligibility conditioned upon hypothetical 
program design parameters (e.g., minimum area enrollment requirements, program oversight and 
administration, contract length). The survey instrument is included as Appendix I. 
 
The survey was developed collaboratively by the entire research team, including academic, 
government, and NGO partners. Extensive input was obtained from the aforementioned May 
2009 workshop (see Ch. I), including follow up conversations with key partners. Findings from 
similar studies in the literature on willingness to participate in hypothetical programs (notably 
(Kramer & Jenkins, 2009) along with numerous studies on actual PES program participation also 
helped to inform the development of the survey instrument. 
 
I worked with local research associates to train Panamanian interviewers and to pilot test and 
modify the survey for maximum success. These local research associates served as “boundary 
spanning agents” helping to connect the researchers, communities, and policy makers (Reid, et 
al. 2009). The engagement of local interviewers helped us to avoid issues of potential distrust of 
external ‘extractive’ research, particularly related to financial issues. Our key local partner in 
Boquete is the nonprofit Fundación Vida, Salud, Ambiente y Paz (FUNDAVISAP). 
FUNDAVISAP provides leadership organizing local groups and the local government in order to 
have an active, participatory, proactive role in the land-use planning process. Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Integral del Corregimiento de Cerro Punta (FUNDICCEP) also contributed 
significantly to this effort as the local partner NGO partner in Renacimiento. The organizations 
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main objective is to promote sustainable development in communities in the buffer zone of La 
Amistad International Park (PILA). Other project advisors included representatives from: 
 Alianza para el Desarrollo Ambiental de las Tierras Altas (ADATA 
 Red Quercus 
 Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM) 
 Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC) 
 The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services Scenarios 
We crafted three PES program scenarios based on workshop discussions and popular program 
options in neighboring Costa Rica (and also broadly representative of major program options in 
many other countries). The three scenarios for potential PES payments were (1) forest 
conservation, (2) reforestation, and (3) agroforestry. Following a general, non-technical 
description of the PES concept, each of the three PES scenarios was described to the respondent, 
after which the interviewer asked respondents to answer a series of questions about how much 
land they would enroll if the program was offered in their community, how they would prefer the 
program to be structured, and potential eligibility and feasibility barriers. Please refer to the 




Quantitative data analysis included numerous statistical analyses of both the original quantitative 
data and the quantitized (originally qualitative) data preformed using PASW-SPSS 18.0 
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(Predictive Analytics SoftWare - Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). When percentage 
results are reported from the survey, they are rounded to the nearest whole integer. 
Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data analysis included coding of the qualitative data.  Since the qualitative data 
collected through this study is highly structured open-end responses from surveys and tightly 
defined interview questions it was coded without additional segmenting of the content. The 
codes were applied as a layer on top of the data and the codes can be analyzed quantitatively. 
The data analysis stage of this project was guided by Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie’s (A. J 
Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003) seven stage process using exploratory thematic analysis. The 
seven stages are: 1) data reduction, 2) data display, 3) data transformation, 4) data correlation, 5) 
data consolidation, 6) data comparison, and 7) data integration. Qualitative data can better 
provide the researcher with an in-depth understanding of the meaning of the experiences of 
individuals in a particular setting, while quantitative data suggests trends in a setting. 
Differences between Communities 
Crosstabulation measuring the linear strength of association between variables was used to 
analyze relationships between demographic information and along with t-tests was used to 
identify variations by location and associations between specific populations and location.  
Factors Influencing Willingness to Participate  
Most studies revealing factors influencing participation in PES programs use some form of 
regression analysis in order to calculate these explanatory relationships. Many of the 56 studies 
in the literature review (table 2.1) presented results from regression or logistic regression 
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analyses.  Regression analysis provides information about the predictive potential of the 
independent variables to explain willingness to participate in various program modalities (Vaske, 
2009). Modeling program participation for our dichotomous dependent variables (willingness to 
participate for the forest conservation, reforestation, and agroforestry scenarios) requires the use 
of logistic regression, a generalized linear model that extends linear regressions to non-
continuous outcomes using logit link functions and a maximum likelihood estimator (Aldrich & 
Nelson, 1984). Logistic regression analysis of the willingness to participate responses is used to 
identify demographic, socioeconomic and behavior variables that predict or explain those 
responses (Champ, Boyle, & Brown, 2003). Zbinden and Lee (2005) used logistic regression to 
model actual binary participation in Costa Rica’s PSA dependent on a set of hypothesized 
behavioral determinants, as did Kramer and Jenkins (2009) in their investigation of hypothetical 
PES participation in North Carolina. In this study, a logistic regression model is used to regress 
respondents’ replies to the questions about willingness to enroll for each of the three PES 
scenarios against a series of explanatory variables to uncover factors, guided by the systematic 
literature review reported above, that have a significant influence on their willingness to 
participate. The odds ratio Ex(B) in logistic regression is similar to the unstandardized regression 
coefficient B in regression, except for instead of explaining the change in the dependent variable 
for every unit increase the independent variable, Ex(B) is the probability that the outcome occurs 
to the probability that it does not (Vaske, 2009). For these analyses we used a simultaneous 






Two sides of the Baru Volcano: General Characteristics of the Study Sample for the Districts of 
Renacimiento and Boquete 
In this section, we present a social and land use overview of the main study region including an 
examination of key differences in farm and demographic profiles between the two primary study 
communities.  
 
Summary information on key farm characteristics is reported in table 2.2. Forty-five percent of 
respondents own small farms with a total of less than 5 hectares. Farm sizes are similar across 
the two communities. However, we found a significant difference in land tenure reponses 
between the two communities. In Boquete 93% of people have title to their land and  
Renacimiento 67% of people have title to their land. Approximately one quarter of farmers in 
Boquete self-reported ownership of steeply sloped agricultural land compared to only 14 percent 
in Renacimiento. Coffee was reported by most farmers to be their highest income producing land 
use (54%) and twenty-four percent of the farmers who are planning to change their current land 
use are planning to increase coffee production on their land. Increasing income was the reason 
that farmers stated for their land use change decisions in 41 percent of the cases. Still 15 percent 
did report plans for reforestation and 8 percent were motivated to change their current land use 
for conservation reasons.  
 
Information about household demographics is summarized in Table 2.3. The majority of 
respondents (78%) are male and the mean age is 55.62 years (SD = 14.78). Most are second 
generation farmers in the area with a mean of 49.51 years of local family farming history (SD = 
29.46). Ninety-two percent of families have been farming in the area for less than 100 years and 
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most have a private individual ownership structure for their farm. About 40 percent have at least 
one household member earning off-farm employment, even so 78 percent still earn the majority 
or all of their income from farming. The most common income class that was selected by 
respondents was $200 – 299 per month; the mean income bracket selected falls almost exactly at 
the $500 - $599 per month range, and the median falls at $400 - $499. Incomes in Boquete 
average slightly higher than in Renacimiento.  Almost seven percent (21 respondents) reported 
incomes of less than $100 per month, representing a very low-income population in the region.  
 
The most common grade in school completed by respondents was 6th grade; the mean and 
median fall at the 9th grade mark. On average, farmers in Boquete have obtained a higher level 
of formal education with ~15 percent more reporting some formal education beyond high school.  
 
A number of questions on the survey related to current and previous participation by landowners 
in conservation programs (Table 2.4). Sixteen percent reported having land in a private reserve 
and 11 percent had land enrolled in the Conservation Coffee program (a Conservation 
International program). When asked about programs which they had participated in the past, but 
no longer participate in Conservation Coffee was the most common program named. Some 
respondents also identified themselves as previous participants of the Rainforest Alliance coffee 
program. The most common reasons they reported for no longer participating were related to 
issues of insufficient support, high costs, program termination, and program expulsion. Non-
participants (64% of respondents) reported lack of access to programs, lack of invitation, and 
unfamiliarity as the most common reasons for never participating in a program. Respondents in 





The number of conservation and agricultural assistance organizations worked with is used in this 
study as a proxy for the level of the landowner’s engagement in conservation. Approximately 
(42%) of respondents said they had worked with at least one of the farmer/rancher organizations 
or agencies in the region. Twenty-nine percent reported working with one of the organizations, 
and only 13 percent reported working with more than one. The most common agency which 
respondents had worked with was Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario de Panamá - MIDA 
(32%) followed Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente –ANAM (10%) and the titling organization 
PRONAT (8.5%).  
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services Scenarios 
Respondents were asked to rate their level of knowledge/awareness of the PES concept on a 
scale of 1-5. The mean response was 1.57, between “no knowledge” and “little knowledge” and 
only 4 people (or 1.2% reported a high level of familiarity with PES. Of the 34 percent who 
reported “slightly familiar” or higher largest group (25%) had heard about PES from a friend or 
acquaintance. Local organizations, Costa Rica program, publications, and television were all 
reported by over 10 percent of respondents as sources. 
Forest Conservation Scenario 
Approximately 53 percent of respondents across both communities were willing to participate in 
the hypothetical forest conservation program if the payment was sufficient and opted for 15 years 
(SD = 27.13) as the maximum number of years for which they would be willing to sign an initial 
contract (Table 2.5).  Farmers in Boquete were willing to enroll an average of 28.54 hectares (SD 
= 98.12); this is almost two times as much land as farmers in Renacimiento were willing to 
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enroll (14.56 hectares, SD = 55.54). These means are reported in the table for consistency, since 
means are used to measure difference by location in the t-test. However, the means are skewed 
by a few households willing to enroll very large amounts of land. The median amount of land 
that landowners are willing to enroll overall is 3.00 hectares.  
 
When asked to identify the type of organizations they would prefer to work with as the 
administrator of the program (charged with helping farmers to register their land, distributing 
payments to participants, and monitoring the program), the greatest proportion of respondents 
across both districts (43%) stated having no preference followed closely by non-governmental 
organizations being preferred by 39 percent of respondents.  None of the remaining options were 
very popular. Private company oversight was preferred by 13 percent and local or federal 
government oversight was selected by four percent and less than one percent respectively.  
 
Reforestation Scenario 
Fewer  respondents overall are willing to participate in the hypothetical reforestation program 
(42%), if the payment is sufficient, and they opted for slightly fewer years for which they would 
be willing to sign an initial contract (table 2.6). Farmers in Renacimiento are significantly more 
willing to participate in the reforestation program than those in Boquete, but for fewer years. As 
seen with the forest conservation scenario, interested farmers in Boquete were willing to enroll 
more land in the reforestation scenario, with a mean of 26.91 hectares (SD = 108.62); this is 
three times as much land as farmers in Renacimiento were willing to enroll (mean of 9 hectares, 
SD = 30.58). Once again, the means are skewed by a few farmers interested in enrolling large 
land areas especially in Boquete. The median number of hectares respondents across both sectors 
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were willing to enroll was 2.5 hectares. After “no preference”, non-governmental organizations 
were again selected as the preferred management option (36%).  Votes for private company, and 




The hypothetical agroforestry program was the most popular program option with 78 percent of 
the overall study population willing to participate if the payment was sufficient (table 2.7). The 
average preferred contract length approximately was 10 years (SD = 1.50). Consistent with 
findings for the other two programs, farmers in Boquete were willing to enroll on average more 
land (26.42 hectares, SD = 100.77) than those in Renacimiento (7 hectares, SD = 9.61). The 
median reported enrollment was 3.00 hectares across both regions. Non-governmental 
organizations were selected as the preferred management option (49%).  Votes for a private 
company or government agency were at 12 percent or below. 
 
Program Ranking 
After considering each program scenario individually, respondents were asked to compare and 
rank the programs. The agroforestry program received the most votes for first choice program 
(57%) followed by forest conservation (42%) and reforestation (10%). This reinforces 
willingness to participate counts in the same rank order of 78 percent for agroforestry, 53 percent 





Logistic regression analysis to determine factors contributing to stated willingness to participate 
Tables 2.8 – 2.17 present the results from a series of logistic regressions with unstandardized 
logistic coefficients and odds ratios. Logistic regression analysis of the willingness to participate 
responses is used to identify demographic, socioeconomic and behavior variables that predict or 
explain those responses. “The goal [of logistic regression] is to identify a set of independent 
variables (i.e., a model) that predicts or explains group membership on the dependent variable” 
(Vaske, 2009, p. 457). The dependent variable in our logistic regression models is willingness to 
participate in the PES scenario. Logistic regression extends linear regression to non-continuous 
outcomes. Guided by the literature we combined independent continuous variables (income, 
farm income, age, education, etc.), and added in binary dummy variables - farm size and 
program participation. This recoding is necessary because categorical variables cannot be 
included in logistic regression. Therefore, the categorical responses are broken down into sets of 
dichotomous variables representing the same information (i.e. does the land owner have a small 
farm or a large farm and does the farmer have a small farm or a medium farm). This allows 
analysis of the relative importance of these variables in regression models.  
 
When interpreting logistic regression analyses, the odds ratio is represented by Ex(B) in SPSS 
software. The odds ratio in logistic regression is similar to the unstandardized regression 
coefficient B in regression analysis. The difference is that in regression analysis B explains the 
change in the dependent variable for every unit increase in the dependent variable, while in 
logistic regression Ex(B) is the probability that the outcome occurs to the probability that it does 
not. A significant odds ratio with a value below one indicates that the independent variable 
reduces the odds of the respondent being willing to participate, conversely, an odds ratio greater 
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than one indicates an increase in the odds. Subtracting one from the odds ratio and multiplying 
the result by 100 gives the percent change in the odds of being willing to participate. For 
example, the odds ratio for total income (which had a value of 1.11 in the forest conservation 
model) indicates that every unit increase in this variable (e.g., moving up one income bracket) is 
associated with an 11% increase in the odds of being willing to enroll in the forest conservation 
program.  
 
Logistic regression models are used in this study to regress respondents’ replies to the questions 
about willingness to enroll for each of the three PES scenarios against a series of explanatory 
variables to uncover factors, guided by the systemic literature review reported above, that have a 
significant influence on their willingness to participate.  
 
Forest conservation scenario 
Several variables were found to be statistically significant predictors (p < 0.05) of a respondents 
stated willingness to enroll in a PES program for the forest conservation scenario; these included 
farm size, participation in other programs, age, and total income (table 2.10). These relationships 
are described in details below. Other non-significant socio-economic and past behavioral 
predictors are useful to help identify potential participants, but they only make a small 
contribution to the prediction. The most influential variable in the forest conservation model 
(Farm Size difference between Small – Large), represents the impact of the increase from small 
(less than 5 ha) to large (greater than 30 ha) landholdings on the odds of being willing to enroll 
in the forest conservation program. Households with large farms are significantly more likely to 
enroll in the program. In fact, the relationship between participation in the forest conservation 
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program and the variable Farm Size difference between Small – Large is significant at p 
<.001with an effect size between typical and substantial (phi = .45). Participation in other 
programs represents land enrollment in government or NGO agricultural improvement program 
and these farmers are, not surprisingly more likely to express interest in enrolling in a forest 
conservation PES program. Participation in other programs is divided into low participation 
(enrollment of <10 hectares) and high participation (enrollment of >10 hectares) and both serve 
as significant predictors of willingness to participate in forest conservation PES. An increase in 
income also increases the likelihood of a household’s willingness to participate. The model also 
found that younger farmers are more likely to be interested in participating in the forest 
conservation PES program. 
 
The “willingness to participate” question for the forest conservation scenario is influenced by the 
fact that each landowner must by definition have existing forest on their land in order to be able 
to participate. As represented in table 2.8, the overall model was predictive for the forest 
conservation program with a chi-square of 92.05 significant at p < .001. This means that the null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients in the model are zero is rejected because the chi-squared 
associated with the difference between the – 2LL models (constant /model) is significant. 
Nagelkerke  R2 approximates the variance which can be predicted as 0.35 The model successfully 
classifies 75% of participants’ willingness to participate in this program with a relatively equal 
predicative success rate across both participants and non-participants (table 2.9).   
Reforestation scenario 
As represented in table 2.11 the overall model for the Reforestation scenario has a chi-square of 
40.31 significant at p < .001.  The predictive power (Nagelkerke  R2) is .17. The model correctly 
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predicts 66 percent of respondents’ willingness to participate in this program (see Table 2.12).  
However, the model is more successful at predicting who will not participate (79%) than it is at 
predicting who will participate (52%). Farm size, tenure, and amount of land enrolled in other 
programs are all significant predictors of willingness to participate in the reforestation program 
at the p < 0.05 level or better (see Table 2.13). Those with a medium or a large farm are more 
likely to be willing to participate in the reforestation PES program than those with small farms. 
Participation in other agricultural improvement programs significantly predicts participation. 
Also, those without secure land tenure are significantly more likely to be interested in the 
program.  
Agroforestry scenario 
As represented in table 2.14, the overall model for the agroforestry scenario has a chi-square of 
16.62 and does not significantly explain variance in willingness to participate in the program ( p 
= .083).  The predictive power (Nagelkerke  R2) is only .085. Overall, the model correctly 
predicts 80 percent of participants’ willingness to participate in this program (table 2.15).  
However, the model is only successful at predicting those who will participate (100 %) and did 
not correctly predict any of the non-participants. The only significant explanatory variable in this 
model is the number of conservation organizations that the landowner has worked with – those 
who have worked with more conservation organizations are more likely to be inserted in 
agroforestry PES (table 2.16).  
Combined results from logistic regression analysis 
Overall, eight out of the 10 variables were significant predictors of willingness to participate in at 
least one of the programs. Figure 2.2 provides a summary of the logistic regression analyses for 
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willingness to participate in the three scenario options. For the forest conservation scenario, farm 
size explains the most variability, followed by participation in other conservation programs. 
Willingness to participate in the reforestation scenario is explained predominately by 
participation in other conservation programs and land tenure, with tenure having a negative 
relationship with participation as described above. The only significant variable explaining 
participation in the agroforestry scenario is the number of organizations with which the farmer 
has worked. The forest conservation scenario model includes six significant variables and the 
forest conservation scenario model includes five. Age and total income are only significant 
predicting willingness to participate in forest conservation. Age has a negative effect on 
willingness to participate, meaning that younger farmers and ranchers were more likely to 
express willingness to participate. Those with higher income are more likely to express 
willingness to participate. Tenure is only significant in the reforestation model; those with less 
secure land tenure expressed a greater willingness to participate. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our survey of agricultural landowners in the districts of Boquete and Renacimiento in western 
Panama was designed to gather information about potential interest in and preferred design 
parameters for a PES program that could deliver conservation and livelihood benefits. As noted 
earlier, no PES program is currently in operation in this region (with the exception of potential 
participation in international carbon markets), placing this region in a similar position to many 
across the world where PES is being explored as a new market-based approach to conservation 
(Daily et al., 2009). How these programs are designed will directly impact the degree to which a 
broad spectrum of landowners are or are not able to receive PES contracts, and therefore whether 
they are in a position to benefit from a new program. Appropriate design requires combining 
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detailed site-specific information with lessons learned from experience to-date with existing PES 
programs. Within the context of lessons learned we interpret the results of our survey, to provide 
insights for future development of a successful PES program in western Panama and to inform 
PES development more broadly. 
 
The first issue that must be addressed, and which could potentially be overlooked, is whether 
landowners express interest in PES and see such a program, albeit hypothetical at the design 
stage, as worthwhile to participate in. Landowner response to the PES concept was 
overwhelmingly positive. Landowner response to the general behavioral intentions to enroll in a 
given scenario can serve to help predict potential reactions to actual programs. Over half of 
respondents stated willingness to participate in a forest conservation scenario. This dropped to 
about 40 percent for the reforestation scenario and swelled to almost 80 percent for the 
agroforestry scenario. Interest was fairly consistent across both communities surveyed. 
Interestingly, landowner familiarity with the PES concept was low with an average response of 
1.57 on a 5 point likert scale (between “no knowledge” and “little knowledge”). Therefore we 
surmise that most respondents are basing their interest in the concept on their own sense of its 
worth and practicality rather than from what they have heard from their neighbors in Costa Rica, 
read online, or seen on television.  
 
Given that landowners across both communities in our survey expressed interest in developing a 
PES program, the next key issue is to explore what type of program would be likely to garner the 
greatest interest. It is logical that agroforestry is ranked as the most preferred scenario, given that 
it fits in best with respondents current agricultural operations.  Probably due to the lack of 
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upfront costs, forest conservation is the second most popular program. Reforestation requires the 
greatest change to current operations and a relatively high upfront investment and it is the least 
preferred program option, but 42 percent of respondents were interested in even this least 
popular scenario.    
 
The basic concept of PES is for users (beneficiaries) of ecosystem services to pay landowners for 
the ecosystem services supplied by their land (Pagiola et al., 2005). However, in reality, 
intermediaries often make these transactions possible through government programs, non-profit 
organizations, private brokers or other institutions that link buyers and sellers, help to set prices, 
and provide information and security to the individuals involved in the transaction. Across two 
of the scenarios, “no preference” was the most common response, with the stated preference to 
work with an NGO a close second or first choice in the case of agroforestry. This is not 
surprising given the lack or government involvement in the area and the strong positive 
contributions of several local and some international NGOs  (Shah, 2006; The Nature 
Conservancy, 2007). (Pagiola et al., 2005) emphasize the important role that local organizations 
community groups or NGOs play in successful pro-poor PES programs.  
 
In addition to choosing a general focus for the PES program, designers are faced with a set of 
decisions that will directly affect the degree to which individual landowners are eligible, and 
indeed find it attractive, to participate in the program. Such factors were highlighted earlier in 
this chapter through the systematic literature review, and how eligibility requirements (e.g., 
minimum acreage) and other design parameters are set can be a powerful bottleneck affecting 




The vast majority (82%) of farms in this study region are 30 hectares or smaller, and of these, 45 
percent are less than 5 hectares in size. Therefore, if a program were to set a minimum size 
requirement, and where this number is set, could have a major impact in allowing or making 
ineligible a substantial fraction of landowners. For example, Costa Rica’s PSA effectively set a 
minimum acreage requirement of 10 hectares, which led to a great deal of criticism of the 
program (Hope et al., 2005; Miranda et al., 2003). Given that almost half of landowners in our 
study region own 5 hectares or less, ensuring that PES designers are aware of the number of 
small farms in the area will be important to evaluating the tradeoffs (ecological, economic, and 
social) in setting a minimum eligible hectarage. 
 
If PES program developers in Panama decided to use the program to address unsustainable 
clearing of steep slopes for agriculture, than the number of potentially eligible participants would 
drop off significantly since only 20 percent report owning steeply-sloped land (however, the 
definition of “steep” was subjective in this survey).  
 
Our logistic regression analysis showed that those with less secure land tenure are significantly 
more likely to be willing to participate in a reforestation PES program. The same relationship 
was evident, but not statistically significant for the other two scenarios. Perhaps this is because 
the respondents see program enrollment as a possible means for establishing secure tenure. It is 
important to keep in mind that this study explores potential for enrollment in hypothetical PES 
scenarios without set eligibility requirements. Studies of actual participation in existing programs 
typically show that those with secure land title are more likely to participate. Tenure eligibility 
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requirements are the likely reason for this discrepancy. That said, due to the successful efforts of 
PRONAT (a land-titling project funded by the Global Environmental Facility and World Bank), 
land tenure is relatively secure in our study region with 80 percent overall possessing title to their 
land. In 2003, PRONAT began a project of systematic property registration in five districts 
(including the two districts where we conducted surveys) in the province of Chiriquí. This is the 
first step towards registration throughout the country. The project formed part of a World Bank 
financed program consisting of different components that together were a prerequisite for future 
land reforms in Panama.  Currently, insecure land tenure is considered to be an impediment to 
PES in most of rest of the country since PRONAT has only addressed this issue in select regions 
(Connelly & Shapiro, 2006). Property rights in Panama are relatively weak, and this affects 
farmers’ investment decisions (Shah, 2006). The uncertainty in land ownership is a disincentive 
to investments in sustainable agricultural and other practices delivering longer-term benefits. 
Participation in the PRONAT project is one of the reasons that this study site was selected. 
 
Farmers interested in PES program enrollment from the district of Renacimeinto would be more 
impacted by land title PES eligibility requirements since the land tenure variable varies 
significantly by location with farmers in Renacimineto 26 percent less likely to possess a legal 
title for their land. They would also potentially benefit less from a program focused on steep 
slope protection since 12 percent fewer reported steep slope land holdings.  
 
Significant differences between Boquete and Renacimiento exist for all of the socio-economic 
characteristics reported in table 2.3. Household heads in Boquete were more likely to be female, 
older, more educated, and have a higher income than those in Renacimiento. Several of these 
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variables may contribute to differences in willingness to enroll in a PES program and preferences 
about the way that a program is implemented. Although there are many similarities between 
these communities they are different enough to offer some insights into program preferences and 
overall interest across a varied landscape and these differences mean that it is likely that there 
will be differences in eligibility and participation, and therefore benefits delivered to each 
community. Understanding the heterogeneity both within and across communities is key to 
effective PES program design. 
 
This study also revealed an association between location and conservation engagement. 
Residents of Boquete may have had more access to conservation programs and support 
organizations over the years due to its less remote location and the large influx of new residents 
from all over the Panama, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere. Overall, the level of 
engagement is probably skewed for both communities due to the sampling procedure which 
selected names from lists of MIDA program participants, member of coffee growing 
cooperatives, etc. Farmers in Panama are not required to register their farm in any way, so there 
is no comprehensive list of farmers. 
 
We close this second chapter with an exploration of the role of landowner socio-economic and 
past behavior characteristics in predicting stated willingness to participate in PES scenarios. The 
aim of this empirical analysis was to find out the extent to which a set of variables account for 
the variability in willingness to participate. The same group of 10 predictor variables was used 
for all three dependent variables (scenarios). It is suggested in the literature that demographics 
are not the best predictors of attitudes and behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Dietz, Stern, & 
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Guagnano, 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising that they were less significant predictors of 
intention to enroll across the three programs. The best predictors of future behavior are often past 
behaviors (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Past program participation explained the most variation for 
both the forest conservation and the reforestation scenarios. Other significant explanatory 
variables such as farm size and tenure would most likely increase in predictive power for actual 
program participation due to eligibility requirements and payment amounts based on number of 
hectares enrolled. It is also important to keep in mind that when the sample population is too 
homogeneous on a factor (i.e. there is not a lot of variability) then not a lot variance can be 
explained by the factor. This may be true for tenure in this study since 81 percent have title to 
their land, even though evidence from the literature about existing programs suggests that this is 
an important factor (Miranda et al., 2003; Zbinden & Lee, 2005).  
 
Overall the analyses of factors influencing stated willingness to participate in the three program 
modalities provided some useful insights into individual decision making drivers. The logistic 
regression model for the agroforestry scenario was less successful then the other two models due 
to a limitation of the model. This model exhibited a lack of variance of the dependent variable 




The information collected through our survey provides information to leaders in our study region 
of western Panama about the potential feasibility of a PES program from the perspectives of 
landowners, who would act as sellers of ecosystem services. This information could help to 
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guide program design decisions. While our specific results are particular to our study region, our 
approach and the ways in which our results support and contradict existing findings in the 
literature from PES programs currently in operation contributes to a broader knowledge about 
the barriers and opportunities presented by PES. Notably this research provides insights 
regarding the difference between those interested in participating in hypothetical PES program 
options in Panama and those actually participating in PES programs in other countries. 
Specifically our results show that famers with less secure land title are interested in participating. 
Our results corroborate findings which show that wealthier land owners with more land are more 
likely to be willing to participate and that conservation engagement and experience with other 
agriculture programs are significant predictors of interest in PES participation. By proactively 
investigating these issues, we can help ensure that PES programs are designed to increase the 
likelihood of broad landowner eligibility and delivering positive livelihood benefits to 
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As payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs in developing countries have increased, so 
have concerns about the impacts on and potential for participation by low income households 
(Pagiola et al., 2007). An estimated 800 million people do not have access to sufficient food 
worldwide, of these “half are smallholder farmers, a fifth are rural landless, and a tenth are 
principally dependent on rangelands, forests, and fisheries” (Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008). Poverty 
and hunger reduction for these people depends on their ability to sustain and increase production 
of crops, livestock, and forest goods, and harvest from fisheries. PES programs are increasingly 
defining social policy objectives, in addition to environmental objectives, that seek to use PES as 
a tool for poverty alleviation, rural development and livelihood improvement. These approaches, 
however, are frequently unsuccessful at involving the poorest landowners (Corbera, Katrina 
Brown, & Adger, 2007; Rosa, Kandel, & Dimas, 2003).  This is perhaps not surprising given that 
the PES approach was created first and foremost as a method to improve natural resource 
management, and not as an instrument for poverty reduction (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 
2005). However, some researchers and other advocates maintain that there is a potential for PES 




Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs and Poverty 
Across a variety of programs and locations there is a positive income gain from PES in Latin 
America, but there’s a lot of variability around this general trend. The average estimated median 
income gains for projects in the region range from 1% to 17% (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).  For 
example, evidence to date has been mixed regarding the impact on the poor for Costa Rica’s PES 
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program (referred to in Spanish as the pagos por servicios ambientales, or PSA), one of the 
largest and longest operating PES programs. In some situations, PES has been found to 
contribute significantly to participants’ household income (Wunder, 2008). A survey of PSA 
participants in Costa Rica found that across income levels in one quarter of households the return 
from PES accounted for over 10% of household income; this can be a significant gain especially 
for very low-income participants and given the frequent thin margins of profitability for small 
landowners (Malavasi, Mora, & Carvajal, 2003). At the same time, however, this means that for 
the remaining three-quarters of households, PES payments accounted for 10% or less of family 
income. Other studies in Costa Rica have indicated greater returns such as a study in the 
relatively wealthy Virilla watershed which found that PES payments on average contributed 
approximatey16% of family income (Miranda et al., 2003). However, several studies (Miranda et 
al., 2003; Malavasi et al., 2003; Zbinden & Lee, 2005) have found that in mixed income 
communities, the majority of program benefits go to large land holders and relatively better-off 
farmers and that overall the middle class benefited the most from PES schemes (Kosoy et al., 
2008; Kosoy, Martinez-Tuna, Muradian, & Martinez-Alier, 2007; Locatelli et al., 2008; Pagiola 
et al., 2007).  These results appear to be due in part to high upfront investment costs and program 
eligibility and selection criteria that create barriers to participation by poorer households (Pagiola 
et al, 2007).   
 
On the other hand, Munoz (2004) did a study in an impoverished region of the Osa Peninsula in 
Costa Rica and found that the PSA program plays an important role in the livelihood of low-
income land holders. The program lifted half of the participants in this study above the poverty 
line and became the primary household cash income source in 44 percent of cases (Muñoz, 
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2004). Other studies in similarly impoverished regions of Ecuador, Bolivia and Costa Rica 
(Echavarria, Vogel, Alban, & Meneses, 2004; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008) also 
showed significant income returns for poor land users resulting from PES. The greatest return of 
30 percent of household income was documented for a PES project in Pimampiro, Ecuador, 
where PES compensation was used to cover healthcare, education, and food expenses, thus 
helping to improve living conditions (Echavarria et al., 2004).  
 
Reasons for concern about the potential adverse effects of market-based conservation 
mechanisms on rural livelihoods are both moral and practical (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Landell-
Mills & Porras, 2002; Rosa et al., 2003; Smith & Scherr, 2002). Currently, all major public 
nationwide PES programs in developing countries (Costa Rica, China, Mexico, South Africa, 
and Vietnam) have mechanisms in place specifically to target the poor (Wunder, 2008).  
According to Pagiola et al. (2005), a pro-poor PES program is one that maximizes its potential 
positive impact and minimizes its potential negative impact on the poor by 1) keeping transaction 
costs low, 2) providing targeted assistance to encourage participation, 3) avoiding 
implementation of programs in areas with conflicts over land tenure, and 4) ensuring the social 
context is well understood. These factors can have important effects on household participation 
in PES. If PES programs do not have eligibility guidelines designed with the poorest households 
in mind, then payments to those who are eligible might actually increase barriers to participation 
and further exacerbate social inequalities (Rosa, Kandel, & Dimas, 2005).  
Many factors have been shown to affect a given household’s ability to participate in PES, such as 
farm characteristics (e.g. amount and type of land), amount of available household labor, 
payment levels, and land tenure (Pagiola et al., 2007). PES often require landowners to enroll a 
85 
 
minimum number of hectares, have title to their land, and to adopt new land practices (e.g., 
reforestation) which can prove prohibitively costly to poorer households, thus creating eligibility 
barriers (Corbera et al., 2007; Pagiola et al., 2007). Property rights have been shown in some 
case studies to strongly mediate access to PES (Corbera et al., 2007; Rosa et al., 2003).  Other 
PES eligibility barriers are due to poor and less educated households being unable to understand 
the program guidelines or fill out the required paperwork (Locatelli et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 
2007).    
PES Program Design and Poverty: The Costa Rican Example 
FONAFIFO, the public agency overseeing Costa Rica’s PSA program, recently introduced 
program modifications designed to increase the potential for positive effects on rural poverty 
alleviation. Carlos Manuel Rodríguez, the Minister of the Environment who engineered the most 
recent changes in FONAFIFO, said that “…we need to stop viewing the PSA program as merely 
a tool for preserving biodiversity and promoting the planting of forests. Instead, we need to see it 
as a tool for rural development that also includes reforestation and biodiversity conservation.” 
(Hartshorn, Ferraro, & Spergel, 2005). This perspective could be seen as signifying a return to 
the original project goals, since the 1996 Costa Rican Forestry Law (No.7575) which officially 
authorized the PSA program specifically identifies income and employment in rural areas as 
goals of the program and prioritizes support and outreach for small and medium farms (Hope et 
al., 2005; Miranda et al., 2003).  
 
Recent modifications to make the Cost Rican PSA program more accessible to low-income 
landowners have included the introduction of agroforestry and silvopastoral activities as a new 
program option, removing land title as a requirement for landowner participation in the forest 
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conservation program, and the prioritization of counties having a social development index lower 
than 40 percent (Wünscher, Engel, & Wunder, 2006, 2008). Including agroforestry and 
silvopastoral payment schemes can make programs more pro-poor by allowing for diversified 
income in a continued agricultural land use context, while requiring formal land title in order to 
participate is probably the most common anti-poor selection bias. It was in response to 
increasing concern about this tenure bias that Costa Rica recently reformed its program to no 
longer require land titles for participation (Wunder, 2008). However, applicants must have a 
cadastral plan that indicates the boundaries and size of their holdings, and many poor farmers 
lack such plans (Hartshorn et al., 2005).  
 
A remaining issue for the PSA program is that the land area requirement reforms are not entirely 
transparent. Costa Rica’s PSA states that parcels of land from one hectare up to a maximum of 
300 ha may qualify for PES payments; however, in practice, FONAFIFO adopts a qualification 
threshold of 10 hectares, to be consistent with the minimum legal area of a “forest” as defined by 
the Costa Rican forestry law (Hope et al., 2005). This effectively excludes small farmers, and in 
the past, FONAFIFO has tended to allocate grants to large and medium landholders (Hayward, 
2005; Hope et al., 2005; Solis, 2001). Also, for all of the PSA program options, properties may 
practically need to be approximately 10 ha or larger to make it financially viable to incur the 
transaction costs. This is because total payments are calculated on the basis of land area 
protected, whereas the transaction costs of enrollment are similar for both large and small land 
parcels (Pagiola et al. 2005).One solution is for small farm transactions to be subsidized. 
However this is not always a popular option since perceived ecological benefits associated with 
87 
 
conserving large tracts may also increase program administrator bias toward focusing on 
contracts for more sizable land parcels (Zbinden & Lee 2005).  
FONAFIFO has attempted to address some of these issues by allowing contratos globales (a 
system of collective contracting). Using this system, a group of small farmers can join the PSA 
program collectively rather than individually, thus spreading transaction costs across the group 
(FONAFIFO, 2000). While a great idea in concept, this approach ran into problems in practice 
when noncompliance by a single group member resulted in payments being halted to all 
members. The approach has since been revised to process the applications of such groups 
together, but then issue individual contracts. This avoids the partial compliance issue, but also 
results in much smaller savings in transaction costs. FONAFIFO recently increased PSA 
reforestation payment rates and extended the payment period from 5 to 10 years (FONAFIFO, 
2008). Accordingly, these changes may help to attract smaller and more farm-dependent 
landowners. 
In addition to insecure land tenure and small landholdings, landlessness and the poor ecosystem 
service potential of land owned by the poor can leave out billions of poor people (Wunder, 
2008). Furthermore, “[i]f PES promoted land uses reduce demand for labor, those who depend 
on such employment for their livelihood could be adversely affected (Pagiola et al., 2005). 
However, for those low-income households who are able to participate, PES offers a new source 






Other Pro-poor PES Concerns and Opportunities 
Wunder (2008) identifies key impacts of PES schemes on poor participants, including important 
non-income effects. The most commonly recognized non-income benefits resulting from these 
projects are strengthened tenure security, increased human and social capital, and a healthier and 
more productive natural environment. Collective action often increases low-income farmers’ 
access to PES programs and many successful pro-poor PES programs have involved cooperative 
agreements among many small landholders in order to reduce transaction fees.  As Wunder 
(2008) explains, some benefits that the poor enjoy as a result of PES programs are intended, 
while others are incidental results of addressing other environmental goals. For example, 
payments to improve water quality for an urban area may also improve the fisheries that local 
people depend on. Drawing upon observations from three continents, Wunder proposes that often 
poor service providers can both participate in and benefit from PES schemes. However, he also 
emphasizes the importance of considering effects on both poor service users and non-
participants. Angelsen & Wunder (2003) make the important distinction between poverty 
reduction - lifting people out of poverty - and poverty prevention - providing safety nets and 
otherwise keeping people from falling into or deeper into poverty. Wunder (2008) also makes an 
equally important distinction between conservation and restoration schemes, pointing out that the 
difference between when “PES is for doing something or for not doing something has likely 
implications for local economic activity, employment, and thus also for poverty.” 
 
Even though sustainable livelihoods make a contribution to conservation and ecological 
integrity, scholars raise caution about considering a PES program primarily as a poverty 
reduction tool. In fact, “[t]here is no reason to believe that PES could, at the one extreme, risk 
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becoming a poverty trap nor, at the other, a massive contribution to the poverty-alleviation 
Millennium Development Goals” (Wunder, 2008). Accordingly, Wunder (2008) argues that the 
primary criteria for participant selection must be the capacity to provide targeted ecosystem 
services. A program will only be sustainable if the buyers are satisfied with the quantity and 
quality of the service that they are paying to receive. Wunder (2008) also argues that “less 
emphasis be given to direct PES poverty targeting, and more to increasing the scale of well-
functioning PES schemes, which likely has more important welfare implications.”  
PURPOSE 
The review of the literature highlights the multiple factors that must be taken into account when 
considering how to develop a PES program that has positive impacts on poor households. When 
designing a PES program, (Pagiola et al., 2005) argue that “…the most important step is to 
design the payment mechanism so as not to exclude poor land users. This requires keeping the 
transaction costs as low as possible, and being creative in response to problems such as insecure 
tenure or lack of titles. This will be easier to do when there are strong local organizations such as 
community groups or NGOs that can help organize participants and provide a forum for 
discussing solutions to problems as they arise.” This part of our study investigates the key issue 
of how to avoid excluding low-income participants at the initial design stage of a PES program. 
This chapter focuses on program design factors that are integral to successful pro-poor PES due 
to their influence on participation. First, we develop a site-specific socioeconomic status index 
based upon the literature to capture a more nuanced understanding of the socioeconomic 
landscape. Second, we apply and test the reliability of this index using the survey data from 
western Panama. Third, we interpret the implications of the results for pro-poor program design 
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through a structured eligibility analysis considering program design elements that could be 
important bottlenecks restricting landowner participation (see systematic literature review in Ch. 
2). There are certainly other issues that will be necessary to explore in order to determine the 
feasibility of PES and to identify the best program design for the region, such as ecological 
targeting, payment amounts, and identifying buyers. Even so, this research contributes to a key 
piece of the puzzle: how to proactively explore ways to ensure that landowners across the 
socioeconomic spectrum (including particularly the poor) are able to participate. Understanding 
trade-offs is important for program success regardless of whether or not a future program has 
explicit rural development or poverty alleviation goals. However, given the growing prevalence 
of social policy goals in PES programs in the developing world (Wunder 2008), it is unlikely that 
a PES program would be offered in Panama without these goals; it is also unlikely that a 
program could be successful in this region without addressing local livelihood concerns. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Factors which influence PES Participation 
In a meta-analysis of landowner participation studies for existing and hypothetical PES 
programs, this author reviewed 56 studies (see Ch. II, table 2.1) and found that program design 
factors, landscape characteristics, and individual household factors play important roles in 
determining landowner participation choices across a variety of socioeconomic, political, and 
ecological landscapes. Based upon a logistic regression analysis from the survey data reported in 
chapter II for our study region of western Panama, we found that multiple factors had a 
significant explanatory effect on willingness to enroll in the three hypothetical PES scenarios 
including farm size, participation in other conservation programs, land tenure, the number of 
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conservation organizations with which the farmer has worked, age, and total income.  Larger 
farms, higher incomes, and more experience working with conservation organizations and or 
other agricultural programs are all significant predictors for interest in participating in one or 
more of the PES scenarios. For the forest conservation scenario age has a negative effect on 
willingness to participate, meaning that younger farmers and ranchers were more likely to 
express willingness to participate. Less secure tenure increases willingness to participate 
significantly for the reforestation model. Several of these factors (farm size, land tenure, total 
income) are related to a household’s socioeconomic status and would likely be related to future 
PES program eligibility requirements. These are important issues to consider if a program is 
meant to be accessible to poor households. However, first it is important to clearly define what is 
meant by socioeconomic status. 
Who are we talking about when we talk about ‘the poor’? How best to measure socioeconomic 
status 
Particularly in developing countries, traditional one-dimensional measures of socioeconomic 
well-being (e.g., income, age, profession or education) are generally found to be inadequate for 
capturing a household’s true livelihood or well-being condition (Wagle, 2008). Several studies 
have responded to this issue of inadequate representation by creating composite indicators of 
social and economic status or well-being that take other factors into account (Cooke, 2005).  
“These indicators attempt to combine several important dimensions of well-being or quality of 
life into a single measure, which can then be compared between populations and across time” 
(Cooke, 2005, p. 1).  Indicators such as socio-economic status (SES) indices are used to assess 
current conditions of a system, compare situations, and monitor changes occurring over time 
(Sayer et al., 2007). These indicators are diverse due to their development and application in a 
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variety of contexts. Part of the variability of well-being dimensions included in such indices is 
due to which types of data are available for a particular region and project, as well as their 
potential comparability (Cooke, 2005). Composite indicators may have anywhere from four to 
over eighty indicators, which demonstrates the diversity between composite indicators (Cooke, 
2005). While no one indicator can comprehensively address all components of well-being or 
socioeconomic status, combined indicators can demonstrate the validity of the composite index 
overall, and prove a useful tool for analyzing other factors. Variables used in a variety of SES-
oriented composite indices are listed in table 3.1.  
Livelihood Issues in Western Panama 
Social inequality is pervasive in Panama where privileged families of European descent control 
most of the wealth and power, and approximately 40 percent of the population lives in poverty 
(BBC, 2009). The Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) - a global partnership program 
that provides strategic assistance to nongovernmental and private sector partners in conserving 
Earth’s biodiversity hotspots - published a review focused on poverty reduction for its Southern 
Mesoamerica portfolio and reported that “socioeconomic data indicate a low standard of living” 
in the Osa-Talamanca-Bocas del Toro conservation corridor. In the same report, researchers 
compared households within the corridor to national averages for the following poverty 
indicators: cook with charcoal/wood, female-headed household, lack of electricity, lack of access 
to potable water, and lack of interior plumbing. Households within the corridor in Panama were 
worse off for all five indicators, with 55 percent cooking with charcoal/wood, 18 percent with 
female-headed household, 62 percent with lack of electricity, 38 percent with lack of access to 
potable water, and 35 percent with lack of interior plumbing (CEPF, 2005). This Osa-
Talamanca-Bocas del Toro conservation corridor encompasses the Talamanca Highlands of both 
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Costa Rica and Panama and includes the study area for this research project. However, the 
highest concentration of poverty occurs within the indigenous territories which are not included 
in our primary study sites. A small scale explorative study was also conducted by this research 
team in one indigenous Ngöbe Bugle community in the region but is not included as part of this 
thesis.   
METHODS 
See chapter 2 for a full description of the study site, survey instruments, sampling methods, 
and modes of data collection. 
 
Data Analysis  
Quantitative data analysis included statistical analyses of the original quantitative data and the 
quantitized (originally qualitative) data from the landowner surveys described in chapter 2. 
Computer analyses were performed using PASW-SPSS 18.0 (Predictive Analytics SoftWare - 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). 
Socioeconomic status (SES) index creation 
PES program eligibility criteria determine who of those willing to participate can actually 
participate.  In order to understand potential relationships between eligibility and socioeconomic 
status in the study region, we created a SES index using indicators selected based upon the 
literature and the context of the study region (table 3.2). Specifically the measures used by CEPF 
guided the creation of our survey questions related to SES. The SES index included the 
following combination of variables: head of household, education level, household monthly 
income, electricity and plumbing availability in house, and type of cooking fuel.  
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Standardized Z-scores were computed for each of the variables in order to standardize the 
variable response scales.  These variables were then combined into an additive index to create an 
SES score for each respondent. The total z-scores that resulted from the index were grouped into 
three categories based on equal intervals: high SES, medium SES, and low SES. These groups 
were divided using natural breakpoints closest to thirds within the z-score results (0 – 36.2%, 
36.3% - 67.4%, 67.5% - 100%).   
Reliability analysis 
We used Cronbach’s alpha to check the intercorrelation of response patterns and thereby 
measure the reliability of the scale. We also used an ANOVA analysis to check differences in 
means across the scale for all of the variables included and for two variables (farm size and 
tenure) which we hypothesized to be related to the SES index.  
SES and Participation Relationship 
We use the crosstabs to investigate the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
willingness to participate. This will help determine if interest in PES enrollment is different 
based on socio-economic data (i.e. are less-educated and poorer people less interested in program 
opportunities). If it turns out that those lower on the SES scale are less interested then 
investigating the reasons why would be important. For instance, are they unable to understand 
the programs? In this case education and outreach programs might be important components of 
pro-poor PES design. However, if there is no difference in willingness to participate then 
eligibility criteria is probably an important place to focus attention in order to make sure that the 




SES and Eligibility Relationship (Eligibility variable creation) 
In order to begin to explore the concept of participant eligibility, another variable was created 
from a combination of pre-existing survey variables. The following variables and their specific 
criteria were combined: tenure (have title to land), ownership (own land, do not rent land), and 
farm size (own more than 5 hectares). Those participants that did not answer yes to all three 
variables were counted as ineligible. This criterion is based on typical PES criteria that require 
participants to have title to their land, to own their land, and to enroll more than five hectares of 
land in the program. We used the 5 hectare cut-off because the survey data only collected total 
farm size data by category (< 5 ha = small farm, 5 – 30 ha = medium farm, and > 30 ha = large 
farm). Since the Costa Rican PSA program (a representative program for the region and the 
inspiration for many other programs) basically requires a minimum of 10 ha, we use this to guide 
our investigation of potential eligibility guidelines in Panama. With this requirement the small 
category of farms from our survey would be ineligible. Some of the medium farms would be and 
some would not, meaning that our hypothetical farm size restriction on eligibility errs on the side 
of being more inclusive for eligibility. Overall, this criterion provides a first approximation 
measure of eligibility, which serves to determine if a relationship between SES and eligibility 
exists in the area.  
 
Eligibility and Participation Relationship 
We then examine the relationship between eligibility and participation using a crosstabs 
procedure to see if those who are willing to participate are more likely to be eligible. The 
statistical significance of this relationship is measured using the Pearson’s chi-square test statistic 
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(comparing the observed against the expected cell counts). Cramer’s V is then used to measure 
the strength of association between the two variables (or effect size).  
 
Potential Eligibility Analysis Curves 
The next step of analyses provided a more in-depth investigation of the eligibility relationship, 
including likely eligibility and pro-poor participation trade-offs. The goal of these analyses is to 
guide program designers toward a “sweet spot” or potential solution where competing factors 
produce a favored outcome between extremes. For each PES scenario, we plotted the percent of 
households against the number of hectares that respondents stated being willing to enroll (line 1). 
Line 1 represents all respondents who indicated that they are willing to participate in the a given 
scenario and graphs the number of hectares they reported that they would enroll. Since actual 
program participation would most likely be bounded by some type of eligibility criteria, we also 
plotted lines for percent of people willing to enroll a given number of hectares bounded by land 
ownership and tenure (line 2) , and land ownership, tenure, and slope - defined by farmers self- 
reporting steep slope (line 3).  Line 2 represents the reported number of hectares that respondents 
who are likely to be eligible are willing to enroll. Eligibility as represented in line 2 is based off 
of affirmative responses to land ownership and possession of land title questions. Line 3 
represents the reported number of hectares that respondents who are likely to be eligible are 
willing to enroll when slope requirements are also included in eligibility criteria. Those who are 
eligible according to the criteria for line 2 and also reported steep slope land on their farm are 
included in line 3. Prior to this analysis we tested the relationship between eligibility and socio-
economic status. If those lower on the SES scale are significantly less likely to be eligible then 
the difference between line 1 and line 2 has serious implications for the inclusion or exclusion of 
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poorer potential participants. A steep slope eligibility requirement is likely to dramatically 
reduce eligibility across all SES levels since only 20 percent of households self-reported steep 
slope farms across the entire sample population. Reasons for bounding participation by size, 
ownership, and tenure have already been discussed above; however, the consideration of a slope 
requirement (or targeting effort) requires explanation. Steeply-sloped lands are more negatively 
impacted by agricultural intensification, due to increased erosion and loss of top soil. Affects can 
be especially negative in watersheds (Nelson & Chomitz, 2004). There is some evidence that 
poorer farmers tend to have more marginal lands including steeply-sloped agricultural lands, so 
this criteria could actually facilitate pro-poor and conservation targeting (Okwi et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, slope is a key premise for targeting in China’s Grain-for-Green program, one of the 
largest PES programs in existence (Liu, Li, Ouyang, Tam, & Chen, 2008). This program aims to 
restore and conserve forest cover and prevent soil erosion on steeply-sloped cropland, as well as 
to alleviate poverty in some of China’s poorest regions (SFA, 2002; Uchida, J. Xu, Z. Xu, & 
Rozelle, 2007).  
 
RESULTS 
SES Index Creation 
Measurement reliability (an analysis of the consistency/intercorrelation of response patterns) of 
our constructed SES index was measured using the internal consistency method and resulted in a 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .61 for the following combination of variables: head of 
household education level, household monthly income, household electricity and plumbing 
availability, and type of cooking fuel. The Cronbach’s alpha decreased if any items were 
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removed. Thus, this scale meets the minimum reliability requirements for an adequate scale 
(Vaske, 2009). 
 Next we conducted a second test of the index using the ANOVA test statistic (table 3.3). We 
found that the relationships of all five variables within the SES index (education, income, 
electricity, plumbing, and fuel) differed significantly across the three SES levels (p < 0.001).  
The effect sizes for these relationships range from typical to substantial (eta = 0.367-0.730). ).  
Respondent’s average level of education ranged from 6th grade (low SES) to 12th grade (high 
SES).  As expected, household income increased as SES increased. Those with a low SES level 
had an average monthly income of $200-299, as compared to the medium SES level with a 
monthly income of $500-599 and high SES level with an average monthly income of $900-999.  
Respondents in the high SES group were found to all have electricity (mean = 3.00), indoor 
plumbing (mean= 3.00) and gas or electric cooking fuel (mean = 3.00).  The low SES group was 
slightly less likely to have all three amenities in their households (mean = 2.31-2.58). 
Variables thought to be related to this index, land tenure and farm size, were tested through mean 
comparisons; their relationship to the SES index were also found to be significant (p <.001), with 
minimal effect sizes (eta >.287).  Those in the low SES group were less likely to have title to 
their land (mean =.67, with 0= no title and 1= title), as compared to the high SES group in which 
nearly all respondents had title to their land (M = .94).  The household’s farm size increased as 
SES increased; low and medium SES levels had an average farm size between ‘less than 5 
hectares (1)’ and ‘5 to 30 hectares (2)’ (low SES M = 1.53, medium SES M = 1.65) and those 




SES and Participation Analysis 
The relationship between the participation variable (respondent’s willingness to participate in at 
least one of the proposed programs) and the SES index was analyzed using crosstabs however, it 
was not found to be statistically significant (p = 0.483). As SES decreased, the percentage of 
people willing to participate remained approximately the same (table 3.4).   
SES and Eligibility Analysis 
The test statistic of crosstabs was also used for analyzing eligibility and the SES index (table 
3.4).  The relationship between eligibility and the SES index was found to be significant (p 
<.001), with a typical effect size (Cramer’s V = .314). The higher a respondent’s SES level, the 
more likely the respondent was to meet the hypothetical eligibility criteria. For example, only 
26% of those in the low SES group were eligible, while 64% of those in the high SES group met 
the eligibility criteria. 
 
The final analysis used eligibility as the independent variable and willingness to participate in 
one or more of the hypothetical program modalities as the dependent variable in a crosstabs 
procedure (table 3.5).  The relationship between participation and eligibility was statistically 
significant (p < .001), with a minimal effect size (Cramer’s V = 0.172).  Non -participants were 
less likely to be eligible than those who were willing to participate.  For example, only 20% of 
non-participants were eligible compared with 47 percent of participants. 
Potential Eligibility Curves 
A total of 182 of the respondents were willing and able (meaning they have forested land) to 
enroll in the forest conservation scenario at various land enrollment levels ranging from 0.25 to 
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700 ha. Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of people willing and able to enroll a given number of 
hectares under various targeting and eligibility criteria up to 40 hectares where the curve levels 
off considerably; only two percent of respondents are willing to enroll more than 40 ha. for each 
of the scenarios. In addition, 40 hectares is well above existing minimum eligibility criteria for 
area seen in existing programs. This same cut-off is used for all three program figures. At the 10 
ha cut-off, which has been so controversial in Costa Rica (e.g. Hope et al., 2005; Miranda et al., 
2003), 29 percent of people expressed willingness to enroll overall. However, this percentage 
drops to 22 percent if participants are required to own and possess title to their land, and only 8 
percent if a steep slope requirement were added to the program qualifications.  
For the reforestation scenario, 144 respondents reported willingness to enroll between 0.1 and 
800 ha (figure 3.2). Using the 10 ha point for illustration (as above), a total of 21 percent of those 
willing to enroll reported that they would enroll a maximum of 10 ha. Adding eligibility 
restrictions for land tenure and ownership reduces this number to 17 percent, and targeting for 
steeply-sloped lands further reduces the number to five percent. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the enrollment intentions for agroforestry, the most popular scenario option 
presented in the survey, as reported in chapter II (77 percent of respondents, or 265 people, 
expressed willingness to participate in this scenario). According to our analysis, if a PES 
program were to require a minimum of 10 ha for enrollment, only 23 percent of potential 
participants would be likely to enroll. This number decreases slightly to 19 percent with basic 
ownership and land tenure requirements. Only four percent of interested participants would be 




Interesting differences in the eligibility curves exist between the two districts included in the 
survey. For the district of Renacimiento, the percentage of potential participants at 10 ha drops 
off to 1% for both the reforestation and agroforestry scenarios when the slope requirement is 
included and it is only slightly higher at 4 percent for the forest conservation. For the district of 
Boquete, enrollment at 10 ha is at 7 percent even when bounded by slope.  
DISCUSSION  
Socioeconomic Status Index 
The results of the SES index analyses support the following conclusions: 
 Households across the full socioeconomic spectrum are likely to be interested in 
participating in a PES program; 
 Respondents with a high SES level will be more likely to be eligible for program 
enrollment than those with a low SES level, given the hypothetical, but representative, 
eligibility guidelines used in our analysis; 
 Households of a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to have more land; 
 Households of a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to have title to their land. 
 
The first set of analyses between the SES index and related variables confirmed the validity of 
the index and the indicators used within it.  Education and income increased as SES level 
increased, and those with higher SES levels were more likely to have household amenities 
(electricity, plumbing, gas or electric cooking). These results support the creation of the SES 
index with the selected variables and demonstrate that combining related demographic and 
household variables into a single index can be effective for measuring SES levels. Land tenure 
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and farm size were shown to increase as a respondent’s SES level increased, demonstrating that 
those with higher socioeconomic levels were more likely to have title to their land and to own 
more land. The results of this analysis demonstrate the validity of the SES index that was 
created, while also demonstrating the significance of the index when compared with farm size 
and tenure.  These findings support prior research and literature that indicates that those with 
higher SES components (education, income, standard of living) are more likely to have title to 
their land and own a larger quantity of land (Corbera et al., 2007; Pagiola et al., 2007). 
 
The second set of analyses between SES index and respondent eligibility indicated that those 
who rank higher on the SES scale due to their income, education, and household amenities were 
more likely to be eligible for PES programs, which is also supported by previous research (e.g., 
Corbera et al., 2007; Pagiola et al, 2007; Rosa, Kandel, & Dimas, 2004). This is notable because 
it highlights the inherent challenges of using PES schemes as a poverty alleviation or livelihood 
development mechanism. It is also important to note that interest in participating remained 
constant across socioeconomic status. However, because we did not provide interviewees with 
hypothetical eligibility requirements or payment levels, we recognize that there is a limitation to 
our study due to respondents potentially expressing unrealistic participation levels.  
There are also practical barriers to participation, which are related to and influence the 
establishment of some eligibility requirements. It may be for this reason that fewer of the 
potentially ineligible households expressed willingness to participate. Perhaps they assumed that 
their farms were too small or that they would not be able to guarantee certain practices under 
contract without secure land tenure or land ownership.  
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This analysis of eligibility and participation has implications for the results of participation 
across SES index levels.  One goal of many PES projects is to contribute to improving local 
livelihoods, even to the point of using PES projects as poverty alleviation tools.  If those with a 
lower SES are less likely to be eligible for PES projects, then there may need to be further 
consideration for aligning PES goals and eligibility requirements. This issue is demonstrated 
through the results of this study which show that those with a lower SES are not only less likely 
to be eligible, but also that land tenure and land size is significantly and positively related to SES 
levels.  Land tenure and size are two of the most common criteria used to establish eligibility 
(Pagiola et al. 2005; ); this demonstrates the need for projects to carefully consider how they 
craft eligibility guidelines, especially if a major goal of a PES project is to provide poverty 
alleviation and/or livelihood improvement. This research demonstrates that implementing the 
standard eligibility guidelines will likely lead to the exclusion of those in the lowest SES bracket. 
Overall, our findings reinforce past research indicating that those with lower socioeconomic 
status are less likely to be eligible for PES projects unless the programs are carefully crafted to 
include them (Grieg-Gran, Porras, & Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008). This 
could have implications for determining appropriate PES eligibility requirements for developing 
PES projects in this study region with poverty alleviation and economic development goals .   
Potential Eligibility Analysis 
Our next set of analyses provides some insight into the range of eligibility options and how they 
expand or diminish program inclusiveness with implications for those with lower socioeconomic 
status. PES land enrollment requirements, tenure, and land characteristics such as slope are some 
of the central issues with which any group developing a program must grapple, and these issues 
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become even more complex when poverty alleviation and ecosystem service production are both 
explicit goals of the program.  
 
Each successively restrictive curve in figures 3.1 – 3.3 is fully “below” the less restrictive ones. 
Therefore, these potential eligibility criteria all appear to be important factors to understand. The 
dependent variable in these analyses is the maximum number of hectares that the respondent is 
willing to enroll. Most respondents who expressed willingness to enroll in a PES scenario 
reported a willingness to enroll at least one ha (95 percent or more across all the programs). A 
big drop-off for these programs can be seen between two and five hectares and between five and 
10. In fact, willingness to enroll drops anywhere from 29 – 35 percent (depending on the 
scenario) between the two and five hectare enrollment levels. Participation continues to drop off 
steadily 13 – 16 percent between five and 10 hectares. Eligibility requirements impact 
households on the low land enrollment end of the graph hardest. Therefore, allowing smaller 
land enrollment levels would have important implications for many potential participants. The 
diverse agroecological systems that are most favorable to ecosystem service production are 
typically managed by smallholders and indigenous farmers. Although most environmentally-
friendly farming practices are not scale-specific by definition, landscapes that consist of many 
small farms often demonstrate a high potential for sustaining both biodiversity and rural 
livelihoods and some studies have found that smaller farms are also more productive per hectare 
(Rosset, 1999).  Policies that favor smallholders, promote diverse farming landscapes, and 
support dissemination of traditional practices and agroecological knowledge are generally good 
for the conservation of biodiversity (Castillo & Toledo, 2000). Accordingly, excluding smaller 
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farms could prove to be problematic for achieving the environmental objectives of PES 
programs.  
 
Ownership does not contribute much variability to the difference between all willing participants 
(line one) and only those eligible under basic ownership and title requirements (line two) since 
98 percent of respondents reported owning their land. We aimed to only survey those who own 
land; however, our lists did end up containing a small number of non-land owners (renters 
involved in agriculture). We included ownership in the eligibility analysis because it is very 
difficult to design programs that include renters and including squatters may be undesirable (i.e. 
encouraging squatters to encroach on protected areas) (Wunder, 2005).  Renters find themselves 
in a similar situation to those with insecure tenure, they cannot promise anything about long-term 
land use without input from the landowner (Wunder, 2005). Thus, accountability is a key concern 
in working with anyone who does not own the land, although some success has been realized in 
working with shareholders of communal lands (e.g. Kosoy et. al., 2007). 
 
Tenure contributes most of the variability between all willing participants (line one) and only 
those eligible under basic eligibility requirements (line two) but most (81%) of respondents do 
have title to their land. Still the second line falls at most 28 percent below the first line, meaning 
that requiring land ownership and tenure will make programs inaccessible to these people. We 
included tenure because almost all PES programs either currently require participants to have 
title to their land or did have this requirement at the beginning of the program and have since 
relaxed requirements. This variable may affect program participation significantly more in other 
parts of the country which have not benefited from the PRONAT titling project (see description 




Adding a steep slope requirement to target a program to address soil stabilization for water 
quality and to prevent landslides reduces participation by as much as 86 percent.  Slope was self-
reported and only provides a rough estimate of the actual land attribute, but there is substantial 
slope variability in the region, so it could be a key program feature. Offering higher payments for 
steeply-sloped land enrollments might be a way to target a program to address the issue without 
cutting other potential participants out entirely. Other targeting efforts might offer higher 
payments to land directly bordering protected areas or land within certain watersheds.  
 
Program design factors are integral to successful pro-poor PES due to their influence on 
participation. Multiple factors must be taken into account when considering how to develop a 
PES program so as not to exclude poor land users. At the initial design stage of a PES program 
the socioeconomic landscape and relationships between SES status, land ownership, and land 
tenure must be carefully considered. Furthermore, the implications of various program design 
factors, especially eligibility requirements, should be analyzed. Enrollment requirements have 
important implications for both poverty alleviation and environmental benefits realized through 
any PES program. In order to realize success on either or both of these fronts it is crucial that 
program designers clearly define the goals of the program upfront and carefully construct 
requirements to reinforce these goals.   
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of empirical data from farming communities in Western Panama provides a 
nuanced understanding of the regions socioeconomic landscape. By applying a structured 
eligibility analysis to our site specific data we are able to provide insights regarding the likely 
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effect of various key program design decisions. Thus, this research identifies program design 
factors which will likely influence the participation of landowners across the socioeconomic 
spectrum (including particularly the poor) in this specific location. Using this approach, those 
interested in developing new PES programs can combine site specific social science data with 
lessons learned from other programs to build customized approaches which are more likely to 
succeed. Ultimately, this research offers both practical information which could help inform the 
development of a pilot PES program in western Panama as well as an example of how social 
science research can be used to inform PES site appropriate program design and during this era 
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Human society depends on healthy ecosystems. Our study focused on PES programs as a 
possible means to achieve ecosystem-service conservation on private lands, which are playing an 
increasingly important role in conservation efforts. Specifically, our study examined the potential 
for PES to address conservation and livelihood issues in the buffer-zone of La Amistad Bi-
national World Heritage Site in Western Panama, and provides insights for the equitable 
architecture of such a program.  
 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
 
While our specific results are particular to our study region, our approach and the ways in which 
our results support and contradict existing findings in the literature from PES programs currently 
in operation contributes to a broader knowledge about the barriers and opportunities presented by 
PES.  
Our study provides support for a growing body of research showing that past behaviors and some 
socio-demographic information can successfully predict or explain an individual farmer’s 
likelihood to be willing to participate in a payment for ecosystem service program. Specifically, 
past improved practice or conservation program participation, and farm size are major drivers of 
PES participation. Using logistic regression analyses we found that farm size, participation in 
other conservation programs, the number of conservation organizations with which the farmer 
has worked, and total income were all significant predictive factors of willingness to participate 
for at least one of three program scenarios with a positive relationship. Farm size is a frequently 
studied strong driver of actual PES participation (i.e. Zbinden & Lee, 2005, Mullan & Kontoleon, 
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2009) and our research further supported these findings in context of behavioral intention, or 
willingness to enroll.  
Land tenure security and age were significant explanatory factors with a negative relationship for 
one or more scenario. This means that as land tenure security and age increase respondents are 
less likely to be interested in enrolling in a PES program. As discussed in the systematic 
literature review, studies of existing and hypothetical PES enrollment have resulted in mixed 
findings regarding the role of age as a driver of participation. This may be because age is a proxy 
for experience in places where farmers have opportunities to engage in innovative land 
management programs and partnerships such as PES. We did find that both variables related to 
past behaviors and prior experience (participation in other conservation programs and the 
number of conservation organizations) helped to explain willingness to enroll in a PES program. 
The land tenure results could indicate that respondents hope that a PES program would help 
them to increase their land tenure security. Perhaps, those with more secure land tenure have 
more income opportunities competing with the PES option. Land tenure and titling programs 
may benefit from working in tandem with PES program advocates in Panama. 
We also investigated equity and fairness concerns including how potential PES program design 
and targeting factors related to minimum enrolled area, land tenure, and land characteristics (e.g., 
slope) might affect eligibility of low-income households, an increasingly important target of PES 
programs, particularly in developing countries. Using eligibility requirements based off of Costa 
Rica’s national program, and also generally in-line with programs elsewhere, we found that 
respondents who ranked lower on our constructed socioeconomic scale were less likely to be 
eligible to enroll in a Panamanian PES program despite that many are willing to participate. 
Targeting and eligibility criteria must be carefully considered in each site specific socio-
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economic landscape were PES might be implemented. PES land enrollment requirements, tenure, 
and land characteristics (e.g. slope) result in participation trade-offs. For example, higher land 
enrollment requirements result in a rapid decline in potential participants. Our research 
contributes to a key piece of the PES design puzzle by proactively exploring ways to ensure that 
landowners across the socioeconomic spectrum (particularly the poor) are able to participate. 
Understanding trade-offs is important for guiding PES program architecture to achieve rural 
development and poverty alleviation goals in tandem with conservation outcomes. Our study 
provides an example of how survey information can be used to map these eligibility/participation 
trade-offs to inform the design of pro-poor PES programs. Using these tools decision makers will 
have a clear indication of the implications that setting specific eligibility or targeting criteria will 




Although Panama does not currently have a national or regional PES program, there is widely 
recognized potential for program development. Site-specific social science data can help guide 
PES design. The information collected through our survey provides indicators to leaders in our 
study region of western Panama regarding the potential feasibility of a PES program from the 
perspectives of landowners, who would act as sellers of ecosystem services. This information 
could help to guide program design decisions to be more acceptable, accessible, and pro-poor.  
While respondents to our survey reported a lack of familiarity with the PES concept, after being 
provided with an explanation, many expressed interest in participating. Our research indicates 
that landowners in the these communities in Chiriquí province are open to trying PES, a new and 
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innovative market-based conservation strategy, and our study results offer information that can 
help guide the development of a functional and locally acceptable program.  
Program type: We found differences in acceptability across our three program modalities. 
However, for all three of these scenarios the positive responses may be considered high enough 
to be worth further investigation as possible future program options. Over half of respondents 
stated willingness to participate in a forest conservation scenario. This dropped to about 40 
percent for the reforestation scenario and swelled to almost 80 percent for the agroforestry 
scenario.  
 Program design: Intermediaries often make PES transactions possible through government 
programs, non-profit organizations, private brokers or other institutions that link buyers and 
sellers, help to set prices, and provide information and security to the individuals involved in the 
transaction. When asked what type of PES program oversight or intermediary body respondents 
preferred, “no preference” was the most common response for two of the scenarios (forest 
conservation and reforestation), with the stated preference to work with an NGO a close second. 
However, for agroforestry, the most popular program scenario, NGO oversight was the first 
choice. This expressed interest by local landowners to work with NGOs through an agroforesty 
focused PES program provides an incredible opportunity for increasing local institutional 
capacity and to strengthen local sustainable natural resource governance in teh region.  
Trade-offs: Notably, our research provides insights regarding the difference between those 
interested in participating in hypothetical PES program options in Panama and those actually 
participating in PES programs in other countries. Specifically, our results show that famers with 
less secure land title are interested in participating. Our results corroborate findings which show 
that wealthier land owners with more land are more likely to be willing to participate and that 
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conservation engagement and experience with other agriculture programs are significant 
predictors of interest in PES participation. However, landowners across the socioeconomic 
spectrum expressed interested and given eligibility requirements used in other programs around 
the globe we are concerned that many of these interested individuals may be excluded if an 
actual program were to be offered in Panama. In some cases this may be acceptable given gains 
for conservation and the reduction in overall program costs, but in order to make informed 
decisions weighing the trade-offs is essential. By proactively investigating these issues, we can 
help ensure that PES programs are designed to increase the likelihood of broad landowner 
eligibility and delivering positive livelihood benefits to participating landowners across the 
socio-economic spectrum.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
At the scope of global efforts to inform the development of market-based conservation tools and 
payment for ecosystem services programs in specific, this research provides both a useful 
example of how to use site specific data to identify PES program opportunities and potential 
obstacles prior to pilot program implementation. Our research also provides some useful 
information on program design preferences from the ecosystem services provider perspective 
and tools for investigating eligibility/participation trade-offs. These same analyses using data 
from a different locations could start to provide insights on how trade-offs change with changes 
to the socio-economic and political landscape. At the aggregate level studies like this one also 




On the site specific front, the results of this study contribute an important first step in 
information gathering, consortium building, and collaboration which could ultimately lead to the 
development of a pilot PES program in the region. Important next steps for research include: 1) 
identifying key ecosystem service beneficiaries and assessing how they value the services that 
they use, 2) spatial ecological mapping for targeting purposes, 3) an institutional capacity 
analysis, and 4) an economic valuation analysis. 
If these next steps are carried out by researchers working in close collaboration with the local 
network of organizations already involved in PES capacity building and build off of the 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 A map with a key of the supply and demand of ecosystem services in and around La Amistad 






Table 1.1 A prioritized list of ecosystem services produced in the La Amistad region. This list was 
developed by participants at the PES workshop in May, 2009 in Cerro Punta Panama. Each participant 
was given the opportunity to identify up to 3 top choices.  
 
Ecosystem Service  Number of Votes  
Hydrological Power  13  
Carbon Fixation  8  
Water –consumption/agriculture  7  
Forests/ Forest regeneration  5  
Protection of biodiversity -ecosystems, species, and genes- for 
genetic and pharmaceutical improvement  
6  
Scenic beauty / Tourism (sale of service)  4  
Agricultural rangeland soils / Fertile  2  
Regulation of regional micro climates  1  




Table 2.1 A systematic review of scientific literature investigating actual and hypothetical PES 
participation. The relationships between explanatory or influential factors and PES participation are 
overviewed. For some factors results varied by study location with some showing a positive relationship 
and others a negative relationship. Some factors were significant predictors of participation in numerous 
studies but were found to be un-significant in one or two studies. These findings are noted as well. The 
mixed/other category is used to indicate more complex relationships or situations where different 
relationships were found for different PES program modalities.  





Positive (ie, larger farms are more likely to participate) 
(Corbera et al., 2007a; De Souza Filho et al., 1999; Fuwa & Sajise, 2009; 
Hope et al., 2005; Jolejole et al., 2009; E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009; Lynch 
& Lovell, 2003b; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Mullan & Kontoleon, 2009; 
Stefano Pagiola et al., 2005; Stefano Pagiola et al., 2008; Rios & Stefano 
Pagiola, 2009; Sven Wunder, 2008; Zbinden & D. Lee, 2005; Zilberman 
et al., 2008) 
Land (and tree) tenure 
Title 
Positive (ie, those with more secure tenure are more likely to 
participate) 
(Corbera, Katrina Brown, & Adger, 2007b, 2007c; Corbera, Kosoy, & 
Martínez Tuna, 2007; Gong, Bull, & Baylis, 2010; H. Rosa et al., 2005; 
Hope et al., 2005; E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009; Locatelli et al., 2008; 
Miranda et al., 2003; S. Pagiola et al., 2004; S. Pagiola et al., 2005; 
Stefano Pagiola, Ramírez, et al., 2007; Pascual & Perrings, 2007; Lisa 
Petheram & Bruce M. Campbell, 2010; Tejada & Peralta, 2000; Sven 
Wunder, 2007, 2008; Zbinden & D. Lee, 2005) 
 
Not Signifiant 
 (Stefano Pagiola et al., 2008) 
Environmental 
/Conservation ethic 
Positive (ie, those with a stronger conservation ethic are more likely 
to participate. This effect sometimes has a stronger predictive power 
then payment amount) 
(Chouinard et al., 2008a; Corbera et al., 2007c; De Souza Filho et al., 
1999; Jolejole et al., 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008b; Kosoy et al., 2007; 
Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Lohr & Park, 1995; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; 
Neupane et al., 2002; Lisa Petheram & Bruce M. Campbell, 2010) 
Age 
Negative (ie, younger farmers are more likely to participate) 
(Jolejole et al., 2009; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Langpap, 2004a, 2004b; 
Layton & Siikamäki, 2009; Lynch, Hardie, & D. Parker, 2002; Neupane 
et al., 2002) 
 
Positive (ie, older farmers are more likely to participate) 
(Xiadong Chen et al., 2009; Nagubadi et al., 1996) 
 
Not Significant 




Positive (ie, those with a higher level of education are more likely to 
participate) 
(Fuwa & Sajise, 2009; Jolejole et al., 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008b; Kramer 
& Jenkins, 2009; E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009; Lynch et al., 2002; Mäntymaa 
et al., 2009; Miranda et al., 2003; Nagubadi et al., 1996; Stefano Pagiola 
et al., 2005; Stefano Pagiola, Ramírez, et al., 2007; Zbinden & D. Lee, 
2005) 
 
Negative (ie, those with a higher level of education are more likely to 
participate) 
(Layton & Siikamäki, 2009) 
 
Mixed 
(Neupane et al., 2002) 
 
Not Significant 
(Mullan & Kontoleon, 2009)  
Off-farm 
income/employment 
Positive (ie, those with a higher percentage of off-farm income are 
more likely to participate) 
(Xiadong Chen et al., 2009; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Lynch et al., 2002; 
Lynch & Lovell, 2003a; Miranda et al., 2003; S. Pagiola, 2008a; Rios & 
Stefano Pagiola, 2009; Zbinden & D. Lee, 2005) 
Family farm labor 
Positive (ie, those with more available family farm labor are more 
likely to participate) 
(De Souza Filho et al., 1999; Zbinden & D. Lee, 2005) 
 
Mixed 
(Ayuk, 1997b; Rios & Stefano Pagiola, 2009; Sara J. Scherr, 1992) 
Program Design Factors  
Contract length 
Positive (ie, households are more likely to enroll in programs with 
more years required by the contract) 
(Xiadong Chen et al., 2009) 
 
Negative (ie, households are more likely to enroll in programs with 
fewer years required by the contract) 




Prefer non-government (ie, households are more likely to enroll in 
programs managed by a n NGO) 
(De Souza Filho et al., 1999; Hope et al., 2005; Lisa Petheram & Bruce 
M. Campbell, 2010) 
 
 
Prefer government (ie, households are more likely to enroll in 
programs managed by the government) 
(Jolejole et al., 2009; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; Nagubadi et al., 1996) 
 
Mixed/Other 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2009; Kerr, 2002; E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009; Locatelli 
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et al., 2008; Lohr & Park, 1995; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Neupane et al., 
2002; Rosa et al., 2003) 
Institutional capacity 
Positive (ie, households are more likely to enroll in programs if the 
institutional capacity of the managing agency is superior) 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008b; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; 
E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009) 
Transaction costs 
Negative (ie, households are more likely to enroll in programs when 
transaction costs are low) 
(John Antle & Jetse Stoorvogel, 2009; Locatelli et al., 2008; Nalukenge, 
J. Antle, & J. Stoorvogel, n.d.; S. Pagiola, 2008b; S. Pagiola et al., 2004; 
Stefano Pagiola et al., 2005; Stefano Pagiola, Ramírez, et al., 2007; 
Stefano Pagiola et al., 2008; Rios & Stefano Pagiola, 2009; Tschakert, 
Coomes, & Potvin, 2007; Sven Wunder, 2008) 
 
Mixed/Other 
(Jolejole et al., 2009) 
Compensation amount 
Positive (ie, As compensation amounts increase households are more 
likely to enroll in programs) 
(John Antle & Jetse Stoorvogel, 2009; Cary & Wilkinson, 1997; Xiadong 
Chen et al., 2009; Chouinard et al., 2008a; Cooper, 2003; Hope et al., 
2005; Jolejole et al., 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008b; Kramer & Jenkins, 2009; 
Layton & Siikamäki, 2009; Lynch et al., 2002; Máñez Costa & Zeller, 
2005; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; S. Pagiola et al., 2005; Lisa Petheram & 
Bruce M. Campbell, 2010; Purvis et al., 1989; Tschakert et al., 2007) 
Mixed/Other 
(S. Pagiola et al., 2004; Stefano Pagiola, Ramírez, et al., 2007; Zbinden & 
D. Lee, 2005) 
Targeting 
Positive (ie, targeting results in more land enrolled with higher 
biodiversity value) 
(Gauvin et al., 2010; Kosoy et al., 2008b; Mäntymaa et al., 2009) 
Land Attributes  




Importance of this factor is discussed  
(Corbera et al., 2007a; De Souza Filho et al., 1999; S. Engel et al., 2009; 
Kosoy et al., 2007; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Neupane et al., 2002) 
Land attributes/ 
opportunity costs  
Importance of this factor is discussed 
(S. Engel & Palmer, n.d.; S. Engel et al., 2009; Stefanie Engel et al., 
2008; Galizzi & Herklotz, 2008; Hope et al., 2005; Layton & Siikamäki, 
2009; E. Lee & Mahanty, 2009; Locatelli et al., 2008; Lohr & Park, 1995; 
Máñez Costa & Zeller, 2003; Máñez Costa & Zeller, 2005; Mäntymaa et 
al., 2009; Mullan & Kontoleon, 2009; S. Pagiola et al., 2004; S. Pagiola 
et al., 2005; Stefano Pagiola et al., 2007; Lisa Petheram & Bruce M. 
Campbell, 2010; Sierra & Russman, 2006; Sven Wunder, 2005, 2008; 









Table 2.2. Key farm characteristics are reported for the entire sample (combined) as well as broken out by 
district (Boquete and Renacimiento).  Respondents selected from three farm size options as detailed blow. 
Those who owned their land also self-reported information about land tenure (official documentation of 
ownership).  Those who reported “Don’t know” may not have any legal claim to their land. Steep slope 
was also self-reported. Significant differences between the two communities on a given variable are 
identified by p value and the systemic measure offers an indication of the effect size or the strength of the 
relationship between the variables (minimal, typical, or substantial). 
 
 Combined Boquete Renacimiento Comparing the Two 
Communities 








Farm Size       
< 5 
hectares 
45% 47% 43% 2.29 .318 .082 
5 – 30 
hectares 
37% 33% 41% 
> 30 
hectares 
 19% 16% 
Land Tenure       
Title 81% 93% 67% 35.89 < .001 .328 
 Property 
rights 
17% 5% 28% 
Don’t 
know 
3% 2% 4% 
Slope       
No steep 
slope 




20% 26% 14% 
1 The test statistic is chi squared and the systemic measure is Cramer’s V unless indicates as follows: * t value, ** eta (minimal ≥ .1 typical ≥ 






Table 2.3. Head of household characteristics are reported for the entire sample (combined) as well as 
broken out by district (Boquete and Renacimiento).  Significant differences between the two communities 
on a given variable are identified by p value and the systemic measure offers an indication of the effect 
size or the strength of the relationship between the variables (minimal, typical, or substantial). 
Variable Combined1 Boquete1 Renacimiento1 Comparing the Two 
Communities 








Age       
 55.62 59.51 51.68 5.04* < .001 .265** 
Gender       
Male 78% 73% 83% 5.36 < .05 -.126*** 
Female 22% 27% 17% 
Income       
 6.03 6.46 5.56 2.07* < .05 .113*** 
Education       
No formal 1% 1% 1% 13.09 < .01 .197 
Low  
 (1st – 5th) 
15% 15% 15% 
Medium  
(6th – 12th) 
61% 54% 70% 
High 
 ( > 12th) 
23% 30% 15% 
1percents are listed for all variables except for age and income for which the mean is listed.  
2 The test statistic is chi squared and the systemic measure is Cramer’s V unless indicates as follows: * t value, ** eta (minimal ≥ .1 typical ≥ 






Table 2.4. A history of conservation engagement is reported for the entire sample (combined) as well as 
broken out by district (Boquete and Renacimiento). Significant differences between the two communities 
on a given variable are identified by p value and the systemic measure offers an indication of the effect 
size or the strength of the relationship between the variables (minimal, typical, or substantial). 
 
Variable Overall1 Boquete1 Renacimiento1 Comparing the Two Communities 











      
None 69% 62% 76% 7.82 < .05 .151 
≤ 10 
hectares 
16% 18% 14% 
> 10 
hectares 
15% 19% 11% 




      
 .6356 .7414 .5266 2.06* < .05 .111** 
1
percents are listed for Hectares enrolled in conservation and means are listed for worked with conservation organization.  
2 The test statistic is chi squared and the systemic measure is Cramer’s V unless indicates as follows: * t value, ** eta (minimal ≥ .1 typical ≥ 




Table 2.5. Overall interest and preferences related to the forest conservation scenario option are 
reported for the entire sample (combined) as well as broken out by district (Boquete and Renacimiento). 
Significant differences between the two communities on a given variable are identified by p value and the 
systemic measure offers an indication of the effect size or the strength of the relationship between the 
variables (minimal, typical, or substantial). 
Variables Overall1 Boquete1 Renacimiento1 Comparing the Two Communities 
Forest 
Conservation 










      
Yes 53% 50% 56% .98 .322 .053*** 
No 47% 50% 44% 







1.34* .737 .109** 
# of Hectares       
 21.59 28.54 14.56 1.14* <.05 .088** 
Program 
Management 
      
Federal Gov. 1% 1% 0% 8.44 .077 .217 
Local Gov. 4% 1% 7% 
Private 
Company 
13% 11% 15% 
NGO 39% 36% 42% 
No 
Preference 
43% 51% 36% 
1percents are listed for all variables except for contract length and# of hectares for which the mean is listed.  
2 The test statistic is chi squared and the systemic measure is Cramer’s V unless indicates as follows: * t value, ** eta (minimal ≥ .1 typical ≥ 





Table 2.6.  Overall interest and preferences related to the reforestation scenario option are reported for the 
entire sample (combined) as well as broken out by district (Boquete and Renacimiento). Significant 
differences between the two communities on a given variable are identified by p value and the systemic 
measure offers an indication of the effect size or the strength of the relationship between the variables 
(minimal, typical, or substantial). 
Variable Overall1 Boquete1 Renacimiento1 Comparing the Two Communities 










      
Yes 42% 35% 49% 7.45 <.01 .147 
No 58% 65% 51% 







2.25* <.05 .195** 
# of Hectares       
 16.81 26.91 9.07 1.34* <.05 .118** 
Program 
Management 
      
Federal Gov. 1% 0% 1% 4.72 .318 .182 
Local Gov. 4% 2% 6% 
Private 
Company 
14% 15% 13% 
NGO 36% 30% 40% 
No 
Preference 
46% 53% 40% 
1 percents are listed for all variables except for contract length and# of hectares for which the mean is listed 





Table 2.7. Overall interest and preferences related to the agroforestry scenario option are reported for the 
entire sample (combined) as well as broken out by district (Boquete and Renacimiento). Significant 
differences between the two communities on a given variable are identified by p value and the systemic 
measure offers an indication of the effect size or the strength of the relationship between the variables 
(minimal, typical, or substantial). 
Variable Overall1 Boquete1 Renacimiento1 Comparing the Two Communities 










      
Yes 78% 74% 82% 3.53 .069 .102 
No 22% 26% 18% 
Contract Length       






-.65 .724 <.05 
# of Hectares       
 15.22 26.42 6.68 2.23* <.001 .146** 
Program 
Management 
      
Federal Gov. 2% 2% 2% 1.97 .741 .086 
Local Gov. 3% 2% 4% 
Private 
Company 
12% 10% 14% 
NGO 49% 49% 48% 
No 
Preference 
35% 37% 32% 
1 percents are listed for all variables except for contract length and# of hectares for which the mean is listed.  
2The test statistic is chi squared and the systemic measure is Cramer’s V unless indicates as follows: * t value, ** eta (minimal ≥ .1 typical ≥ .243, 







Table 2.8. This is the model summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting willingness 
to participate in the Forest Conservation PES scenario. The Nagelkerke R2 approximates the variance 
which can be predicted by the model (otherwise known as predictive power). -2LL represents -2 times the 











.35 325.289 92.05 10 <.001 
 
Table 2.9. This is a classification tablea of our logistic regression analysis for variables predicting 
willingness to participate in the Forest Conservation PES scenario. Our model successfully classifies 75% 
of participants’ willingness to participate in this program with a relatively equal predicative success rate 
across both participants and non-participants. 
 Observed Predicted 
 Forest Conservation Participant 
Percentage Correct  No Yes 
Step 1 Forest Conservation 
Participant 
No 100 41 70.9
Yes 34 127 78.9
Overall Percentage   75.2












Table 2.10. Logistic regression analysis model of variables predicting willingness to participate in the 
Forest Conservation PES Program: Regression analysis provides information about the predictive 
potential of the independent variable to explain willingness to participate in the given program. The two 
Farm Size and Participation in Other Programs variables are binary dummy variables. This recoding is 
necessary because categorical variables cannot be included in logistic regression. B is the unstandardized 
logistic regression coefficients (i.e., the log odds). The S.E. represents the standard error associated with a 
given coefficient. A significant odds ratio - Ex(B)- with a value below one indicates that the independent 
variable reduces the odds of the respondent being willing to participate; conversely, an odds ratio greater 
than one indicates an increase in the odds. The Wald statistic is used to test the significance of individual 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (i.e., the Wald statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that a given regression coefficient is 0). Significant explanatory regression coefficients in the 
model are indicated by the associated p-value. 





Constant .40   .94 1.49 .19 .661 
Farm Size difference 
between Small – 
Medium 
1.42 .30 4.12 2.85 <.001 
Farm Size difference 
between Small  - Large 
2.29 .50 9.84 21.31 <.001 
Tenure -.59 .35 .56 2.85 .091 
Participation in Other 
Programs with 
enrollment of  < 10 
hectares 
1.82 .44 6.16 17.32 <.001 
Participation in Other 
Programs  with 
enrolment of  > 10 
hectares 





-.12   .16 .90 .45 .501 
Level of Education -.01 .04 .99 .09 .764 
Age -.02 .01 .98 3.96 <.05 
Amount of Total 
Income from Farm 
-.09 .12 .91 .58 .448 




 Table 2.11. This is the model summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting willingness 
to participate in the Reforestation PES scenario. The Nagelkerke R2 approximates the variance which can 
be predicted by the model (otherwise known as predictive power). -2LL represents -2 times the log 











.17 371.32 40.31 10 <.001 
 
Table 2.12. This is a classification tablea of our logistic regression analysis for variables predicting 
willingness to participate in the Reforestation PES scenario. Our model successfully classifies 68% of 
participants’ willingness to participate in this program and predicts better for those who are not willing to 
participate.  
 Observed Predicted 
 Participation in Reforestation program 
Percentage Correct No Yes 
Step 1 Participation in 
Reforestation program 
No 138 36 79.3
Yes 62 66 51.6
Overall Percentage   67.5












Table 2.13 Logistic regression analysis model of variables predicting willingness to participate in the 
Reforestation PES Program: Regression analysis provides information about the predictive potential of 
the independent variable to explain willingness to participate in the given program. The two Farm Size 
and Participation in Other Programs variables are binary dummy variables. This recoding is necessary 
because categorical variables cannot be included in logistic regression. B is the unstandardized logistic 
regression coefficients (i.e., the log odds). The S.E. represents the standard error associated with a given 
coefficient. A significant odds ratio - Ex(B)- with a value below one indicates that the independent 
variable reduces the odds of the respondent being willing to participate; conversely, an odds ratio greater 
than one indicates an increase in the odds. The Wald statistic is used to test the significance of individual 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (i.e., the Wald statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that a given regression coefficient is 0). Significant explanatory regression coefficients in the 
model are indicated by the associated p-value. 





Constant 1.26   .84 3.51 2.25 .134 
Farm Size difference between 
Small – Medium 
.78 .29 2.18 7.2 < .01 
Farm Size difference between 
Small  - Large 
.86 .40 2.35 4.60 < .05 
Tenure -1.11 .33 .33 11.53 ≤ .001 
Participation in Other Programs 
with enrollment of  < 10 
hectares 
1.18 .37 3.26 10.10 < .01 
Participation in Other Programs  
with enrolment of  > 10 hectares 
.72 .41 2.06 3.14 < .01 
Number of Conservation 
Organizations Worked With 
-.00 .14 .10 .00 .991 
Level of Education -.03 .04 .97 .63 .429 
Age -.02 .01 .98 3.04 .081 
Amount of Total Income from 
Farm 
-.13 .11 .88 1.43 .232 






Table 2.14. This is the model summary of our logistic regression analysis for variables predicting 
willingness to participate in the Agroforestry PES scenario. The Nagelkerke R2 approximates the variance 
which can be predicted by the model (predictive power). -2LL represents -2 times the log likelihood and 











.085 286.37 16.62 10 .083 
 
Table 2.15. This is a classification tableab of our logistic regression analysis for variables predicting 
willingness to participate in the Agroforestry PES scenario. Our model successfully classifies 80% of 
participants’ willingness to participate in this program. The model only successfully predicts those who 
are willing to participate. The model predicts no one will be unwilling to participate.  
 Observed Predicted 
 Participation in Agroforestry 
Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 0 Participation in 
Agroforestry 
No 0 61 .0
Yes 0 239 100.0
Overall Percentage   79.7
a. Constant is included in the model. 











Table 2.16. Logistic regression analysis model of variables predicting willingness to participate in the 
Agroforestry PES scenario: Regression analysis provides information about the predictive potential of the 
independent variable to explain willingness to participate in the given program. The two Farm Size and 
Participation in Other Programs variables are binary dummy variables. This recoding is necessary 
because categorical variables cannot be included in logistic regression. B is the unstandardized logistic 
regression coefficients (i.e., the log odds). The S.E. represents the standard error associated with a given 
coefficient. A significant odds ratio - Ex(B)- with a value below one indicates that the independent 
variable reduces the odds of the respondent being willing to participate; conversely, an odds ratio greater 
than one indicates an increase in the odds. The Wald statistic is used to test the significance of individual 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (i.e., the Wald statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that a given regression coefficient is 0). Significant explanatory regression coefficients in the 
model are indicated by the associated p-value. 





Constant 1.32 1.01 3.75 1.72 .190 
Farm Size difference between 
Small – Medium 
.03 .34 1.03.62 .01 .938 
Farm Size difference between 
Small  - Large 
-.47 .46 .75 1.06 .304 
Tenure -.29 .41 1.23 .51 .474 
Participation in Other Programs 
with enrollment of  < 10 
hectares 
.20 .49 1.29 .18 .675 
Participation in Other Programs  
with enrolment of > 10 hectares 
.26 .52 1.53 .25 .620 
Number of Conservation 
Organizations Worked With 
.43 .21 1.09 3.98 <.05 
Level of Education .09 .05 .99 3.47 .063 
Age -.01 .01 1.11 1.12 .289 
Amount of Total Income from 
Farm 
.11 .13 .94 .665 .420 
Total Income -.06 .04  2.07 .150 





Figure 2.2. This graph displays the unstandardized logistic regression coefficient B (i.e., the log odds) of 
variables which predict willingness to participate in the three PES scenarios presented in this study 
(Forest Conservation, Reforestation, and Agroforestry). A positive B represents that and increase the 
given variable results in an increase in the likelihood of their willingness to participate and a negative B 
represents that an increase in the given variable results in a decrease in the likelihood of their willingness 
to participate. The Nagelkerke R2 approximates the variance which can be predicted by the model 






Table 3.1. The table lists literature results for a variety of indicators used in composite measures of socio-
economic status. 




























































































































Cinner, Daw & McClanhan, 2008 
 
√  √    √    √  √       
Cinner, Sutton, & Bond, 2007 
 
√  √  √  √      √  √    √ 
Cooke, 2005 
 
√  √  √               
McClanhan, Cinner, Maina, et al., 2008 
 
√      √  √  √    √  √  √ 
Rai, Sharma, Misra Sahoo & Malhotra, 2008   √    √    √           
Sahn & Stifel, 2000 √  √    √  √  √         
Sayer, Campbell, Petheram, et al., 2007 
 
  √  √    √        √   
Cinner, Daw & McClanhan, 2008 
 
√      √    √  √       
Cinner, Sutton, & Bond, 2007 
 
√  √  √  √      √  √    √ 
Cooke, 2005 
 
√  √  √               
McClanhan, Cinner, Maina, et al., 2008 
 
√      √  √  √    √  √  √ 
Rai, Sharma, Misra Sahoo & Malhotra, 2008   √    √    √           
Sahn & Stifel, 2000 √  √    √  √  √         
Cinner, Daw & McClanhan, 2008 
 
  √    √             
Sayer, Campbell, Petheram, et al., 2007 
 




Table 3.2. Information about the variables selected from the survey to be used in our Socio Economic 
Status (SES) index1 is listed in the table. 
 
Variable Response categories 
Income 
Monthly household income 
16 categories from 
1 =‘Less than $100 a month’ to 
16 = ‘More than $3,500 a month’ 
 
Education 
Head of household highest level of education 
15 categories 
0 = ‘No formal education’ 
Grade levels 1-12 
13 = ’Technical school /University’ 
14 = ‘Graduate school’ 
 
Electricity 
Availability of electricity in house 
1= ‘No’, no electricity in house 
3= ‘Yes’, electricity in house 
 
Bath/Plumbing 
Type of plumbing available in house  
1= ‘Latrine’, no indoor plumbing 
3= ‘Bathroom’,  yes indoor plumbing 
 
Cooking Fuel 
Type of fuel used for cooking in the house 
1= ‘Wood’  
2= ‘Kerosene’ or ‘coal’ 
3= ‘Gas’ or ‘electric’  
1-Response categories are ranked from lowest to highest in terms of contribution to SES status. For education and income, higher response 
categories correspond to a higher SES score. No electricity and no indoor plumbing score low on the index (scores of 1).  Wood, kerosene/coal, 





Table 3.3. Socioeconomic status index level based on scale attributes and related variables. 
 
 SES Index Level1    
Variables in index Low Medium High F p-value eta 
Education  5.58 8.02 12.19 174.13 <.001 .730
Income of household 3.03 5.63 10.18 159.00 <.001 .726
Electricity 2.58 2.98 3.00 24.03 <.001  .367
Plumbing  2.31 2.98 3.00 49.18 <.001 .495
Cooking Fuel  2.36 2.96 3.00 41.88 <.001 .462
       
Related Variables       
Tenure .67 .83 .94 14.11 <.001 .292 
Size of Farm 1.53 1.65 2.03 13.87 <.001 .287 





Table 3.4. Respondent program eligibility across socioeconomic status index. 
 SES Index Level1    
Variables Low Medium High  n 2 p-
value 
Cramer’s V 
      1.46 .483 .069 
Willingness to Participate 
 (Any Program) 
85% 87% 90% 271    
Eligibility     30.70 <.001 .314 
Yes-eligible 26% 43% 64% 139    













Table 3.5. Willingness to participate and program eligibility. 
 Eligibility1    
Variable ineligible eligible n 2 p-value Cramer’s V 
Non-Participant 80% 20% 341 10.103 <.001 .172 
Participation _Any 53.5% 46.5%     























Figure 3.1. This graph depicts the maximum number of hectares which households are willing to enroll in 
the forest conservation scenario. Line 1 represents all respondents who indicated that they are willing to 
participate in the forest conservation scenario and graphs the number of hectares they reported that they 
would enroll. Line 2 represents the reported number of hectares that respondents who are likely to be 
eligible are willing to enroll. Eligibility as represented in line 2 is based off of affirmative responses to 
land ownership and possession of land title questions. Line 3 represents the reported number of hectares 
that respondents who are likely to be eligible are willing to enroll when slope requirements are also 
included in eligibility criteria. Those who are eligible according to the criteria for line 2 and also reported 
steep slope land on their farm are included in line 3. The dashed line at 10 hectares makes it easier to see 
how many people would be left out of the program if program requirements included a minimum land 
enrollment of 10 hectares. We cut off the graph at 40 hectares since the percent of people willing to enroll 































Figure 3.2. This graph depicts the maximum number of hectares which households are willing to enroll in 
the Reforestation scenario. Line 1 represents all respondents who indicated that they are willing to 
participate in the Reforestation scenario and graphs the number of hectares they reported that they would 
enroll. Line 2 represents the reported number of hectares that respondents who are likely to be eligible are 
willing to enroll. Eligibility as represented in line 2 is based off of affirmative responses to land 
ownership and possession of land title questions. Line 3 represents the reported number of hectares that 
respondents who are likely to be eligible are willing to enroll when slope requirements are also included 
in eligibility criteria. Those who are eligible according to the criteria for line 2 and also reported steep 
slope land on their farm are included in line 3. The dashed line at 10 hectares makes it easier to see how 
many people would be left out of the program if program requirements included a minimum land 
enrollment of 10 hectares. We cut off the graph at 40 hectares since the percent of people willing to enroll 

































Figure 3.3. This graph depicts the maximum number of hectares which households are willing to enroll in 
the Agroforestry scenario. Line 1 represents all respondents who indicated that they are willing to 
participate in the Agroforestry scenario and graphs the number of hectares they reported that they would 
enroll. Line 2 represents the reported number of hectares that respondents who are likely to be eligible are 
willing to enroll. Eligibility as represented in line 2 is based off of affirmative responses to land 
ownership and possession of land title questions. Line 3 represents the reported number of hectares that 
respondents who are likely to be eligible are willing to enroll when slope requirements are also included 
in eligibility criteria. Those who are eligible according to the criteria for line 2 and also reported steep 
slope land on their farm are included in line 3. The dashed line at 10 hectares makes it easier to see how 
many people would be left out of the program if program requirements included a minimum land 
enrollment of 10 hectares. We cut off the graph at 40 hectares since the percent of people willing to enroll 
more than 40 hectares is very low.   





































A Case Study: Costa Rica’s PSA Program 
Costa Rica’s national program was one of the earliest large-scale PES programs to be 
implemented in the developing country context and has been referred to as ‘‘probably the most 
elaborate such system in place in the developing world.’’ (Pagiola, Bishop, & Landell-Mills, 
2002, p. 7). This PSA program was initially criticized for not being accessible to low-income 
populations despite this being a stated goal of the program. Two specific problems that affected 
the participation of the poor early in the PSA program were lack of land title and delays in 
payments. Title is often used as proxy for secure land tenure. It is actually secure tenure, and not 
title that is most important to PES in order to guarantee that the service provider can control the 
land use. More recently, the law in Costa Rica was changed to facilitate the participation of 
landowners that lack title (Pagiola, 2008), and the program continues to work on shortening the 
turnaround time for payments. High transaction costs were another early stumbling block for the 
PSA program. Applicants had to meet eleven separate requirements (e.g. providing proof of 
payment of local taxes and that they do not owe anything to the national health system) (Miranda 
et al., 2003). Many of these requirements had nothing to do with their ability to provide 
environmental services (Miranda et al., 2003). These requirements have been reduced, by linking 
FONAFIFO's databases to those of other government agencies (Pagiola, 2008).  The 1996 Costa 
Rican Forestry Law (No.7575) which officially authorized the PSA program specifically 
identifies income and employment in rural areas as goals of the program and prioritizes support 
and outreach for small and medium farms (Hope et al., 2005; Miranda et al., 2003). Although the 
PSA program stated that land parcels anywhere from 1 – 300 hectares would be eligible to apply 
(Solis, 2001), the National Forestry Finance Fund (FONAFIFO) which directly handles the 
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payments will only accept parcels of 10 hectares or higher into the program (Hope et al., 2005). 
The rational for this revised minimum is that the legal definition of a forest according to the 
Forestry Law stipulates that it must be at least 10 hectares. Beginning in 2003 the program also 
required a legal land title deed (Hope et al., 2005). 
 
A brief discussion of how the Costa Rican program has developed and changed over time, offers 
some useful insights into key issues driving PES program design discussions worldwide.  
FONAFIFO, the Costa Rican organization overseeing the PSA program, recently introduced 
certain modifications to the PSA program in order to increase rural poverty alleviation effects. 
The Minister of the Environment, who has engineered the most recent changes in FONAFIFO 
(Carlos Manuel Rodríguez ) said that “…we need to stop viewing the PSA program as merely a 
tool for preserving biodiversity and promoting the planting of forests. Instead, we need to see it 
as a tool for rural development that also includes reforestation and biodiversity conservation.” 
(Hartshorn et al., 2005).   Program modifications include the introduction of agroforestry 
activities as a new PSA program option; the inclusion of land owners without land title to the 
PSA forest conservation program; and the prioritization of counties having a Social Development 
Index lower that 35%. Including agroforestry and silvopastoral opportunities in a program can 
make programs more pro-poor, while requiring formal land title in order to participate is 
probably the most common anti-poor selection bias. It was in response to increasing concern 
about this bias that Costa Rica recently reformed their program to no longer require land titles for 
participation (Wunder, 2008). However, applicants must have a cadastral plan that indicates the 
boundaries and size of their holdings, and many poor farmers lack such plans (Hartshorn et al., 
2005). The land area requirement reforms are also not entirely transparent. The Costa Rican PES 
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program states that parcels of land from one hectare up to a maximum of 300 ha may qualify for 
PES payments; however in practice FONAFIFO adopts a qualification threshold of 10 hectares, 
to be consistent with the minimum legal area of a “forest” as defined by the Costa Rican forestry 
law. This effectively excludes small farmers so FONAFIFO has historically tended to allocate . 
Also for all of the program types, properties may need to be over approximately 10 ha to make it 
worthwhile to incur the transaction costs involved. This is because total payments are calculated 
on the basis of forest area protected, whereas the transaction costs of enrolment are similar for 
both large and small forests (Pagiola et al. 2005). Perceived ecological benefits associated with 
conserving large forest tracts may also increase program administrator bias toward soliciting 
these contracts (Zbinden & Lee 2005). FONAFIFO has attempted to address some of these 
issues by allowing contratos globales (a system of collective contracting). Using this system, a 
group of small farmers can join the PSA program collectively rather than individually, thus 
spreading transaction costs across the group (FONAFIFO, 2000). While a great idea in concept, 
this approach ran into problems in practice when noncompliance by a single group member 
resulted in payments being halted to all members. The approach has since been revised to 
process the applications of such groups together, but then issue individual contracts. This avoids 
the partial compliance issue, but also results in much smaller savings in transaction costs. Also, 
they recently increased PSA reforestation payment rates and extended the payment grants to 
large and medium land holders (Hayward, 2005; Hope et al., 2005; Solis, 2001) period from 5 to 












































   
 
La vinculación de la conservación a los medios de subsistencia de la comunidad: ¿Se pueden alcanzar 
objetivos ambientales y de bienestar humano, en el oeste de Panamá, mediante el establecimiento de 
pagos por servicios ambientales? 
 
Numero de Encuesta :  
Location :_________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
¿Hubo un cambio de residente en esta dirección? ___________________________ 
¿Cambio de la hora y fecha de la entrevista? ___________________________ 
 
 
Consentimiento verbal (leído esta parte en voz alto) 
Hola, ¿puedo hablar con ____________________________________? 
Mi nombre es ________________________________ y soy asistente de investigaciones por FUNDAVISAP. 
FUNDAVISAP,  junto con FUNDICCEP y la Universidad Estatal de Colorado en los EEUU, están buscando 
nuevas fuentes de financiamiento para desarrollar acciones de conservación en tierras privadas.  Las acciones de 
conservación en fincas pueden proporcionar muchos beneficios a la sociedad, incluyendo limpiar el aire y el 
agua, mantener la fertilidad de suelos, preservar el paisaje, y proteger el hábitat para la vida silvestre. La frase 
servicios ambientales se refiere a esos beneficios. Estamos llevando a cabo un estudio de investigación que 
explorará como un programa de “pagos por servicios ambientales” podría ser diseñado en esta área para pagar 
los productores locales por desarrollar acciones de conservación—actividades que ayudan mantener la tierra 
sana tanto para la gente como para la vida silvestre. 
 
Si una organización decidiera ofrecer este tipo de programa, usted podría participar. Quiero hacerle algunas 
preguntas sobre su finca y cuales tipos de incentivos relacionados con servicios ambientales que le gustaría ver 
desarrollados en el futuro para Usted y otros dueños de tierras en la comunidad. Hablaremos por 
aproximadamente 30-40 minutos. Como productor o campesino, sus opiniones y experiencias valen mucho y 
pueden dar forma a programas exitosos en el futuro. Su nombre e información de contacto será anónima y 
nunca será asociado con sus respuestas en los informes publicado de este estudio. No hay ningún tipo de riesgo 
asociado con la participación en esta entrevista. Su participación en esta entrevista es voluntaria. 
Agradeceríamos mucho su apoyo. 
 
¿Está dispuesto a participar? 
_____ Sí (Sigue con la encuesta) 
_____ No (Termine la encuesta) 
 
 
Investigación de la viabilidad de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales 
Encuesta de Productores 
 
Sección I: Información descriptiva de su finca 
 
1. ¿ En qué comunidad está ubicada su finca? (marque una sola respuesta) 
  en el sector de Boquete  en el sector de Renacimiento (incluye a Cerro Punta, Guadalupe y Rio Sereno) 
 en comarca Ngöble Buglé 
   
2. ¿Por cuantos años usted personalmente ha cultivado o mantenido tierra en este distrito?  ______ años 
 
3. ¿Desde cuándo su familia ha cultivado o mantenido tierra en este distrito?______ años (Marque “0” si la familia es de otro parte) 
 
4. Por favor marque la ubicación de su finca en el mapa. 
 
5. ¿De que tamaño es su finca? (marque una sola respuesta) 
  menos que 5 hectáreas  entre 5-30 hectáreas  más que 30 hectáreas 
 
6. ¿Su producción está ubicada en: su propiedad, en tierra alquilada, o en tierra comunal? (Marque todos los que se aplican)  
  Soy el dueño  Alquilo la tierra  Uso tierra comunal 
 
7. ¿Si usted es el dueño, arrienda alguna parte (o toda) de la tierra a otros? (Marque una sola respuesta)  Sí  No 
 
8. ¿Aproximadamente que parte de los ingresos anuales de su hogar  son generados por su finca? (Círculo uno) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ninguna Una pequeña parte Media parte La mayoría Los ingresos enteros 
 
9. ¿Contrata usted trabajadores en su finca ? (Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No 
 
Si es así, ¿cuantos trabajadores? _______ y ¿cuantos meses por año trabajan ellos? ______________ 
 
Sección II: Uso de tierra 
  1a. Marque “sí” para cada 
uso de tierra que se aplica a 
su finca. 
1b. Si respondió “sí,” 
¿aproximadamente 
cuantas hectáreas? 
1c. Si respondió “sí,” tiene la tierra (Marque 
todos los que se aplican)  
1 – poco o no cuesta (plano) 
2 – media cuesta (lomada) 
3 – empinada cuesta (montañosa) 
  
Café    Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Verduras   Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Huerta frutal   Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Ganadería   Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Maderas   Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Bosque natural/bosque 
ribereño   




  Sí  No  1 2 3 
 
Otro uso de tierra   Sí  No  
Qué uso?  
 1 2 3 
 
 
2. Entre los usos de su  finca, ¿Qué rubro le genera más ingresos (por ejemplo: café, papas, maderas, ganado)?__________________ 
 
3. ¿Tiene algún plan de cambiar el uso de su tierra en los próximos 5 años? (Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No   No sé 
(Continúa a pregunta #6) 
 
 
4. Si es así,  cuál uso actual  y  cuál será el uso en el futuro?__________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Si está pensando en cambiar el uso de tierra, ¿Cuál es la razón?_____________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ¿Tiene planes de talar áreas boscosas para ampliar producción agropecuaria dentro de los próximos 5 años? (Marque una sola 
respuesta)   Sí  No 
 
7. ¿Qué parte de la producción de su finca es para uso personal de su familia? (Marque con  un circulo) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ninguna Una pequeña parte Media parte La mayoría Toda 
 
8. ¿Qué parte de la producción de su finca es para vender en el mercado? (Marque con  un circulo) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ninguna Una pequeña parte Media parte La mayoría Toda 
 
9. ¿Qué parte de la producción de su finca es intercambiada por otros productos o servicios? (Marque con  un circulo) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ninguna Una pequeña parte Media parte La mayoría Toda 
 
10. ¿Qué productos del bosque usan usted y su familia (por ejemplo: peces, hongos, hierbas medicinales, leña, u otros)? 
Favor especifique ________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. ¿Colinda  su finca  con cualquiera de los siguientes opciones? (Marque todos los que se aplican)  
  agricultura 
  pantano/ciénaga 
  riachuelo o  rio 
  lago 
  bosque 
  desarrollo residencial o comercial 
  área(s) protegida(s) ¿Cuál es el nombre del área protegida? __________________________________________________ 
 
Sección III: Programas y técnicas de conservación 
 
1.  ¿Ha recibido usted información, servicios, capacitaciones o ayuda de alguna otra manera de FUNDICCEP o FUNDAVISAP para 
hacer a su finca más sostenible? (Marque todos lo que se aplican)  
  FUNDICCEP   FUNDAVISAP    Ninguno 
 
3.  ¿Con cuáles otros programas, organizaciones, o agencias ha usted trabajado como granjero? (Marque todos los que se aplican) 
  TNC (The Nature Conservancy) 
  MIDA (Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario) 
  AMISCONDE 
  PRONAT 
  ANAM (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente) 
  Corredor Biológico 
  Otros, enumere por favor_____________________________________________________________________________ 
  Ninguno 
 
Ahora voy a hacerle algunas preguntas sobre los usos  para la conservación de la biodiversidad implementados en su finca. Es 
decir, usos que promueven la protección de las áreas naturales en su tierra, métodos sostenibles, o agricultura ecológica. 
 
4.  ¿Cuál o cuáles de los siguientes usos de conservación actualmente se aplican en su finca? (Marque todos los que se aplican) 
  Reserva ecológica privada, ¿número de hectáreas? ____  
 Es parte del Red de Reservas Privadas de Panamá (RRP)   Sí  No 
   Servidumbre de conservación, ¿numero de hectáreas? ____ 
  Proyecto de Café de Conservación, ¿numero de hectáreas?____ 
   Programa de Alianza para Bosques/Rainforest Alliance, ¿numero de hectáreas? ____ 
  Otro programa de conservación, ¿cuál programa?_______________________________________ ¿numero de hectáreas?___ 
  Ninguno 
 
  
5.  ¿Ha participado anteriormente en alguno de los programas enumerados en la pregunta previa (#4) en el cual actualmente no 
participe? 
(Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No  No sé 
 
 En caso afirmativo, ¿cuál(es)?____________________________________________________________________________ 
 ¿Porque terminó su participación?_________________________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 






Sección IV: Escenarios de “pagos por servicios ambientales” 
En Costa Rica y otros países del mundo, productores reciben pagos por mantener sus tierras para proporcionar servicios valiosos que 
sostienen el bienestar humano. Estos servicios incluyen agua y aire limpio, mantenimiento de laderas estables, belleza escénica, 
hábitat para las abejas y otros animales que polinizan cosechas agrícolas, y otros.  Los dueños de tierra reciben los pagos a parte de los 
ingresos ganados por comida y otros productos cultivado en su finca. Estos programas se llaman “pagos por servicios ambientales.” 
La participación en estos programas es voluntaria y no es requerida por la ley. Actualmente no existe en este región dicho programa, 
pero podría ser posible en el futuro. Si una agencia gubernamental, organización no gubernamental o empresa privada decidiera 
ofrecer este tipo de programa, usted podría participar.  Sus respuestas a las siguientes preguntas nos ayudarán entender cuál tipo de 
programa, desarrollarse, podría beneficiarle a usted y otros productores locales.   
 
Voy a empezar haciéndole algunas preguntas generales: 
 
1. En una escala de 1 a 5, ¿qué nivel de conocimiento tiene usted sobre el concepto de “pagos por servicios ambientales”? (Marque 
un solo numero con un circulo) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ningún conocimiento Poco conocimiento 
 




(Si marcó “2” o más): ¿Cómo se enteró de “pagos por servicios ambientales”? ____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ahora voy a pedirle sus opiniones sobre tres programas hipotéticos que representan escenarios alternos para demostrar como 
usted podría recibir  pagos por servicios ambientales en su finca. Para cada programa, le preguntare que haría si el programa 
fuera a ser ofrecido en su comunidad. 
  
2. Escenario A: Conservación de tierras forestales existentes.  Imagine que podría recibir pagos por proteger las áreas boscosas en 
su finca. El pago sería proporcional al tamaño de la tierra registrada en el programa (entonces, si registra más hectáreas, recibe un 
pago más alto). Para recibir el pago, tendría que firmar un contrato acordando que proteja el bosque y no corte arboles sanos por cierto 
número de años. Podría recoger frutas, hongos, agua, etc. del bosque y usar el bosque en maneras que no hacen daño a la naturaleza. 
Sin embargo, el cultivo de cosechas y el pastoreo de ganado serían prohibidos en este bosque. 
 
2a.  Si el pago fuera suficientemente alto, ¿consideraría registrar su finca en el programa de conservación de bosques? (Marque una 
sola respuesta) 
 Sí  
 No ¿Porque no?______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 No es posible, no tengo bosque en mi tierra  
(Si respondió “sí”, siga con la próxima pregunta; si respondió “no” o “no es posible,” sáltese a Escenario B) 
 
2b. ¿Cuantas hectáreas del bosque en su  finca consideraría registrar en este programa de conservación de bosques?__________ 
 
2c. Si participaría en este programa, ¿tendría que abandonar algún otro ingreso que actualmente está ganando de su tierra forestal? 
(Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No 
Si respondió “sí”, ¿Cuáles fuentes de ingresos tendría que abandonar?_______________________________________________ 
 
 
2d. ¿Cuál es el mínimo pago por hectárea por año que aceptaría usted para participar en este programa? Tome en cuenta que estaría 
compitiendo con otros productores en la región por recibir pagos por servicios ambientales en sus tierras, y que el programa sólo 
aceptaría a aquellos quienes ofrecerían a recibir los pagos más bajos  ______________________________ 
 
2e.  ¿Cuál es el máximo número de años que estaría dispuesto a proteger el bosque sin cortar árboles? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  5 años    10 años    15 años    20 años    30 años   
  otro ¿cuántos años? ____ 
    
2f. La organización que administraría el programa también ayudaría a los productores a registrar su tierra, repartiría pagos a los 
participantes,  y  haría el monitoreo del programa. ¿Con cuál tipos de organización(es) prefería trabajar? (Marque todos los que se 
aplican) 
  Gobierno central    Gobierno local    Organización de conservación no gubernamental  
  Empresa privada    No tengo preferencia 
  
2g.  Si participara en este programa de conservación, ¿cambiaría el número de trabajadores en su finca que son familiares o comparten 
su vivienda? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
2h.  Si participara en este programa de conservación, ¿cambiaría el número de trabajadores en su finca que contrata de afuera de  su 
vivienda o su familia? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
3. Escenario B: Reforestación. Imagine que pudiera recibir pagos por reforestación en su finca. Para recibir estos pagos, tendría que 
cultivar una variedad de especies de árboles nativos con una concentración mínima de 70 árboles por hectárea. Podría cultivar algunas 
especies de árbol que producen frutas o nueces, pero habría que crear un medio ambiente natural. Podría usar el bosque en cualquier 
manera con tal de que no hiciera daño al medio ambiente natural. Sin embargo, el cultivo de cosechas y el pastoreo de ganado serían 
prohibidos en esta tierra forestal. 
 
3a.  Si el pago fuera suficientemente alto, ¿consideraría registrar su tierra al programa de reforestación?  
(Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí  
  No ¿Porque no?______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 (Si respondió “sí”, siga con la próxima pregunta; si “no” o “no es posible,” sáltese a Escenario C) 
 
3b.  ¿Cuantas hectáreas de su tierra consideraría registrar en este programa de reforestación?__________ 
 
3c. ¿Cuál es el mínimo pago por hectárea por año que aceptaría usted para participar en este programa? Tome en cuenta que estaría 
compitiendo con otros productores en la región por recibir pagos por servicios ambientales en sus tierras, y que el programa sólo 
aceptaría a aquellos quienes ofrecerían a recibir los pagos más bajos ______________________________ 
 
3d.  Para participar, tendría que plantar árboles al comienzo del programa. Si usted tuviera que pagar por esto antes de recibir pagos 
por el programa, ¿sería capaz de pagar? (Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No 
 
Si respondió “sí”, ¿a cuáles de las siguientes  fuentes de financiamiento tendría acceso? (Marque todos los que se aplican)  
  ahorros    crédito del banco   crédito del gobierno    crédito de otro organización  
¿qué banco?______________________________ 
 
3e.  ¿Cuál es el máximo número de años que estaría dispuesto a participar este programa de reforestación?  (Marque una sola 
respuesta) 
  5 años    10 años    15 años    20 años    30 años   
  otro ¿cuántos años? ____ 
 
3f.  La organización que administraría el programa también ayudaría a los productores a registrar su tierra, repartiría pagos a los 
participantes,  y  haría el monitoreo del programa. ¿Con cuál tipos de organización(es) prefería trabajar? (Marque todos los que se 
aplican) 
  Gobierno central    Gobierno local    Organización de conservación no gubernamental  





3g.  Si participara en este programa de reforestación, ¿cambiaría el número de personas trabajando en su finca que son familiares o 
comparten su vivienda? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
3h.  Si participara en este programa de reforestación, ¿cambiaría el número de trabajadores en su finca que contrata de afuera de  su 
vivienda o su familia? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
4. Escenario C: Sistema agroforestal. Imagine que pudiera recibir pagos por mejorar las técnicas agropecuarias implementadas en su 
finca de manera que fueran más sostenibles. Para recibir los pagos, tendría que firmar un contrato acordando aceptar usos de tierra 
agroforestal. Sistemas agroforestales consisten en la plantación de árboles en combinación con el mantenimiento de tierra para 
producción de cosechas y ganado. Un ejemplo de una técnica agroforestal es café de sombra. Para calificar, tendría que plantar árboles 
nativos en su finca (si no  existen), pero podría usar la tierra para cultivar cosechas y ganado también. Este programa es diferente a los 
otros, en este programa  se le pagaría  por el número de árboles en vez de por hectárea. 
 
4a.  Si el pago fuera suficientemente alto, ¿consideraría registrar su tierra con el programa agroforestal? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí  
  No ¿Porque no?_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Si respondió “sí”, siga con la próxima pregunta; si “no” o “no es posible,” sáltese a #5:rango de escenarios) 
 
  4b. ¿Cuál es la cantidad 
del dinero por árbol por 
año que necesita recibir 
para participar? 
4c.Años del contrato: 
(5, 10, 15, 20, 30, otro) 





    
 
4f.  La organización que administraría el programa también ayudaría a los productores a registrar su tierra, repartiría pagos a los 
participantes,  y  haría el monitoreo del programa. ¿Con cuál tipos de organización(es) prefería trabajar? (Marque todos los que se 
aplican) 
  Gobierno central    Gobierno local    Organización de conservación no gubernamental  
  Empresa privada    No tengo preferencia 
 
4g.  Si participara en este programa agroforestal, ¿cambiaría el número de trabajadores en su finca que son familiares o comparten su 
vivienda? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
 
4h.  Si participara en este programa agroforestal, ¿cambiaría el número de trabajadores en su finca que contrata de afuera de  su 
vivienda o su familia? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
  Sí, trabajarían menos personas     Sí, trabajarían más personas     No cambio 
 
5.  Rango de Escenarios.  Ahora que ha considerado cada programa hipotético, queremos saber cuál tipo(s) de programa le interesa 
más ver desarrollado. 
 
5a.  En una escala de 1 a 3, donde 1=más preferido y 3=menos preferido, ¿cómo categoriza su preferencia para cada programa? 
(Escriba un numero para cada escenario abajo sin repetir números, o indique “no tengo preferencia”) 
 
Escenario A: Conservación del bosque existente  ____ 
Escenario B: Reforestación    ____ 
Escenario C: Sistema agroforestal   ____ 
O 
  No tengo preferencia 
 
5b.  Explique brevemente su respuesta_____________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5c.  ¿Que información adicional quisiera obtener para asistirle en su decisión sobre estos programas?___________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sección V: Datos Adicionales 
Estas últimas preguntas nos ayudan a llegar a algunas conclusiones generales sobre los productores de su comunidad. Como todas las 
preguntas de la encuesta, sus respuestas serán anónimas y nunca serán asociadas con  su hogar en los informes publicados de este estudio.  
 
1.  ¿Cuantos años tiene? ____ Años 
 
2.  ¿Cuál es su país de nacimiento? ______________________________________ 
 
3.  ¿Cuál es su país de nacionalidad? ______________________________________ 
 
4.  ¿Cuál es su etnicidad?  (Marque una o más categorías) 
  Latino      Negro   Asiático    Blanco  
 
  Guaimí (Ngöble/Buglé)          Otro,__________________________________________________           
   
5.   ¿Cuantos residentes hay en su hogar incluyendo a usted?  ____ ¿de estos cuantos son menores de 18 anos? ____ 
 
6.  ¿Cuantos de los residentes de hogar trabajan en su finca? ____ 
 
7.  ¿Cuantos de estos residentes de hogar ganan ingresos de trabajo afuera de su finca? _____ 
 
8.  Tiene su casa electricidad? (Marque una sola respuesta)   Sí  No 
 
9.  De donde viene su agua potable? (Marque todas que se aplican) 
  Sistema municipal de agua potable    Sistema rural de agua potable    Pozo o cisterna 
 
  Río    Otro, ¿donde? ________________________ 
 
10.  ¿Qué tipo de combustible usa para cocinar? (Marque todas que se aplican) 
  Gas    Electricidad    Carbón   Queroseno o diesel   Leña, ¿de dónde? ____________ 
 
11.  ¿Tiene su casa? (Marque una sola respuesta)   Baño  Letrina 
 
12.  ¿Cuál es el nivel de escolaridad más alto que ha completado? (Marque un solo numero con un circulo) 
1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° 8° 9° 10° 11° 12° Más alto 
 Más alto, ¿Qué nivel?_______________  No tengo educación formal 
 
13.  ¿Bajo qué  figura tiene su propiedad 
 Titulo de propiedad   Derecho posesorio   No sé 
 




14.  Aproximadamente, ¿cuál es su ingreso mensual del hogar? (Marque una sola respuesta) 
 Menos que $100  $100 a $199  $200 a $299  $300 a $399 
 $400 a $499  $500 a $599  $600 a $699  $700 - $799 
 $800 a $899  $900 a $999  $1,000 a $1,499  $1,500 - $1,999 
 $2,000 a $2,499  $2,500 - $2,999  $3,000 – 3,499  $3,500 o más 
 





¡Muchas gracias por su apoyo con nuestro proyecto!   
 
Notas de las entrevistas posteriores: 
1. Genero del entrevistado (Marque una sola respuesta)   Masculina  Femenina 
2. Nombre de entrevistador_______________________________________________________ 
